European Central Bank (ECB) and the responses to economic crises

Shannon Rabey, EU Study Tour 2019, student at the University of Victoria

Issue: European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision to keep inflation at zero limits the ability to respond to economic crises as non-standard monetary measures do not provide the same ability to stimulate the economy as traditional monetary measures and have long-term implications for the financial system in Europe.

Links with ECB, Bruegel, Bank of Canada, Brexit, Deutsche Bundesbank University

At the ECB visit, our presenter spoke of the necessity of using non-standard monetary measures due to the exhaustion of standard monetary policy (interest rates). The ECB must turn to other monetary policies such as quantitative easing to help stimulate the economy. I posed the question of whether these non-standard monetary policies would be sufficient if another economic crisis occurs and what the long-term implications of leaving interest rates so low are. The presenter seemed to have anticipated the question and spoke to the successes of low interest rates without addressing the key risks associated with periods of prolonged low interest rates or the ECB’s ability to respond to the next economic downturn if standard monetary policy remains unavailable.

Low interest rates constrain the ability of central banks (CB’s) to respond to economic downturns.  The ECB’s current stance is to turn to non-standard monetary policies to help stimulate the economy. These policies include an asset purchase programme (APP), purchasing of debt securities, targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) as a few examples of what was rolled out in a three-phase response to the 2007 financial crisis (ECB, 2019). While the presenter from the ECB did not elaborate on the risks or possible solutions to prolonged low interest rates, Professor Schollmeyer from the Deutsche Bundesbank University discussed other non-standard measures that are being examined, including the elimination of cash transactions to help circulate money through banks.  In addition, fiscal policies have been examined as a possible solution however there have been questions of their effectiveness in comparison to monetary policy due to the current infrastructure in place. This is speaks to the lack of fiscal policy coordination with the 19 euro-area member states who still remain in control of fiscal and macro-prudential policies (Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza, 2018). The lack of euro-area architectural framework for standardised fiscal policy, non-existent stabilization tools and differences in national macro-prudential frameworks limits the ECB’s effectiveness and requires reforms in order to adequately respond to shocks in the financial system (Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza, 2018). The exhaustion of standard monetary policy is especially concerning with the instability seen in current markets. Most prominently in Europe, the instability caused by Brexit as well as US-China trade relations. In a report released by Bruegel, Martin Wolf, the Chief Economics Commentator of the Financial Times, stated that these low interest rates leave little room to manage even a modest cycle or negative shock (Baltensperger, 2019).

The ECB is following in the footsteps of other central banks like the US Federal Bank and Japan. The Bank of Canada (BOC) has laid out concerns with leaving the interest rate so far below the net neutral interest rate that is estimated to range between 2.25 – 3.25% as of April 2019 (Carter, Chen and Dorich, 2019). The current view of many economists is that current economic trends point to the continuation of low interest rates that will lead to a buildup of vulnerabilities and financial stability risks. It should be noted that a scenario of low interest rates accompanied by low growth implies more significant financial stability risks than a scenario of gradually increasing interest rates. The ideal is to follow the Taylor Rule Principle where central banks should, for each percentage increase in inflation, raise the nominal interest rate by a percentage point as well. This presents an issue as many countries are expected to see periods or relatively low growth. Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza address the net neutral rate in Europe suggesting that if the neutral rate is around 0% in the euro-area and inflation remains around the target of 2% that the interest rates would need to be around 2% following the Taylor Rule principle in order to leave central banks the margin required to adequately respond to the next financial crisis (2019).

The authors of ‘A monetary policy framework for the European Central Bank to deal with uncertainty’ recommend significant reforms to strengthen the resilience of the ECB. These recommendations include a tolerance band around the inflation rate target of 2% and closer coordination with national macro-prudential authorities and greater harmonization of fiscal policies (Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza, 2018). These recommendations would allow greater ability to respond to economic downturns and decrease unfavourable outcomes like deflation. Japan is a country stuck in a ‘low interest rate trap’. They began lowering interest rates over 20 years ago and have now reached a period of deflation and act as a warning story for other central banks to examine their policies and adjust accordingly or face the inability to respond to shocks in the financial system. The ECB should follow the recommendations laid out by Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza to ensure the health of the euro-area economy.

 

Sources

Baltensperger, M. (2019). What 2019 could bring: A look inside the crystal ball. [Blog] Bruegel: European Macroeconomics and Governance. Available at: http://bruegel.org/2019/01/what-2019-could-bring-a-look-inside-the-crystal-ball/ [Accessed 29 May 2019].

Carter, T., Chen, X. and Dorich, J. (2019). The Neutral Rate in Canada: 2019 Update. [online] Bankofcanada.ca. Available at: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/04/staff-analytical-note-2019-11/ [Accessed 3 Jun. 2019].

Claeys, G., Demertzis, M. and Mazza, J. (2019). A monetary policy framework for the European Central Bank to deal with uncertainty. Monetary Dialogue 2019. [online] European Parliament Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/157082/Bruegel_FINAL%20publication.pdf [Accessed 1 Jun. 2019].

ECB. (2019). Monetary policy decisions. [online] Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/decisions/html/index.en.html [Accessed 2 Jun. 2019].

Image by moritz320 from Pixabay

Gaps in the System: Absence of Solidarity Principle on Migration

Noel Guscott, EU Study Tour 2019,  student at the Dalhousie University

Migration is a salient European issue. Certain countries such as Italy and Greece were the major landing zones for migrants fleeing the Middle East and North Africa. The consequences of this asymmetrical migrant flow have caused serious political and socio-cultural tensions. Notably, Gattinara (2017) argues that  the ‘refugee’ crisis exacerbated a crisis of legitimacy within the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS). This blog contribution focuses on part of the EU-level legitimacy crisis, arguing that the crisis has shown gaps in the EU’s ability to promote and enforce the principle of solidarity in migration policy.

Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) outlines a common liberal democratic value system where solidarity is noted but lacks a clear definition. According to a policy post by the European Observatory of Working Life (EurWORK), the solidarity principle can be defined as a “… principle based on sharing both the advantages, i.e. prosperity, and the burdens equally and justly among members”. Articles 79 to 81 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) set the legal direction to establish a ‘common’ immigration policy based on the vague principle of this burden-sharing solidarity (Šalamon, 2018, p. 689). Later, the Schengen and Dublin conventions introduced in the 1990s were supposed to outline workable frameworks to manage internal migration and refugee claimants among MS (Guiraudon, 2018).

Italy and Greece – due in part to the first-country mechanism found within the Dublin Regulation – had the national responsibility to process migrants reaching their shores (2017, p. 321). Internal political and socio-cultural opposition to migrant and refugee assistance made it clear that some MS would not respect the principle of solidarity and prevent comprehensive EU assistance, forcing other MS like Germany to step up their relocation and settlement efforts. Domestically, Italian and Greek right-wing parties have used this breach of trust to heighten anti-immigrant messaging for political gain (Gattinara, 2017, p. 325-326). The response of this fragmented European response was limited to rhetoric, and no institutional measures were successful in reversing these national positions (Gattinara, 2017, p. 322, 328).

The cracks are clear in the immigration policy, but at its root is violations of the solidarity principle. Without a clear institutional framework to promote and enforce solidarity, MS have the ability to pick and choose when and how they help on issues with a collective European impact. This, certainly, threatens the legitimacy of the European project in the days to come.

 

References

European Union (2011, May 4). Solidarity Principle. European Observatory of Working Life. Retrieved May 29, 2019 from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/solidarity-principle.

European Union (2016). Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union – TITLE I – COMMON PROVISIONS – Article 2. Retrieved May 30, 2019 from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016M002&from=EN.

European Union (2012). Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C326, p. 77-78. Retrieved May 29, 2019 from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.

Gattinara, P. C. (2017). The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy, Contemporary Italian Politics         , 9(3), p. 318-331.

Guiraudon, V. (2018). The 2015 refugee crisis was not a turning point: explaining plocy inertia in EU border control. European Political Science, 17(1), p. 151-160.

Šalamon, N. K. (2017). The principle of solidarity in asylum and migration within the context of the European Union accession process. Masstricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(5), p. 689.

Image by Jim Black from Pixabay

 

Analytical Reflection of European Integration

By  Malcolm Thomson, EU Study Tour 2019,  BA student at the Political Science Department, University of Victoria

On May 23rd, the European Central Bank (ECB) presented a talk on its increased supervisory role in the Banking Union to a group of students from Canada during the EU Study Tour. 2019  It allowed  me to gain a nuanced understanding of the dynamics that occur in this relatively new area of EU governance. However, while the presentation allowed me to gain a first-hand account of how employees of the ECB view the actions of their institution in a post-Eurozone crisis context, it also left me with some areas of question regarding the overall action of the ECB in the Banking Union. In preparation for this presentation, I returned to previous research that I had conducted on member state non-compliance with Banking Union policies in order to contextualise the position of the ECB in the broader arena of the Banking Union.

I was especially interested in understanding the ECB’s position on whether member state non-compliance with resolution policies could negatively affect the completion of the Banking Union. These questions stemmed from research conducted by Donnelly (2018), who analysed why cases of Italian and Portuguese non-compliance in the Banking Union occurred. According to Donnelly (2018), it was a mixture of institutional “leeway provided for national authorities” and “accommodation from the Commission and Single Resolution Board (SRB)” that allowed for member states to act against the policies set out in the Banking Union if such policies did not fit the member state’s national interest (p.159). Further, it was this lack of institutional and political rigidity that allowed “liberal economic nationalism” the exist within the Banking Union, which significantly decreased the effectiveness of the Banking Union at further breaking the link between private banks and sovereign debt (Donnelly, 2018, p.159-160). Although the political role of the Commission was not directly addressed in the presentation, the presenter’s answers to the question asked regarding member state non-compliance allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of how the ECB sees its role in the Banking Union.

The answer provided by the ECB was focused on showcasing the completed areas of the Banking Union and highlighting that the SRB was a powerful and reliable institution in resolving banks according to EU rules. While this answer showed that the ECB was more focused on its role in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SRM) than the SRB, it was limited in explaining how politics and national preferences by member states can work their way into decisions made in the Banking Union. Though it is understandable that the ECB would not give a political answer to the question, it is interesting to take that apolitical stance and place it in the context of the larger Banking Union. This is because, as Donnelly (2018) showed in his article, the political actions of the Commission and the SRB have had a significant effect in bending guidelines to non-compliant member states, which in turn limits Banking Union’s effectiveness. For the ECB to see itself as an actor completely removed from these political areas of Banking Union highlights disunity in how EU bodies see their relationship with member states in banking policy following the Eurozone crisis. Although, this disunity also creates interesting questions regarding how much national political context should be given to Banking Union resolutions, and how much the EU should take into account member states that will work to be non-compliant given their national government’s views towards European integration. The answers to these questions could be beneficial to understanding the relationship between the EU and its member states in the area of banking policy post-Eurozone crisis.

References

Donnelly, S. (2018). Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 21(2), 159-173. doi: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1400433