Media in Turkey: a testing ground of censorship and control

By Fazila Mat (PhD candidate, University of Victoria) and Sofia Verza (PhD candidate, University of Perugia)

Four years after the attempted coup of 15-16 July 2016, the space for media pluralism in Turkey continues to shrink. Numerous pro-government media, owned by companies which have investments in several other sectors, dominate the scene. The presidential system introduced in July 2018, during the state of emergency declared immediately after the attempted coup, legally tied any public institution to the presidency, including the body that issues the cards proving journalists’ membership of their professional association.

The criminalisation of journalism is widespread and the country is currently the largest prison for journalists in the world, with over 80 media workers in detention.   The Covid-19 pandemic seems to have provided yet another opportunity to criminalise thought. A recent Amnesty International report explains that criticisms of the authorities’ management of the health emergency led to charges attracting prison sentences of between two and four years. In addition, a recent package of reforms, introduced to reduce the risk of Covid-19 infection in Turkish prisons, set free 90,000 people excluding journalists, activists, and others charged with political crimes.

Online media outlets – TV channels on YouTube, news websites and podcasts – have proliferated in a bid to evade state control and offer an alternative narrative. However, the Internet has also become a target for censorship, often through the takedown of content and the blocking of web pages – as it the case of Wikipedia, which was inaccessible in Turkey for almost three years – or through new laws and licencing rules. The trajectory of state intervention online appears to have gone through all three “generations of control” of the Internet identified by Deibert and others in Access Controlled (2020) – from imposing a complete block to indirect interference in the production of content.

While the country stands out for the frequency with which it requests user data from Facebook, in the last few years the authorities set up a “Social Media Monitoring Unit” and an app that allows citizens to report posts they consider terrorist propaganda. Finally, on 29 July, the Turkish parliament approved a law that obliges social media companies to have legal representatives in Turkey and to store users’ data in the country. Those who refuse to comply could see their bandwidth slashed, and be subject to monetary penalties. The courts will also be able to order the removal of online content, not just block access to it.

The full article has been published by the European Journalism Observatory (EJO) in collaboration with Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT).

 

 

 

How COVID-19 is eroding civil liberties and damaging society 

By Javier Dichupa, student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria

Civil liberties are essential in the proper functioning of any democracy. The unprecedented scale of the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities in our democracies. The situation in Spain and Italy during the peak of their pandemics highlighted the ease in which governments were able to suspend the civil liberties of their people. Questions should be raised regarding what happens when civil liberties are suspended for extended periods and democratic legitimacy.

The suspension of civil liberties in Spain and Italy was justified by the public health crisis occurring. The strict lockdown in these countries undoubtedly saved many lives and slowed the spread of the virus. Furthermore, it bought time for the beleaguered health care systems in their fight against the virus.

Unfortunately, how the governments of Spain and Italy went about enforcing their lockdowns was very problematic. In Spain, crippling fines were threatened and levied against those who broke the new restrictions. As the pandemic progressed, the armed forces were also used to aid the government in enforcing the lockdown. This approach relied heavily on coercion to achieve its objective, and coercion can only ever be used as a short-term solution.

As with Spain, Italy’s approach to enforcing its lockdown was similar. Police and military personnel were heavily relied on to keep people at home. Fines were also used as a tactic to implement the lockdown. Italy was one of the first European countries to face a large-scale outbreak. therefore, it has had to endure one of the longest lockdowns in the Union.

Coercion was a common factor in the Italian and Spanish lockdowns. As such, the use of fear and intimidation to achieve the objectives of the government is dangerous. Coercive force degrades the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of the people. When civil liberties are suspended, people’s right to express themselves is also curbed. Making it difficult for governments to gain insight from their people.

Another unintended consequence of the heavy-handed lockdowns was the effect they had on the poorer members of society. The use of security forces to keep people indoors was especially problematic for those who did not have the option to work from home or were ineligible for benefits. This further stigmatized many groups as they were subsequently forced to use means outside the law to survive. These issues were seen in the less prosperous south of Italy and among the temporary worker communities in Spain.

The decline in civil liberties has far-reaching effects that touch on all parts of society. These reductions make it difficult for people to express themselves, eroding the relationship between the authorities and people. Once civil liberties are reduced or removed, it is very difficult to restore them. As such, the president set regarding the suspension of civil liberties during the COVID-19 pandemic is problematic.

We live in unprecedented times, and the spread of COVID-19 must be stopped if life is to return to normal. We must remain critical of the actions being taken to deal with the virus. Governments need to walk a fine line balancing civil liberties and public health. Though, if they continue to do so while curbing the civil liberties of their people, it could create long term issues for the health of their democracies.

Citations:

Studdert, David M., & Hall, Mark A. “Disease Control, Civil Liberties, and Mass Testing – Calibrating Restrictions during the Covid-19 Pandemic.” The New England Journal of Medicine 1, no. 1 (2020): 1-3. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp2007637

“Photos and videos reveal brewing unrest in southern Italy as lockdown make people desperate for cash and food.” BuinsessInsider, 25 May. 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/italians-desperate-for-cash-food-amid-coronavirus-lockdown-2020-4.

“650,000 fined for breaking Spain’s Coronavirus lockdown.” The Olive Press, 25 May. 2020, https://www.theolivepress.es/spain-news/2020/04/13/650000-fined-for-breaking-spains-coronavirus-lockdown/.

Pic: Civil Rights 50th Anniversary March / Photo credit Sinn Féin

Can COVID-19 Be Taken as An Opportunity to Improve our policies?

By Ethan Quilty, student in Computer Science and Marine Biology at the University of Victoria

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19

The onset of the COVID19 pandemic has been swift. In just a few months, the world is a completely different place than the one we knew in 2019. We now face a long period of uncertainty. When will we travel again? When can we go to school again? But, most importantly, when will we stop this virus? Amidst all the uncertainty and ambiguity of this period, it is important to use the old cliché and look at the positives. As a self-proclaimed optimist, I believe there are many.

Being confined to your home is not an ideal situation; Furthermore, being unable to meet friends and family in person is equally upsetting. The loss of physical contact and activity is extremely difficult, and many see the confinement as an empty time to be filled with media consumption and make-work projects. I argue that it is an opportunity to learn from the mistakes that led to this situation and prevent such a tragedy from reoccurring, or at the very least, to be prepared for the next one. In addition to instigating a catastrophic global tragedy, the pandemic has exposed some areas of particular political importance. Namely, the environmental crisis has seen some positive impacts from this virus. Reduced vehicular traffic, scarce air travel and fossil fuel operations have all contributed to vastly reduced emissions levels in some of the hardest-hit countries, namely China and Western Europe. Here in British Columbia, reduced marine traffic has seen Salish Orcas and some juvenile whales travelling further into the port of Vancouver than they have been seen in hundreds of years. These are only some of the many examples that can be found of positive environmental impacts that are the result of this pandemic.

HOW WE CAN IMPROVE

The implementation of policies reducing vehicle usage and fossil fuel consumption could help us get on track to improving the environment. These types of actions will require policies that take a new approach; putting the environment first. Should policies be implemented that do not favor large companies and infinite economic growth, we could see a rise in environmental stewardship and improvement work. Studies have shown that climate instability has caused a great increase in zoonotic diseases like SARS CoV2. This really is only the beginning. Perhaps one more great thing to come from this pandemic is how it has shown the ability of nations to work together and get things done. Opposing political parties are more unified in pushing forward aid programs and directives than ever before – so why couldn’t this be applied to the environmental crisis? If a unified and directed approach can be taken on this, many of the problems we face could be lessened or eliminated altogether.  Though COVID19 can be labelled as a public health crisis, its roots are far deeper than that. It has shown that if we cannot improve our practices, such as seriously fighting climate change or limiting our insatiable economic consumption,then humanity will certainly encounter more pandemics.

Citations:

Zambrano-Monserrate, M. A., Ruano, M. A., & Sanchez-Alcalde, L. (2020, April 20). Indirect effects of COVID-19 on the environment. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969720323305

 

 

What the European Responses to COVID-19 Say About Integration

By Alina Sobolik, student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria

Critical observers have noted the lack of solidarity present in EU Member State actions following the outbreak of COVID-19 in Europe. When Italy called for help it was met with silence from its fellow Member States, eventually receiving supplies from China. The situation has been analysed as evidence of a disjointed union, lacking the solidarity it claims to be built on and heading toward political turmoil.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR INTEGRATION? 

However, this situation points to the advanced stage of integration that the EU has achieved. Member States are behaving as entities within a federal state rather than individual states in a crisis. Within a federal structure, the federal government is trusted to ensure equality among states and react effectively to crises. It is the federal government that is responsible for implementing a coordinated response, enforcing solidarity and ensuring the well-being of each province. The role of the provinces in this situation is to defend their own interests and ensure that their needs are being heard and addressed at the federal level. Importantly, the provinces do not feel responsible for the well-being of other provinces.

While the Member States responded selfishly to the COVID-19 crisis, the European Commission responded by stating that “we are all Italians” and implemented a comprehensive plan to protect the economy and the citizens.

LOOKING BACK

When the refugee crisis hit Europe in 2015, a number of Member States acted in solidarity but were not rewarded by the Commission as it attempted not to over-step its jurisdiction or infringe on Member State sovereignty. The result was a weak and disjointed response which was not implemented equally. Learning from this experience, the Commission took up a stronger leadership role in the COVID-19 response. Creating a system wherein Member States do not have to be held responsible for the well-being of other Member States because they have already provided the institutions with the jurisdiction and funding required to respond effectively.

LOOKING FORWARD

Furthermore, the Commission’s comprehensive response plan expands the competencies of the institutions to areas previously untouched and suggests the possibility of a fiscal union in the future. The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived reaches European citizens directly in a way that EU initiatives in the past have not by providing vouchers and home deliveries directly to citizens. The Temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) provides funding to extend national job creation programs, taking a direct role in providing employment insurance to European citizens. While the European Central Bank already produces country-specific recommendations for taxing and spending, the COVID-19 response reaches out directly to citizens.

Citations:

Braw, E. (2020, March 18). Europe’s Coronavirus Response: Selfish Member States and Active Institutions. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from https://rusi.org/commentary/europe-coronavirus-response-selfish-member-states-and-active-institutions

ANSA, R. (2020, March 11). We’re all Italians – von der Leyen – English. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from https://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2020/03/11/were-all-italians-von-der-leyen_d1d4067c-c9ed-4b8c-96c9-2dd0f4fcfd5a.html

Overview of the Commission’s response. (2020, May 25). Retrieved May 28, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/overview-commissions-response_en

 

On Populism and Democracy

By David Matijasevich, Simon Fraser University / Capilano University

Ever since populism became a grave matter of concern in the Western world with the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote, and the electoral success of a number of European populist parties, there have been two primary responses to the current trend. The first – that populism poses a threat to the survival of Western liberal democracies; the second – that populism is a much-needed corrective to the shortcomings of these liberal democracies. While more nuanced analyses have acknowledged the merits of both lines of appraisal, most commentators have tended to lean one way or the other, sparking the debate that rages on today. As one minor contribution to this debate, I aim to call into question the framing of the debate itself. In doing so, I would like to put forward two questions that challenge some of our basic assumptions about the complicated relationship of populism and democracy.

  • How are we able to designate one phenomenon (in this case, populism) as the single threat of importance, when several other threats have been responsible for the appearance of this phenomenon in the first place?
  • When we utter the word corrective, are we speaking of a corrective in principle or in practice?

To answer the first question, it may be appropriate to begin with an analogy. If a person dies from radiation pneumonitis as a result of chemotherapy, we do not ultimately blame the death on the radiation pneumonitis or the chemotherapy. Although medical professionals will log this final cause in the records, we know that when someone asks, “what happened to dear Jane?” the response will be, “Jane had cancer.” The common sense of the situation overpowers the finer details. We do not miss the forest for the trees.

When it comes to the relationship between populism and democracy, the common sense of the situation is that our Western liberal democracies have been a threat to themselves for a long time. In the last few decades, growing socio-economic inequality and class stratification, increasingly divided societies (both ideologically and demographically), and an aloof political elite that has failed to respond to these challenges with the big ideas and actions that they require have forced citizens to search for quasi-democratic alternatives, including populist leaders and parties. And why would they not? To begin with, democracy is not supposed to be compatible with the concepts of elites and masses. The political equality that democracy, as a principle, rests upon is to enable us to have a high degree of control over our individual and collective lives. This is why entrusting elites (whether elected or unelected) with this control is such a profoundly important political exercise. It is, indeed, a grand but also risky bargain. Rousseau warned us over two hundred years ago that the English are only free at election time. In exchange for this control (some would say our political equality itself), we expect that this elite – dedicated to the task of solving society’s most pressing problems – will, in fact, be able to do so.

The problem, as stated above, is that they have not been able to do so, at least not to the satisfaction of those to whom they are accountable. As a result, in our present day, not only is there no real political equality, there is thought to be no political quality either. Hence, the revolt of the masses, channelled through savvy political entrepreneurs who have been able to capitalize on anti-elite sentiments.

How familiar all of this sounds. For certain, it ought to sound familiar. After all, populism constitutes much of the political story of 20th and 21st century Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia and, in turn, the theories that comparative politics have generated from these experiences. It is remarkable, thus, how little these historical (and some recent) experiences of what we call the Global South have featured in discussions of populism and its impact on democracy in the Western world. It is even more remarkable when one considers that many of the current conditions are similar. The absence of stable liberal democracy in much of the Global South has often been attributed to a small middle class and/or a powerless working class. In North America and Europe, the middle class is shrinking and the power of the working class has declined. The absence of stable liberal democracy in many countries of the Global South has also often been attributed to the lack of fair and effective institutions for managing diverse (“divided”) societies. Many European governments gave up on attempts at “two-way street” integration in the early 2000s.

Given the increasing similarities, one must ask if the Global North-Global South distinction that we impose on the world and our discipline holds us back from learning meaningful lessons. One must also ask if some scholars of the Western world have simply been too smug to acknowledge that valuable lessons could be learned from these experiences.

With that said, which particular lessons could be learned? First, that democratic shortcomings are just as responsible for the rise of populism as the rise of populism is responsible for democratic shortcomings.  Second, and to answer another question posed at the beginning of this essay, populism should not be embraced as a democratic “corrective”. Why is this so?

Of course, there is much truth in the idea that, as a “return of the people” against an unresponsive, incompetent and sometimes corrupt elite, populism embodies the democratic spirit. Indeed, due to its initial horizontal and unmediated nature, it is arguable that it does so much more purely than with the vertical election of public officials or the vertical consultation between interest groups and government. As Ernesto Laclau states in On Populist Reason,  “democracy is grounded only on the existence of a democratic  subject, whose emergence depends on the horizontal articulation  between equivalential demands…So the very possibility of  democracy depends on the constitution of a democratic ‘people’.”   (Laclau, 2005)

Yet, while this might serve as a corrective in principle, it has not served as a corrective in practice. As the experience of the Global South has demonstrated, the political equality so central to the origins of populist movements – perhaps best understood as their “social movement” stage – generally gives way to reliance upon a new political elite, either an entrepreneurial individual or an alternative bureaucracy. In this sense, democratic deficits are not corrected.

Furthermore, populist leaders of the Global South have often shifted the foundations of their legitimacy from a legal-rational to charismatic basis. By appealing to a narrow support base of devotees posing as “the people” rather than the people as a whole, the populist leader is able to claim popular legitimacy above and beyond the law as well as to selectively reward those who support them. In this way, political equality and universalism – principles so central to the democratic ideal – are not corrected, but torn asunder.

Finally, the populist experiences of the Global South point to the fact that its politics is often framed in terms of destroying one’s enemies as opposed to vigorously competing with one’s adversaries. To use the language of Chantal Mouffe (against her own advocacy of populism), populist leaders and supporters have lacked agonistic respect – the tolerance for opponents necessary to maintain democratic input in a pluralist society (Mouffe, 2013).

To conclude, with Western liberal democracies failing to satisfy many of their citizens and populism not meeting the high standards of the democratic ideal, it is imperative that those who are committed to democracy devise a new alternative. While the form and style should be left to the imagination of its creators, it is necessary that this new movement, in its quest to find solutions to old problems (class inequality and divided societies), be committed in principle and in practice to tolerance, universalism, and true political equality through the popular control of collective life.

On the Uses of Populism and Illiberal Democracy: Fences, Border Hunters, and Identity

By Kristen Csenkey,  PhD Candidate,  Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo

Photo credit: http://www.police.hu

Populism can mean many things. It is ambiguous at times because it is used by all sides of the political spectrum and in diverse contexts. At its core, populism embodies an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality and embodies some aspect of protectionism. For example, when the state identifies a crisis that seeks to threaten the current order and established identities, populism is often employed to garner a specific political response.

The idea of a ‘crisis’ is an important part of this discourse as an existential threat or performance that paints society as constantly under siege.  Populists lay claim to protecting the people from the corruptions and harm that the crisis will most certainly bring with it.

The post –2015 Hungarian border security policies highlight re-reimagining of nationalism within a populist framework. This is especially interesting because it is nested with an illiberal democratic (https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp) framework. Populism is not inherently undemocratic, but it uses nationalism to create and protect a community against an imminent ‘threat’ or ‘crisis’. Populism is a part of democracies and seeks to solve the inherent ‘dilemmas’ within, including defining power and the limits of boundaries.

Within the context of power and boundaries, border security policies in Hungary are crafted as a way to protect the core nation of people. This is evident in the construction of the Southern border fence, or déli határzár, and the creation of the border hunters. When seen through a populist lens, these policies are a way to unite and create solidarity and as a means to defend the identity of the nation.

photo credit: Viktor Orbán’s Facebook  album

Fences

The határzár, crafted within the context of Hungarian nationalism, is a physical and symbolic representation of the state. Paired with the border hunters, the combination serves to promote a populist construction of protectionism.

The fence at Röszke in Hungary is an ultra high tech, fence built along the Hungarian-Serbian border. It is mainly patrolled by the Hungarian border guard, known as határvadászok/‘border hunters’.

photo credit: Viktor Orbán’s Facebook album

Border Hunters

The creation of a Hungarian border guard feeds in to the state’s use of nationalism. It serves as a tangible response to the migration crisis that involves Hungarian citizens in the processes of defending the core nation from perceived outside threats. Moreover, it serves as a way to create and promote an illiberal post-2015 Hungarian identity that sees the nation as threatened by immigrants and promotes the duty to defend a common culture. This is seen as an investment into not only the security of the Hungarian borders, but of the nation.

The Ideal Citizen: Protecting ‘Us’ from ‘Them’

The role of the border hunters is an important part of the populist discourse in Hungary because they do not simply to patrol the határzár and catch illegal crossers, but to perform the protection of the nation.

Using Orbán’s 2017 speech at the swearing-in ceremony of the border guard as a basis to discuss nationalism, we can see the importance of the határvadászok in promoting the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality. As an apparatus of the state, the határvadászok represent the ideal Hungarian citizen who shares the same values of the state, recognizes the fragility of the Hungarian culture, gain meaning from an identity of solidarity, and perpetuates the crisis.

Populism within (an Illiberal) Democracy

Within an illiberal democracy, there must be borders – borders that protect the integrity of the nation and give meaning to individuals. The image of the border hunters patrolling the határzár is a tangible answer to a crisis. Citizens can share in the protection of the nation, gain individual meaning as a member of the core nation, and recognize the state as a protector. Border hunters perform the crisis at the border.

In the Hungarian context, the main goal of the state’s use of illiberal democratic policies is to maintain power and create a shared reality of the Hungarian nation for its citizens to ascribe to. This reality benefits the state by legitimizing their power and forming a monopoly over values systems. This is because the state has limited and quickly diminishing power over the nation. In our modern era this means that their legitimacy must be acted in the creation and constant protection through, in this case, nationalism.

Populist states protect the citizens of the nation against foreign threats or by internal actors that may threaten their moral understandings of life. They also give identity in a modern world constantly engulfed by the void of meaninglessness and make some of their citizens feel the need to fight against the perceived diminishing sovereignty of their nation. If this exclusive meaning-making within an illiberal democracy is not truly democratic or representative of the entire nation, then what it is?

Is Populism Democratic?

It’s complicated. According to Kaltwasser (2014), populism is a part of democracies and seeks to interrogate the dilemmas therein. These dilemmas call into question the limits of self-government and boundary issues, or simply, ‘controlling the controllers’ and defining the community (Kaltwasser 2014; 472). As such, populism raises legitimate questions about democracy and is not necessarily a threat or a corrective force.

This relationship between populism and democracy is clear in the Hungarian context: populism provides the solution to the boundary issue by defining a political community based on the dilemmas of democracy. It also creates roles of members of the community via nationalism to control the boundaries through enforcement. Border security policies in Hungary, including the határvadászok, allow members of the community to perform their identities while reinforcing the illiberal democracy of the state.

The role of populist and nationalist discourses at play within Prime Minister Orban’s framework of illiberal democracy demonstrates this and can help us understand the fluctuating power of the state, the formation of political communities and identities, and the violence that comes with it.

Thus, populism is neither a threat nor a corrective mechanism to democracy, but a part of the system that enables actors to personify the inherent dilemmas within the system. The déli határzár and the határvadászok are a part of this performance.

 

 

COVID -19 and the rise of populist movements

By Flamur Gruda, student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria

Although it may be too early to tell, the rise of populist movements might continue to occur during these very trying times. Due to theCOVID-19 pandemic, populist parties might try and gain more influence in citizens after the situation becomes a bit more stable. They may be able to do this because of the financial constraints that the virus is causing on local and also global economic markets. It can already be observed that industries such as the banks and airlines will need bailouts due to massive losses. Even though the major airlines actually had plenty of capital last year, they had used it in order to do stock buy backs. This means that they used the profits that had been gained in order to buy back public shares so as to divert from giving out dividends to the current shareholders. This is problematic especially during a crisis like the one we are all currently in because now they are on the verge of going bankrupt. Since these corporations are so large and employ thousands of individuals, they have already started asking national governments for money or bail out packages and the governments might be inclined to do it. This I believe will be a step in the wrong direction since there is now millions of citizens that have also lost their jobs and have no source of income. If national governments decide to instead bail out the large airlines and banks, this will trigger a lot of anger and disappointment to local citizens because they need the money more. It can also be argued that the airlines and banks would have been able to maintain their fiscal responsibilities if it were not for their greedy decisions to buy back their shares. I believe that once the dust settles, the populist parties will rise in a lot of different countries, especially in Europe and North America because the citizens will feel even more disenfranchised. On top of already being isolated and filled with fear from COVID-19, citizens will have built up anger towards their respective governments because of the bail out packages. This will be a great scapegoat for the further rise of populist parties, and they can argue that the current governing regimes have let down the people. Instead of caring for the ordinary citizen, they again chose to follow the traditional capitalist model and bail out the large corporations in the hope that trickle-down economics would work, and money would eventually go to the hands of ordinary citizens. If it were not for COVID-19, I think citizens would have accepted that stark reality and would not have questioned it. However, these are truly difficult times for most people in the world and I believe the level of patience and tolerance will be running very thin, and because of this, the rise of populist parties will occur and whole governments will collapse. Populist parties will gain power and continue to instill fear onto the populace. Borders now are being closed in most countries and I think that will continue to occur even further and there is a real risk of the Schengen to collapse for a very long period of time, maybe even for good. The traditional values that the populist parties preach will be highlighted even further and the idea of globalized society and diverse cultures will become even harder to grasp. Although this pandemic should unite humanity and makes us realize that we are very similar as citizens of the world, I am afraid that populist parties will use this to do the exact opposite.

A return to the people? The case against populist politics

By Laurence Claussen, MA Political Science, University of British Columbia

Populism must be considered a long-term threat to democracy. I say ‘long-term’ because it is plausible that many intransigent problems democratic systems face might be temporarily addressed through a populist show of force. The rise of sub-national separatism in Europe, declining turnout numbers in industrialized democracies, foreign interference in elections, backlashes against the global flow of migrants, and a quickly diverging wealth gap all call for some kind of answer. Rallying the people and clarifying a nation’s goals might not entirely resolve these issues, but it would indicate action and forward-progress.

But, inevitably, populist change is unstable. It creates space for future discord and weakens the institutional architecture upon which democracy, regardless of context, inherently depends.

Our systems of government and society need improvement; this improvement demands reflection and at times brutal honesty. Thomas Jefferson summarized this idea best, arguing that “institutions must advance […] and keep pace with the times.” To not do so represented political naivety: “we might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy” (Jefferson to H. Tompkinson (AKA Samuel Kercheval), July 12, 1816).

The degree to which necessary progress has be made is up for debate. But given the widespread perception – made clear by most political commentators and myriad of 2019 protest movements – that traditional politics have fallen short it seems reasonable that popular pressure must be channeled in order to secure new and vital sources of political capital. Alarm bells triggered because of new reports by the EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) and Freedom House entrench such sentiments. As the latter bluntly put it in their Freedom in the World 2019 Report, the “surge of progress has now begun to roll back” (Freedom House, 2019).

No issue captures this situation better than Climate Change, and the Swedish teenager turned Times Person of the Year leading the call to action. Greta Thunberg has led a kind of righteous politics fueled by an upswell of passionate young people. Her name has become synonymous with Climate Change activism in the popular lexicon. Many frustrated observers laud these efforts, believing that such a movement is needed if we are ever to correct the flaws of a stagnant, broken system.

Since this movement is premised on a popular figure and has so far operated on grassroots support and protest, many might label it populist. After doing so, some might conflate its methods and rhetoric with a general political toolbox needed to tackle other problems.

But I do not see Greta and the forces she represents as true populism. In facing climate change, income inequality, police brutality and economic mismanagement, politicians and activists are right to criticize and agitate. Urging accountability upon the powerful and expressing frustration through protest is responsible democracy.

Labeling any kind of socio-political movement dependent on mass-involvement as populism – a common reality these days – is unhelpful and dangerous because it obscures through normalization a threatening political phenomenon.

True populism can be distinguished and identified in two significant ways: the dangerous simplification of national problems and the reliance on categorization to establish political capital. There has never been a populist movement that did not divide society into the righteous and the corrupt and recast delicate dilemmas as quests to vanquish the corrupt. The politics that follow never ‘correct’ the system in place but rather seek narrowly defined reprieves for those newly in charge. Populists do not deal in systemic change, although they speak often of it. Instead they orient themselves entirely against the concerns of the present and those groups believed complicit in them. To agitate and uproot requires the closure of dialogue, and the recasting of tribe.

We see these patterns in the current line-up of populist politicians: Bolsonaro, Duterte, Salvini, Farage, Modi and Trump. All of them adhere to the same political handbook, and all represent the end-product of political ecosystems that nurtured and legitimized populism. Populism is a threat to democracy because those who have been elected or held power through populist means have weakened democracy wherever they rise.

When we bemoan the decline or death of democracy, it is not that citizens no longer express themselves at the ballot box, or that a series of military coups have secured power all over the world. It is the newfound manifestation of a political rhetoric and approach to problem solving that corrupts mature consensus-building. It is the determination not to play the political game, to side-step institutions and discredit the inherent legitimacy of any contrary opinions that unites the populists in power. Observers of democracy have noted this phenomenon repeatedly. In the same report that spoke of the roll back of progress, The Freedom House exclaimed: “Most troublingly, even long-standing democracies have been shaken by populist political forces that reject basic principles like the separation of powers and target minorities for discriminatory treatment.”

But why now? This argument, after all, must be placed in a specific political moment, not left to abstraction or theory. Populism has existed on or below the surface of society and will continue to do so. But what makes it a relevant and dangerous contemporary force is that it taps into and takes advantage of the defining political problems of our age. This is the encroachment of dualistic identity politics. Almost every political question has succumbed to a polarization of opinion. The space for agreement has shrunk, and the terms in which we address those who disagree with us have intensified. This is a parallel development to populism’s resurgence, but the two go hand in hand. The reality of dualistic politics has created fertile soil for populist politics to flourish.

Social media has been the fertilizer to this flourishing. Opinions are shared and multiplied with great frequency; and the algorithms of the platforms through which this marketplace exists puts us in boxes with those who share similar views. Agitated by the need to prove fidelity to the cause, all manner of opinions become intensified. This has made disagreement more contentious and intractable. Truth and empiricism, foundations of past decades, have become fluid concepts. David Greenberg, writing about the Bush administration’s ‘post-truth’ mentality, labeled the development “epistemological relativism;” I think this is a fitting description.

Populism by necessity is an exercise of identity politics; clashing and conflicting identities founded on sets of ideas. To pursue populist change is to devolve democracy into a contest of identities. In the modern age of social media and hyperpolarization, this is a contest from which states could not easily emerge.

This is no fringe development; it spreads widely in a receptive body politic. It should therefore be considered an exacerbation of an already widespread malice. The divisiveness that existed in the United States before Trump, that already had the nation folding in on itself, is focused and sharpened with a populist at the helm. Because of this, no current democracy can rely on populism to correct its worst impulses, because the originating energy for both is one and the same. It is an indication of the dire straits we find ourselves in, that populism is considered by some our saving grace.

Our current models and systems emerged since the end of WWII through careful work, historical patience, and unglamorous effort. Democracy reached its zenith in the last eighty years without a single populist leader or party leading the way. The gains of our day were not secured in any other manner, and the countries most associated with successful democracy today all achieved their status through compact and compromise.

Steven Pinker, whose work embodies the ideas expressed here, reminds us that humanity’s moral development “is a consequence of the interchangeability of perspectives and the opportunity the world provides for positive-sum games” (Pinker, Better Angels of Our Nature, 182).

Unless change for the sake of change – because we cannot bear the alternative any longer – is the only metric, maximalist politics cannot go well. Analyzing Bernie’s brand of Democratic politics, Paul Krugman recently observed that “Obama raised taxes on the wealthy more than most people realize – by 2016 the average federal tax rate on the 1 percent was almost as high as it was pre-Reagan – but he did so quietly, without much populist rhetoric.” And “everything we know suggests that a progressive who insists on going for broke will end up, well, broke” (Krugman, ‘Bernie Sanders is Going for Broke’, NYT Online March 5).

I suspect a reliance on populism for the day’s problems carries within it the seeds of its eventual unraveling. Implicit in a dependence on populism is the notion that government legitimacy is questionable and mistrust universal. Populists leave themselves vulnerable to politicians and counter-movements that utilize similar tactics; once outsiders become insiders, they lose the singular appeal they once had. More importantly, those gripped by one populist wave can just as easily fall back again to the spot they first found themselves. That is because the act of moving as a populist follower is a momentary exertion of angst and an expression of hope; briefly, the world is made plain and possibilities seem endless. But it cannot last. The well-known early worker-activist Eugene Debs iterated this truth when he spoke against messianic, idealistic leaders meant to save the workers of the world. To Debs, change had to be seized by those who most needed it, and it needed to grow from the determination within, not the rhetoric without. He captured this sentiment eloquently: “I would not lead you out if I could; for if you would be led out, you could be led back again” (Ray, The bending cross; a biography of Eugene Victor Debs, 244).

My argument is not that populism plays no role in the historical progress of government and society, nor that certain problems of the day might not be best addressed with populist elements. Instead, I believe that the growing politics of populism are not suited for the present political and historical moment. A reliance on populism will eat away at the foundations of democracy by inviting and legitimizing new categories of disagreements and harmful ideological methods.

Populism can only tear down, it cannot craft. We cannot tailor society’s new coat and build new institutions with expressions of fury, opaque goals, and hierarchies of the virtuous.

The democratic limits of “ant-populism”

By  Thibault BiscahiePhD Candidate at York University

Since the 2008 global financial collapse and the subsequent deep sovereign debt crises and austerity measures experienced in various EU countries, the term “populism” has been widely used to account for the rise of anti-establishment movements across the continent. It has also been widely contested. Indeed, the “populist” epithet tends to amalgamate a myriad of different political tendencies, from the radical-right to the radical-left. This has led some to argue that the term has come to encompass too many political persuasions to remain analytically meaningful. An intense concept-stretching would thus be at play, especially when the term leaves academic circles to be mobilized by pundits, editorialists and (mostly centrist) politicians. In consequence, this essay argues that there is a clear distinction to be made between the academic understanding of populism – which is not consensual but relies on a prolific and diverse literature – and the far more deficient journalistic and political conceptions of populism, that do not designate a meaningful political category but fall rather within the realm of value judgment.

My essay posits that “populism” does not constitute a threat or a corrective to democracy in and of itself. Instead, whether populist forces threaten or renew democracy eventually depends on the specific socio-cultural context in which they emerge and develop. As the first section of this essay demonstrates, populism can be seen as an ideology, as a discourse, or as a strategy, and this has implications for assessing its effects on the political system. Secondly, against widespread anguish regarding the “populist surge”, this essay analyzes the democratic consequences of “anti-populism” as a political discourse, strategy, and ideology in Western European countries, and in particular in France. Referring to one’s adversary as a “populist” is always pejorative and aims to discredit, neutralize and delegitimize any political claim that does not conform to the status quo. In that sense, “anti-populism” has detrimental effects on democracy inasmuch as it socially constructs political deviance through simplistic dichotomies and thus places considerable discursive framing limits on what is politically possible on ideological grounds. Ultimately, the populist zeitgeist leads – under the pressure of both “populist” and “anti-populist” political actors – to a symbolic weakening of traditional political cleavages and to their replacement by unhelpful, superficial binary categories such as “nationalists” versus “progressives”.

Please read the full essay and feel free to comment