Category: Democracy

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Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism

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By Jeremy Webber, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria

The debate over populism forces us to think harder about the meaning of popular self-rule, democratic practice, and the constitutional structures that organize and constrain that practice. The debate necessarily brings us back to constitutionalism, with that term considered in its broadest sense: not just the legal rules that confine government action, but also the institutional arrangements and ethical practices that establish government, give government its form, subject it to popular decision-making, characterize the nature and processes of that decision-making, and indeed define the people (or peoples) themselves. The debate over populism is intrinsically connected, then, to debates over other essentially contested concepts, notably democracy, citizenship, peoplehood, and the rule of law.

My discussion paper   for the conference at UVic seeks to begin that process by canvassing various ways in which populism is used, identifying elements that are common in uses of the term; identifying others that are often invoked but that appear to be less universal in their invocation (elements, that is, where the relationship to populism is more one of affinity or propensity than centrality); and attempting to show how those elements are interrelated. This discussion paper is not intended to define populism. That is not what one does with essentially contested concepts. But it does seek to sketch the contours that emerge from the deployment of populism’s various elements – or, to mix metaphors, to explore the discursive ecosystem that populism helps to determine. The paper was itself developed discursively, first by a call for input to a group of faculty and graduate students engaged in the Cedar Trees Institute , and then workshopped among a group of some twenty faculty and grad students on 2 March 2020.

To be clear, the purpose of this paper is not primarily descriptive. It is undertaken in order to clarify what is at stake in populism for normative political and legal theory – or, better, not for theory but for practice: How should we conduct ourselves as democratic citizens? How should we conceive of the dimensions of our people? What are the appropriate constitutional foundations for democratic self-rule?

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The Brexit vote: a clear example of politicizing migration

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By Kate Korte, Student at the Political Science Department at the University of Victoria

In June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) startled the world by voting to leave the European Union (EU) in a public referendum. Although the majority of voters voted to leave, the margin was small — 52 per cent voted leave, and 48 per cent voted to remain. Since then, politicians in the UK and EU have been struggling to meet a deal, to no avail. On Jan 31 of this year, the UK left the EU officially.

During the Brexit campaign, immigration was a key focus. The leave campaign, in particular, used the perceived threat of increased migration with EU membership to steer voters in their direction.

It’s peculiar, however, to think that this would amass a majority of the public’s support. The United Kingdom never signed on to the Schengen Agreement, so it actually held more power over its borders than many other member states. The United Kingdom is also one of the farthest removed countries in the EU from the Mediterranean Sea. It has not seen a vast influx of refugees. This begs the question: why would voters resonate so strongly with the leave campaigns message of a migration threat?

The leave campaign capitalized off of the perceived, not actual, threat they saw migration posing to the EU’s economy and culture. Like many other countries in the EU, voters routinely overestimate the amount of migrants their country welcomes. Campaigns like the Leave campaign are able to capitalize off this innumeracy by feeding into the fears without articulating any real migration data. This could explain part of the reason voters opted to leave.

All areas in Wales opted to vote leave. This strikes as odd, given that Wales is one of the most economically worse off areas in the United Kingdom and benefits from a lot of EU money. Importantly, Wales doesn’t see a lot of migration. Despite these two facts, Welsh voters still resonated with the Leave campaign’s message enough to vote to leave and effectively vote to cut themselves off from a significant amount of EU funding.

On the other hand, areas in London that see a lot of migration voted to remain in the EU. Some have linked this to the general young, educated, and cosmopolitan nature of the city. In a big city like London, there is a high cost of living and a lot of people to compete for employment. Alas, London seems to welcome newcomers and voted to remain. Even though more migrants set their sites on London than on Wales, Londoners were less willing to listen to the argument that migrants hurt the economy.

Of course, as is the case with both London and Wales, other factors are clearly at play here. It’s certainly not the case that everyone who voted to leave did so out of a perceived threat of migration. But given the campaign’s heavy emphasis on migration and its impact on the economy, it’s worth questioning how unfounded voter’s perceptions of migration data are.

Brexit is still a staple issue in British politics, with Boris Johnson echoing his slogan, “get brexit done” at nearly every opportunity. In the 2019 election, a lot of the areas that switched from Labour to Johnson’s Conservative party were rural areas in Britain — and areas that don’t see a lot of migration. For as long as Brexit is relevant, migration will remain part of the political discourse. Whether or not voters’ fears are founded in reality is something worth exploring, as it draws to light how politicized migration has become in the UK.

The Brexit vote is broken down by area here. Migration data by area can be found here.

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Populism and the politics of migration

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By Oliver Schmidtke, Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria

Migration figures prominently in the political mobilization of right-wing populism. Anti-immigrant sentiments are at the very core of this actor’s rallying cry and popular campaigns. Yet, how are we to understand the link between populism and migration? Are immigration and growing cultural diversity to blame for populist forces that advocate an exclusionary form of nationalism? For instance, has the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015-16 triggered or even caused the series of extraordinary electoral achievements of the populist right? In my view, this link between populism and migration is more indirect and multidimensional in nature. Here are some ways to conceptualize this link:

Migrants as easy scapegoats: It is one of the essential tools in (electoral) politics to assign blame and, by assigning responsibility for social ills, design politics based on the exclusion of the undesirable group. In politics, this form of scapegoating works so effectively for mobilizing purposes because it allows complex issues – such as unemployment, social inequality, housing, or crime – to be addressed in a highly simplistic fashion. Ascribing blame to a particular group like migrants steers a general, unspecific sense of frustration with politics towards a concrete adversary and frames intricate political issues in a simplistic logic of Us versus Them. Migrants are an easy target for such scapegoating practices also because they have a very limited public and political voice in particular in European societies. And right-wing populists can build on latent xenophobic feelings that are deeply rooted in the historic legacy of the European nation-state and its colonial practices.

Migrants as the threatening Other: Populists need a tangible sense of who is threatening the people and their well-being. Their very political identity is organized around the image of an urgent threat directed at ordinary people. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Twenty-First Century Populism, 2008) define populism as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.” The practice of depicting migrants as the ‘dangerous others’ is instrumental in providing the people with a collective identity (in the case of right-wing populism primarily defined in terms of an ethno-cultural nationalism) and identifying those depriving the ‘virtuous people’ and their community in fundamental ways. With the anti-immigrant rhetoric, the alleged threat to the wellbeing of the own community is given a face, an easily identifiable reference point for directing dissatisfaction and political aspiration.

Migrants as a tool for a mobilizing collective identity: The racialization of the non-national other is a highly productive way of political mobilization drawing on the friend-enemy dichotomy that Carl Schmitt depicted as the very essence of politics. In his book The Concept of the Political (1932: 26, 38), he describes the friend-enemy distinction as speaking to the “utmost degree of intensity … of an association or dissociation.” Right-wing populism exploits this distinction and the emotional, or even existential power it displays. In this regard, populists can challenge the often frustratingly unresponsive and stale routine of liberal democracy with an emotionally charged fight for the security, if not the survival of the own community. Migrants are indispensable for the form of identity politics based on which right-wing populism challenges traditional competitive party politics. The resurgence of exclusionary nationalism and anti-immigrant forces itself has the potential of developing into a veritable threat to the viability of liberal democracies in general and the rights of minorities in particular.

 

Not by accident these three interpretations focus on how populist actors use migration for their political mobilization rather on the challenges posed by migration itself. My underlying hypothesis is that the political and policy issues related to migration (security, long-term integration of newcomers, accommodation of cultural diversity, etc.) cannot explain the rise of right-wing populism. Rather, the politics of migration regularly follows a different logic. Consider the 2015/16 ‘refugee crisis’: The number of irregular border crossings has dropped dramatically and the number of asylum seekers coming to Europe has gone back to pre-crisis levels. Still, the political debate in many European countries is still dominated by anti-immigration rhetoric deliberately staged by right-wing populists to exploit a divisive issue for their political mobilization.

Are the three approaches to conceptualizing the link between migration and populism the most fruitful and relevant ones? What aspects do these three interpretations leave out? Please feel free to add to the conceptual discussion or contribute with some empirical observations.

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Contesting the memory of the Holocaust: Loss of lived memory and the rise of the far-right populism

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By Oliver Schmidtke, lead of the Jean Monnet Network European Memory Politics, director of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria

The 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp marks a somber occasion to remember the crimes of Nazi Germany, to honor the victims of the Holocaust and consider what commitments should result from the plea ‘Never Forget’. In a twofold sense, this year’s anniversary marks a fundamental challenge to the way in which we remember the Holocaust and what it means for contemporary social and political life.

First, we are in the midst of a gradual transition from the lived memory of Holocaust victims and contemporary witnesses to a form of commemoration that will increasingly less be able to rely on those who share their experiences directly and personally. What does the gradual reliance on archived material and recorded memory mean for how our society relates to and commemorates the Nazi crimes and the genocide of the Jewish people? Will the change in commemorative practices have a substantial impact on the significance and urgency of the Holocaust as formative of our collective past? Advanced technologies and new media of storytelling will play an important role in keeping the memory alive. Regardless of what exemplary projects such as the USC Shoah Foundation’s Visual History Archive (https://sfi.usc.edu/) are able to achieve in archiving and making testimony of the Holocaust available to the public, the generational change will be a critical challenge for how we remember and what this memory means to upcoming generations.

Second, the urgency in protecting and reinvigorating the memory of the Shoah also results from the changing political environment in Western democracies: we currently see a challenge to the anti-fascist consensus on which much of post-War politics had been built. The experience of the Nazi crimes and the Holocaust provided the ground for a fundamental moral and political commitment to address aggressive forms of nationalism and the hatred of others. The commitment ‘Never Forget’ or ‘Never Again’ provided a commonly shared ethical compass that steered politics across party affiliation and insulated actors that would openly endorse racist ideologies. What we have witnessed over the past decade is a gradual erosion of this post-War consensus. Right-wing groups across the European continent have gained respectability and their xenophobic ideas, regularly concealed in the less scandalous rhetoric of identity politics, have regained political currency.

An indication of this changed political environment is the notable rise of anti-Semitism and hate crimes in recent years. The latest global survey  by the Anti-Defamation League (ADF) notices that anti-Semitic attitudes have substantially increased in Central and Eastern Europe since 2015. According to the ADL’s longstanding index, the segment of adults displaying a high level of anti-Semitic views increased from 37% to 48% in Poland, 32% to 46% in Ukraine and 23% to 31% in Russia. Similarly, the Vienna-based European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has pointed to a significant growth in anti-Semitism across Western Europe. In a 2018 FRA survey, 65% of French and 43% of German citizens described anti-Semitic incidents a “very serious problem.” According to the ADL study, citizens of the four Central and Eastern European countries also resent being confronted with the Holocaust. 74% of Poles, 59% of Hungarians, 50% of Russians and 44% of Ukrainians declared that they agree with the following statement “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the genocide”. These figures are also noteworthy for the Western European context: 52% of Austrians 42% of Germans, 40% of Belgians, 38% of Italians and 37% of Spaniards consider the public debate of the Holocaust as ‘excessive’. Most troubling, a recent study of the World Jewish Congress points to a 20% increase in anti-Semitic attacks in Germany( https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/auschwitz-75-years-anti-semitism-germany-1.5441314 ), a trend that the German president Frank Walter Steinmeier acknowledged at his speech at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial ( https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/full-text-of-german-president-s-yad-vashem-speech-we-germans-have-not-learned-from-1.8438504

These findings point to how the memory of the Holocaust and the Nazi regime is interpreted and appropriated in contemporary society. It is not by accident that the way in which we commemorate this period of 20th century history has become highly contested, a development closely associated  with the rise of nationalist-populist parties. It is through a particular interpretation of the past that political communities define their sense of identity and constitutive values. Across Europe, populist-nationalist parties seek to promote an historic narrative that diminishes the importance of and responsibility for the Holocaust replacing it with an account of national grandeur. The controversial bill (‘Holocaust Law’) by the Polish Senate that would have outlawed blaming Poland for any crimes committed during the Holocaust is a prominent example of this attempt to  appropriate historic memory for political purposes. The commemoration of the Holocaust is not only challenged by the gradual loss of lived memory. The more radical challenge comes from the political fight by right-wing populists to eradicate this memory and to rehabilitate an exclusionary nationalism with a clear sense of the undesirable other.

Photo credit: “Ausschwitz B-W / Vorsicht Color” by bramloquet is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 

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Catalonia-Spain: Seminar “Self-determination: failures and successes”

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By Pablo Ouziel, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria

On December 5th, I attended the seminar Self-determination: failures and successes at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. This international seminar was the closing event of a Research Project lead by Joan Vergés-Gifra (Universitat de Girona), Ivan Serrano (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya), and Peter Kraus (Universität Augsburg). I found the event to be a tremendous contribution towards the dialogical resolution of the political conflict between Catalonia and Spain and the social conflict existing within Catalonia. Only in June, I gave a talk in the Universitat Pompeu Fabra around the 15M movement and the occupations of public squares in Spain in 2011. During that talk, I had the pleasure of meeting some of the speakers that participated in the event I attended last week. From June until today, I have witnessed palpable differences in the way in which these academics speak about Catalonia and the current political crisis. The main differences from my perspective are, a broadening of the imaginary of possibility for resolution of the conflict, and a genuine commitment to listening to the other side while undergoing self-critique. Despite the fact that everyone in last week’s seminar defends the idea of self-determination, there is a clear intent at critical reflection of the steps taken by those defending the Catalan independence process. This is not to say that all of a sudden, pro-independence academics in Catalonia are shifting the blame from the Spanish State to the Catalan pro-independence leaders. Like myself, these academics are very clear about the authoritarian practices of a Spanish State that carries with it fascistic legacies from its dictatorship. Nevertheless, we all acknowledge that not everything on the pro-independence side was exemplary.

The conversation in this seminar on self-determination was initiated by Andreas Oldenburg (Freie Universität Berlin). The title of his talk was “Constitutional Politics of Peoples”. Oldenburg began his contribution citing James Tully and his understanding of “freedom as non-domination”. This was his attempt at walking towards a constitutional politics of the people by giving the constituent people their say through the organization of deliberative mini-publics. In these spaces citizens would decide on things like what kind of referendum should Catalonia have and what kinds of questions should be asked. This Oldenburg reminds us, is what Tully calls the first phase of negotiation. This phase is followed by a second, in which the negotiation with the rest of the state opens up. As Oldenburg interprets Tully, this avoids moves towards unilateral secession without seeking consensual agreement with the State. What Oldenburg means by this is that if the State does not agree once there has been genuine deliberation with the Catalan people, then Catalan’s have a right to civil disobedience. This is the groups right to constituent self-determination following a democratic process in which all claims are negotiated. For Oldenburg, there is a constitutional right to secede because constituent people come before the constitution. Despite this acknowledgment of the right to secede, Oldenburg actually defends federalism as a better option. Although he reserves the final choice to the constituent people.

Kraus was the discussant to Oldenburg’s paper. His main question was: What to do if the federal option does not work? From Kraus’ perspective there is no level of ‘federality’ in Spain to protect a minimum of sovereignty. Therefore, he asks: What are the minimum levels of ‘federality’ required for freedom as non-domination to be actual? He then follows this with the following question: What are the consequences if these levels are not granted? For Kraus, sucession has to be taken very seriously, Catalonia and Spain are part of the EU, so in a sense, Catalonia’s independence is like an internal secession of part of a polity within the EU. With this secession, the constitutional rules and capitalism would stay within the parameters delineated by the EU. Through such secession there could even be the pertinent economic compensations to Spain. Kraus ultimately thinks that despite the fact that we exist in a complex multi-identity world, in a normative sense nationality is the kind of collectivity we need to stabilize republican commitments. For him, as a non-nationalist, nationality aims at institutional completeness. This final point from Kraus, Oldenburg refutes by arguing that there are more genuinely political alternatives to nationalism as a point of unity. Oldenburg defends more cosmopolitanism as an antidote to nationalism. This is what he thinks is required in order to address the global problems that we face.

Following this very stimulating session, we went into a short coffee break prior to resuming our multilogue with a talk by Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra). The title for his contribution was: “Quandaries of legitimacy in the German unification process”. The aim of bringing German unification was to evaluate the ways in which legitimacy could be obtained for the demands of the Catalan Independence movement. Nagel, described the way in which exceptions are always made when there is interest in processes moving forward. For example, he spoke of the fact that before unification West Germany as part of the EU traded with East Germany without having to pay levies for dealing with a foreign power. This, despite the fact that East Germany was not in the EU and all transactions with non-EU countries had a levy attached to them. In addition, with unification East Germany did not become the 13th state to join the EU, but entered through the back door. This is why con-federal arguments during the process were ignored as they would force East Germany to join the EU through the normal application channels. This was agreed upon, because West Germany said that it would pay for unification and not the EU. Adhesion was carried out through article 23 of the West German constitution and unification could be considered legitimate by federal pact. It was federal money which financed it. Nagel, also spoke of legitimacy by consent. According to him, there was explicit and implicit consent before, during, and after unification. This one can observe according to Nagel, through the study of prior election results, the ratification of treaties, the foundational elections of the unified Germany, and post-unification public opinion polls.

Sören Keil (Canterbury Christ Church University) was the discussant for this intervention. For Keil, the main concern was determining who actually was the source of legitimacy during German unification. As he pointed out, in the West it was clear because it was the Länder but in the east identifying this legitimacy is more complicated because of the East German relation with the Soviet Union.

Keil’s second point had to do with sovereignty. As he put it, at the time neither of the German states was actually fully sovereign. Due to the post-War settlement, unification happened in a framework linking German unification with the transference of powers to Brussels. This led Keil to ask to what extent sovereignty was a variable worth looking at when thinking about German unification.

Keil also discussed different forms of legitimacy. The fact that there was no referendum for unification was not a problem in Germany but it would have been a problem in other places. As Keil puts it, there is legitimacy at different points in time, therefore, legitimacy as a theoretical tool is problematic; it risks looking back and re-writing history.

Finally, Keil asked: What can we learn from German unification? For him it was a successful German revolution. As he put it, German’s are not good at revolution, yet if one studies the unification process, it is clear, at least in the East, that protests for democracy quickly became protests for unification. This crystalizes, as Keil pointed out, with the shift in the language of a slogan popular at the time from “We are the people” to “we are a people”.

Both Nagel’s talk and Keil’s critique generated a long debate. Joan Vergés-Gifra (Universitat de Girona), asked which of the lines of legitimacy presented by Nagel was the most important. Oldenburg asked whether legitimacy could best be seen as legitimacy by welfare. In the sense, that in East Germany people just wanted to have all the beautiful products they knew were available in the West. If there had not been this promise of welfare, he argues that the process of unification would have required other steps. Finally, Pau Bossacoma (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) brought the question back to the demands of the Catalan people, by pointing out that the Maastricht treaty was treaty reform and that what the Catalan and Scottish pro-independence voices want is a treaty revision through article 48 of the European Constitution, not changes through article 49.

The next speaker in the event was Jule Goikoetxea (Universidad del País Vasco/EHU). The paper she was intending to present was: “Self-determination processes in the Basque Country: new discourses and strategies”. However, by the time she arrived to the talk she realized she wanted to talk about privatizing democracy in Europe. She mixed political theory with case studies, and her main argument was that there existed a causal connection between neo-liberalism and secession. According to her, the growing privatization of democracy was causing people to want to secede. The demands of movements like 15M, Occupy and the anti-austerity movements in Latin America were being grouped under demands for self-determination. For Goikoetxea, sovereignty demands are going to be re-defined during the 21st century but ultimately this is the democratic demand of governing oneself. In the case of Catalonia and the Basque country, this is a demand against privatization which in Spain is being carried out through centralization. The kind of sovereignty demands she is seeing in Spain are learning with non-patriarchal sovereignties found within the country’s feminist movements. Goikoetxea understands the EU as part of the neoliberal privatization project, she argues that EU integration has led to stronger states. What she means by this is stronger executives with a stronger judicial system to support these executives. Goikoetxea finished her talk by reminding us that in 2006 federalism was the main demand to Spain coming from Catalonia, and as she points out, this has changed to secession because of privatization and centralization.

The Discussant for Goikoetxea’s paper was Ivan Serrano (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya). Serrano praised Goikoetxea’s contribution and spoke of the de-democratization spoken of by Wendy Brown. He also spoke of the gamification of the political process by movements like Tsunami democratic in Catalonia. This is a de-centralized movement that organizes through an app called Telegram and which has conducted a series of actions including blocking Barcelona’s airport through a mass demonstration.

Keil asked regarding self-determination if the goal was to be better off or to be able to do things differently. Vergés-Gifra emphasized that rather than speaking of a causal relationship between independence demands and neoliberal privatization, it would be more accurate to speak of a correlation in certain cases. As he pointed out, all the demands in the new statutes for autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque country have been democratic demands. All related to having more political capacity.

Goikoetxea responded to this discussion by emphasizing that the causal link she was referring to was in regards to what leads to big mobilizations taking place. The main demands are for more democracy and the anger is coming because people are losing power. For Goikoetxea the causal relation is the loss of power, the fact that people are unable to govern themselves.

Following a lunch break the afternoon sessions began with an intervention by Vergés-Gifra: The title was: “An ethnicity bias in Catalan independentism? An analysis of its discourses and legislative actions”. According to Vergés-Gifra, the critique against the pro-independence movement in Catalonia goes something like this: It is top-down, elite led, non-urban, non-cosmopolitan, populist, xenophobic and ‘ethnicist’. He has developed a case against all these lines of criticism, yet, during his talk he focused only on responding to those speaking of the Catalan pro-independence movement as an ‘ethnicist’ political movement. The reason he was interested in speaking about this, is the fact that he considers this a critique that is growing in popularity. He considers it a part of the revisionist turn in studies on the Catalan pro-independence movement. As he points out, before it was presented as an exemplary civic kind of nationalism which was set apart from Basque nationalism which was described as ethnicist by mainstream commentators. This dichotomy, Vergés-Gifra does not find useful, he does not think it holds. As he puts it, in Catalonia there is no ethnicist dimension to the Catalan pro-independence movement. Being Catalan, he says, has nothing to do with being a nationalist, but has to do instead with contributing to the forging and creation of a Catalan nation. Vergés-Gifra argues that if one studies all the institutional and legal moves towards independence in Catalonia since 2010, one actually sees how there has been a tremendous attempt at broadening the scope of people who can be part of the Catalan nation. This he says is clear in laws passed, like the covenant of immigration and reception of 2010 which made Catalonia into a receiving nation. It is also clear in how Catalonia grew from 3,6 million people in 1997 to 7,5 million people in 2010, predominantly through immigration. As Vergés-Gifra argues, the more political the Catalan process has become, the less ethnicized pro-independence parties have become. Having said this, and despite defending the fact that there has been no ethnic conflict so far, Vergés-Gifra does acknowledge that ethnic conflict is possible if something changes.

Following Vergés-Gifra’s talk and a response by Goikoetxea in a feminist key, Keil, asked why Spain was so keen on calling the Catalan independence movement ethnicist when everything Spain has done towards Catalonia is ethnicist. Of course, he is not surprised. He understands that many Spanish intellectuals call those defending independence ethnicist in order to delegitimize them.

Finally, Bossacoma, gave us the last session with a paper titled “Coercion and Accommodation in Spain. The case of Catalonia”. As a lawyer for the Catalan government, Bossacoma spoke of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional court regarding referendums. As he emphasized, referendums are allowed, but the process necessary in order to have a referendum makes it almost impossible to be able to have one. That is, anything that alters the constitution is required to follow of article 168 of the Spanish constitution. With article 167 which is an ordinary procedure it is fairly easy to have a referendum, but when 168 is required, it is very rigid and it actually protects constitutional articles and not ideas. If there were to be a referendum on independence for Catalonia, it would require a 2/3 majority in the Spanish congress and a 2/3 majority in the Spanish senate. Then it would require the dissolution of parliament and once a new parliament is formed another 2/3 majority in congress and a 2/3 majority in the senate. Only then could a referendum be held and it would be one in which all Spanish people would have the right to vote.

Bossacoma acknowledges that in 2017, there was not a genuine attempt at reaching consensus on the referendum. It is also true, he says, that the move in 2015 to call plebiscitary elections in Catalonia was also used by Franco during the Spanish dictatorship. Bossacoma also points out that although during the election of 2015 secessionist obtained the majority of seats they did not obtain the majority of votes. Notwithstanding, what has happened since then, is that with the self-determination act and the beginning of the process of disconnection of Catalonia from Spain a particular legal logic has been followed. Under the philosophy of law applied by those who defended the unilateral declaration of independence, it was the people who decided on independence through the referendum, and the politicians only followed suit by abiding to their mandate to govern for the people. Bossacoma describes the unilateral declaration of independence as staged and liquid. From this lens, the declaration of independence was not a call for an uprising, yet, the Supreme court of Spain says that there was an uprising. It was not rebellion but sedition says the court. These are both uprisings but rebellion requires that the uprising be violent. According to the supreme court what we witnessed in Catalonia was a tumultuous uprising.

Bossacoma finished his talk with a thought on the fact that the Spanish government will defend the sentence against the Catalan independence leaders by arguing that although it seems quite rigid Spain has a lax penitentiary system. This coupled with the fact that prison competencies are in the hands of the Catalan government, means in effect, the Spanish government will argue, that the pro-independence leaders will soon be enjoying very relaxed prison sentences. This Bossacoma emphasizes, is the reason why him and other lawyers are advising the Catalan government to keep the convicted pro-independence leaders in prison a little while longer without privileges. This is a recommendation made, keeping in mind that the Spanish government might use this as a defense when the sentence is judged outside of Spain in the different international courts.

As discussant, Macià Serra (Universitat de Girona) took the conversation back to the idea of a referendum approved through the Spanish government. He pointed out that in the last 200 years just three Catalans have been president of Spain; all of them during the time of the Second Republic. This he said, explained the difficulty of obtaining a referendum on self-determination in Catalonia through the means set out in the Spanish constitution.

Sören, responded to the point made by Bossacoma about the lax penitentiary system, by saying that people who have done nothing wrong should not be in prison. This he followed with these questions in the form of closing remarks: What is next? A permanent state of crisis? More radicalization? More violence?

I think the questions on which Sören closed the seminar, are indicative of what many in Catalonia and in Spain are feeling. Yet, as I stated at the beginning of this text, I think that the fact that people are in dialogue opens up the possibilities for resolution in the long term for a conflict which appears to have no near-term solutions. As many of the participants in this event highlighted, this is a conflict in which people are demanding more democracy. This is a reoccurring demand across the globe. Therefore, despite reluctance by those governing the status quo to address the issue in a meaningful, forward looking and virtuous manner, this demand is re-shaping the way in which we understand democratization processes and practices in the 21st century.

Photo by Toimetaja tõlkebüroo on UnsplashPhoto by Toimetaja tõlkebüroo on Unsplash

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Rethinking the Relationship between Islam, Secularism and Democracy

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By Uluhan Sahin, MA Student, Universities of Applied Sciences Kehl/Ludwigsburg, Germany

The events of the Arab Spring have fundamentally changed the global perception of the Islamic countries in the Middle East. A region often associated with tyranny, religious fanaticism and the lack of civil liberties has witnessed the struggle of its population for democracy and freedom. In this atmosphere of cautious optimism, citizens engaged in countless public debates about the political future of the region.

Unfortunately, only Tunisia emerged from this struggle as a democracy, although even Tunisia still has a long way to go. Despite its failure to turn the authoritarian states of the Middle East into democracies, the Arabic Spring will continue to have an effect, especially through the sparked political discussions. One major debate, which can be traced back even decades ago and has been intensified with the events of the Arab Spring, is the compatibility of the Islamic religion with democracy and secularism.

The traditional narrative in both the western and the eastern hemisphere is that unbridgeable discrepancies exist between Islam on the one hand and democracy or secularism on the other. The extreme conclusion of this flawed logic is that Islam must be “reformed” in order to fit with democracy and secularism or that there is an Islamic exceptional way towards democracy, which includes the dominance of religion on state and society. Both ideas lead to a dead end and will create only further problems and challenges. Instead, alternative ways should be pursued to address the discrepancy between these terms.

It would be foolish to think that this difficult challenge only affects the countries of the Middle East. Europe, with its large Muslim communities and its rising numbers of Muslim refugees must also recognize the severity of the task to reconcile Islam and the fundamentals of modern democracy. In order to start a discussion in this respect, a comprehensive definition of the relevant terms should be considered.

The first question we need to ask ourselves is what exactly is democracy? Is it just the ballot box and elections? Or is it more than that? Traditionally, democracy is described as the rule of the people, which is expressed through majority voting in free elections. Although free elections are an indisputably important part of a democracy, the exclusive focus on elections would be an insufficient characterization of the concept of democracy. Democracy reduced to majority decisions would be nothing but the dictatorship of the majority, in which minorities (in this case in the politically context) could not exert any influence in the political decision-making process despite their participation in elections.

Therefore, in addition to free elections, other conditions must be met in order to speak of a complete democracy in a country. One of the main components would be the separation of powers. The intention behind this is to avoid a concentration of power among the rulers through the existence of certain control mechanisms as well as through the independence of the judiciary. No matter how popular the government is in a country, it must not have absolute control over all state organs and institutions. In this sense, it would be absurd to claim that the action of a constitutional court against a government is anti-democratic.

Furthermore, in a democracy, civil liberties must be protected and safeguarded by the state. These rights are defensive mechanisms designed to protect individual citizens from arbitrary state interference. These rights are defensive mechanisms designed to protect individual citizens from arbitrary attacks by the state and society. In the context of a democracy, this means above all that the individual rights of the citizen (including those of minorities) should be protected, even if the majority of the population disagrees.

Another core element of any democracy is a free press or freedom of speech. The nucleus of human progress is the clash of ideas and opinions, which can only take place if the right to different opinions and criticism is respected and protected by the state. This element quickly reveals the difference between an autocracy and a democracy. While in democracies, people openly talk about grievances and problems in the state or in society and are able to criticize the government, in dictatorships people who criticize the government or uncover grievances such as corruption or arbitrary power are branded as dissidents and persecuted.

The task to define the term secularism is much harder.  Different explanatory patterns exist side by side. The interpretation of this term depends on the respective ideological point of view. From a religious fundamentalist perspective, secularism is inherently anti religious. According to proponents of this position, the aim of secularism is the complete elimination of religion from society. Similar views are shared with the Communist perspective, where religion is viewed as a relic of the past that hinders societal progress. On the other hand, the consensus about secularism is that it is the separation between religion and state/politics and the resulting fact that the religious beliefs of some groups cannot provide the basic framework for political authority. However, how thick this dividing line between religion and state is, is handled differently across different contexts. For the purpose of this text, secularism should always be understood as the separation of state and religion and nothing else.

As with the term democracy, secularism also contains various key components that must be fulfilled in order to call a state secular. One of them is the neutrality of the state towards religious groups. The state does not interfere in religious affairs and keeps the same distance from all religious groups. The consequence of this commitment is another core feature of secular states, namely freedom of religion.

In this sense, a secular state cannot tolerate a religious group trying to impose its religious doctrine on other people or even on society. In such a situation, it also becomes clear that religious freedom is not absolute; it ends where the rights of another human being begin. In this context, one should also not forget that the possibly religious views of a person or a group, if applied in practice, could lead to discrimination against other people. In other words, the secular state is exempt from its policy of neutrality towards religious groups only if religious fundamentalist groups threaten the constitutional order or the rights of individual citizens.

So, what is the connection between secularism and democracy? The importance of secularism for democracy can be explained by the following consideration: Secularism is a prerequisite of democracy, since it ensures the transfer of the legitimacy of power from God’s grace to the will of the people. It is important to stress here that secularism is only one of several preconditions for democracy. Secularism alone never guarantees democracy. Without secularism, however, no democracy is conceivable.

Opponents of secularism repeatedly bring the example of the Communist states to illustrate that secularism does not guarantee democracy and that tends to be anti-religious. The answer to this assertion is that the reason for the authoritarianism and for the hostility towards religion does not rest in secularism, but in Communist ideology itself. Whether Communist states were at all secular states is also open for discussion, since the state did not act neutrally towards religions here.

Secularism is not only a precondition for democracy, but also for civil rights. For civil rights to be protected, a kind of wall must be built between the citizen and the state to guard the citizen from state interference. Secularism would not be the wall, but an important brick in this protection. This point can be explained by the fact that religion and politics merge in a non-secular state. The product of this unholy connection is that religion no longer is a covenant between the individual and the divine, but a political weapon and foundation of legitimacy. In non-secular states, political opponents therefore also become heretics at the same time. This mode of legitimating political authority is the perfect way for autocrats, especially in theocracies, to justify the persecution of political activists in the eyes of the particularly conservative sections of the population. Therefore, I would argue that secularism is positive for religions, since secularism prevents religions from becoming the political power instrument of despots and autocrats.

Although secularism alone cannot bring democracy into the world, it can nevertheless be said that a minimum of secularism in the sense of a separation of religion and state/policy is necessary for a functioning democracy and for the existence of civil rights.

Now we come to the Islamic perspective on the two terms. Unfortunately, both in the West and in the Islamic world, the common opinion is that Islam and secularism are incompatible, as is the relationship between Islam and democracy. It is important to emphasize that there is no single “Islam”; there are as many different interpretations of the Islamic religion as there are Muslims. This means that it is never possible to make universal statements about Islam and its relationship towards democracy and secularism that apply to all Muslims. Nevertheless, in order to make statements about the relationship between Islam, secularism and democracy, which is appealing for a large part of Muslims, one must look at the relationship from a theological perspective. It should be noted here that the only way to convince conservative Muslims of democracy and secularism is to use the Koran and Islamic theology as arguments. In this sense, Islamic theologians play an important role in the struggle for secularism and democracy.

Although the dominant current narrative preaches the incompatibility of Islam and secularism, there are also voices that argue for compatibility, using theological arguments as well. Although these persons represent a minority opinion within the Islamic world, they are nevertheless very important, since they are a proof that religious hardliners within theology are not left with the monopoly of interpreting this relationship.

Indeed, with the help of Koranic verses, attempts are being made to legitimize secularism and democracy through Islamic means. Examples would be the following verses: And those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what We have provided them, they spend. (Surah 42, Verse 38). This verse implies that rulers must consult with citizens on political decisions. My argument is that this verse implies democracy, since consultation with citizens takes place best through democratic elections.

And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ. (Surah 5, Verse 48). This verse implies that a plurality of laws and political systems is God’s will. This verse contradicts the idea of religious hardliners that there is only one law of God that must be imposed upon all mankind.

There shall be no coercion in matters of faith” (Surah 2, Verse 256). The verse also argues that the best way to avoid coercion in questions of faith is to treat all religious groups equally. This objective is best achieved by a neutral state in matters of faith, in other words a secular state. The fact that the Prophet was also a head of state is often cited as an example of the incompatibility of Islam and secularism. Here it is worth noting that the time of the Prophet must be given an extraordinary classification. It should also be considered that according to the Koran the time of prophets is over and that no more prophets will come. In other words, the reasons for legitimizing the Prophet’s rule cannot be applied to our time.

One reason why secularism has such a bad reputation in the Islamic world is the prohibition of religious symbols in the state sphere. This experience leads to the exclusion of Muslim women who wear headscarves. Although it would be wrong to say that the prohibition of religious symbols is based on hostility to religion (in some cases it is rather a desire to prevent abuse of religion using religious symbols), in my view such prohibitions are counterproductive to secularism. In Turkey, for example, such prohibitions have led to the exclusion of conservative women in school and work, and thus to them being driven into the arms of religious fanatics. A headscarf debate has also strongly shaped public discourse in many Western states, most prominently in secular France. Even if the headscarf is misused as a political symbol by religious fundamentalists, such prohibitions should be avoided, since the only consequences are an increased polarization of society and the creation of a victim role, which is exploited by religious fundamentalists.

Instead, secularism should be interpreted in such a way that religious symbols are also allowed in the public sphere. Ultimately, wearing religious symbols does not violate other people’s rights and this should always be remembered in such debates. The state should only act in the case of concrete violations of rights by religious fundamentalists.

A positive link between Islam and secularism would also be extremely beneficial for Europe. For decades, the integration of Muslims in Europe has been discussed. The integration of Muslims in Europe could be effectively facilitated if one could show them that the Islamic religion is compatible both with secularism and with a pluralistic-democratic society. In this way, the rising right-wing populism in Europe could also be combated. The main reasons for the success of right-wing populists in Europe are the alleged and exaggerated danger of an “Islamization” of Europe and the assertion that Muslims cannot be integrated into democratic, secular societies. A successful experience in daily life that Islam, democracy and secularism are compatible with each other and that the majority of Muslims in Europe also think so, would deprive right-wing populists of their key ideological argument.

 

In my concluding reflection, I would like to point out that Islam, secularism and democracy are compatible and that democratization in Islamic countries must include secularization. However, the concept of secularism should be redefined and reconsidered to guarantee religious freedom and to prevent the abuse of religion as a political means. In addition, followers of secularism should distance themselves from any despots in the Middle East, who present themselves as secular rulers to gain sympathy abroad. Such autocrats have nothing to do with secularism and have more in common with religious fundamentalists than one might think.

Islam is a holy covenant between the individual and the divine, but without the separation of state and religion, this holy covenant can become a crook stock for autocrats, which they like to use like a mace against their own population.

“The author of this blog entry was supported by the Baden-Württemberg-STIPENDIUM for University Students, a scholarship of the Baden-Württemberg Stiftung”.

https://www.bw-stipendium.de/en/students/bws-for-university-students/

 

 

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Countdown to the Spanish Elections: Who are the populists?

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By Pablo Ouziel, Centre for Global Studies at University of Victoria

Eight days to go before Spanish people decide who will represent them in the country’s national government. As we survey the field of party politics in the country, it certainly looks like Chantal Mouffe’s assertion that we currently experience a ‘populist moment’ applies to Spain. Considering this broader political context, it is warranted to engage in an intellectual and academic inquiry into populist practices and populist actors in the country.

Who are the populists that challenge the status quo in a ‘populist key’? It is clear that many different factions are articulating populist contestation, both from the right and the left. Yet, what is more difficult to understand is how so-called establishment parties are becoming populist in what seems like a move to defend the status quo, but which perhaps is more geared towards a radicalization of the political.

What I am trying to articulate, is that in contemporary Spanish party politics, the status quo is not enough for anyone. The country has entered a phase of radical and antagonistic politics in response to the post-political period popularized by the ‘Third Way’ of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. In the United Kingdom and the United States, this period began in the 1990s. In Spain, it started later in the early 2000s with the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Its peak moment was on August 23, 2011, when through the reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution the socialist party surrendered  the country to the creditors of Spain’s public debt. This was the moment in Spain when socialism defended neoliberalism as the only reasonable option for modern democracy and, stopped defending socialist ideals for a more egalitarian society.

This was the moment of absolute neoliberal hegemony. Yet, I think it marks the beginning of neoliberalism’s downfall in the country. Since 2011, in Spain we have witnessed a multiplicity of popular movements seeking change. We have experienced the birth of numerous new political projects on both the right and the left and, have seen new political parties entering parliaments across all levels of government (local, regional and national). In a sense, this is positive, as Mouffe would argue, as it brings back politics into post-politics. Nevertheless, the challenge now is to turn the antagonisms that this process has crystalized into agonisms that can somehow co-exist in a virtuous cycle of democratic regeneration and broadening.

The problem, however, is that as more political actors are joining the process, the less capacity for and interest in dialogue there seems to be. Despite everyone’s bragging of their own dialogical abilities, the fact is that everyone’s ears have shut down and only masqueraded monologues are occupying the space of genuine political discussion. In this sense, it seems clear that unless something radically changes in the Spanish context, neoliberalism will give in to even more authoritarian and destructive forces. I am not sure if a populism of the left is the right response to rising reactionary currents, what I am sure about, is that the field of populism in Spain requires in-depth study and mapping so that we can understand the particulars of the complex political reality the country faces.

Perhaps we will continue to simplify and catalogue new parties into left or right populist. It might be the case that we continue to grant legitimacy to establishment parties claiming to hold the centre of democratic politics without a serious critique of their practices. Yet, if this is our approach, then I fear we will fail to understand the current conjuncture and will have a hard time capturing what is populist in Spain. More importantly, through the generation of such a blind spot, we will fail to determine whether any of the political projects engaged in the country’s populist moment are actually capable of steering politics in a progressive direction.

 

 

 

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Ukraine and the Peace Initiative with Russia

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By Derek Fraser, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria

The combination of Ukraine’s inexperienced and naive President, Ukrainian weariness with the unremitting war in the Donbas, pressure from France and Germany,  and American ambiguity, is pushing  Ukraine  to accept peace with Russia on terms that threaten Ukrainian independence.

Analysis

To understand the pass in which Ukraine finds herself we must go back to the events of 2014 when the overthrow of the venal, dictatorial, and pro-Russian  president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, led  Russia, in an attempt to prevent Ukraine from moving West, first to seize Crimea, and then to seek to provoke uprisings in a broad band of  Ukrainian territories from Donets and Luhansk, known as the Donbas, in the South-East, Kharkiv  and the industrial belt of Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the Centre, to Odessa in the South-West. An influential voice on Russian foreign policy, Sergey Karaganov, the Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, and a Kremlin adviser on Russia’s relations with the other former Soviet republics, stated at the time Russia wants “a united, federative Ukraine, if possible. Only this arrangement will maintain the formal integrity of the state, but Ukraine as a full-fledged state will be a distant historical memory.” “This scenario will ensure Russia’s de facto dominance in east and southeast Ukraine and semi-autonomy for the country’s west.”

The failure of the Russians to kindle revolt in any part of Ukraine save the Donbas, did not change Russian plans. The Donbas, to remain controlled by Russia and largely autonomous of Ukraine, was nevertheless to maintain its representation in the Ukrainian parliament, allowing it to influence Ukrainian policy, including any move to Ukrainian membership in Western treaties and organizations.

Ukraine fared badly in the fighting that followed the uprising in the Donbas. The Protocol that emerged from the Minsk I and the Minsk II negotiations in September 2014 and February 2015   between Russia and Ukraine, with the participation of Germany, France, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has had little effect. The   ceasefire the Protocol stipulated has repeatedly been broken, although fighting is at a lower level that it was before Minsk II. The Protocol provided for local elections and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, actions that were to lead to the return of separatist regions to Ukraine’s control. None of these measures have been acted on.

Part of the problem may have been that the Protocol did not indicate in which order the steps should be taken. The German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier filled this gap when he presented, with French support and involvement, in October 2015 a Formula for carrying out these provisions.

Under the Steinmeier Formula, Ukraine would introduce in the constitution a special autonomous status for the Russian-controlled part of the Donbas that would give it representation in the Ukrainian parliament.

In addition, the terms for the municipal-level elections that, under the Minsk Protocol, were to be carried out in accordance with Ukrainian law, were instead to be negotiated with the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,”

Ukraine would bring the special autonomous status for the region into effect temporarily on the date of those elections and then on a permanent basis if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found that those elections had “on the whole” respected international standards.

The elections were to take place before any withdrawal of any foreign forces. The departure of foreign forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control on the Ukrainian-Russian border on the east of the Donbas  were instead matters to be negotiated separately after the political steps had been taken.

Unlike the Minsk Protocol, the Steinmeier Formula did not have any official status.

The Ukrainian government did try to introduce legislation in 2015 to decentralize its constitution in reponse to the Minsk II Protocol, but gave up in face of a parliamentary and popular revolt.

It has always refused to contemplate holding elections in the rebel areas without the prior withdrawal of armed forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border.

It has also insisted that any elections should be held in accordance with Ukrainian law. The special law for elections in the Donbas would provide for Ukrainian and international election observers, the participation of all willing political parties, freedom of political campaigning, access to Ukrainian media for the residents, the freedom of Ukrainian media to report on the election campaign, and voting rights for the one and a half million refugees who had fled the Donbas.

Since the rejection by Ukraine of the terms of the Steinmeier protocol, there had been, up until the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine last April, a stalemate in diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Russia; but a stalemate accompanied by repeated violations of numerous ceasefires and the use of prohibited weapons on the battle field, the seizure of Ukrainian naval ships in the sea of Azov last November, and the application of economic sanctions.

The announcement by the newly elected President that he wanted to reach a peace settlement within a year has led to an increase in Russian political and military activity and economic pressure.

The Russians revived the Steinmeier Formula. In October 1, after weeks of negotiation, and under pressure from Germany and France, President Zelensky finally gave in and accepted the Steinmeier Formula as a basis for a settlement. His move was greeted with hostile demonstrations across the country, and a condemnatory letter signed by Ukrainian notables, including former foreign ministers.

At the same time, however, as he accepted the Steinmeier Formula, Zelensky effectively undermined it by issuing a declaration reaffirming the traditional Ukrainian position that there could be no internationally recognized elections in the Donbas without the prior withdrawal of armed forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border.

We doubt whether Zelensky’s declaration will be accepted by the Russians. Putin’s top adviser, Yurii Ushakov on September 13 had demanded a “written codification of the Steinmeier Formula” at the leaders’ summit, as well as finalization of the summit’s concluding document ahead of the event itself, with its implementation guaranteed by an “iron agreement”.

We do not know either whether the Germans, and especially the French, will support any Ukrainian derogation from the Steinmeier Formula. President Macron stated in a speech on 27 August that “pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic mistake.” The EU had to make a new strategic offer to Russia.

Perhaps because of French and German pressure, the Ukrainians had earlier indicated their desire to bring the Americans and British into the negotiations. While the State Department has always supported the Ukrainian position on elections, President Trump has repeatedly called on the Ukrainians to settle their differences with the Russians. Then of course, he held up almost $400 million in military aid.

If the Russians refuse to accept Zelensky’s declaration, it is hard to see what interest the Ukrainians have in maintaining their acceptance of the Steinmeier Formula. As things now stand, the peace process is not likely to lead to the recovery of the Donbas for Ukraine, but instead to leave the Russians in control of a Trojan horse seeking to destroy Ukrainian independence.

In the first place, the Russians apparently consider that the two governments, together with their military organizations, of the  “people’s republics” in the Donbas would remain in place, unaffected by the outcome of the municipal elections. The people’s republics have already indicated that control of the borders was their responsibility and not that of the Ukrainian government.

In addition, we should have no illusions about what the Russians are after:

The Russian online newspaper Vzglyad  stated on Oct 3 that the adoption of the Steinmeier Formula will effectively turn Ukraine into a loose confederation, which Russia may gobble up piece by piece.

The Russian economist and former adviser to President Putin, Andrei Illarionov has stated that Putin sees in the Steinmeier Formula  “a historic chance to implement the program that he’s reiterated since 2014, namely to restore full control over Ukraine”.

“Ukraine will get a ticking time bomb, because the launch of this mechanism will mean the implementation of the first and second Minsk Agreements, as a result of which two quasi-state entities are integrated into the state body of Ukraine. These two entities will make Ukraine’s political system implode from within. They will block any attempts to bring about concrete internal developments, towards which pro-Ukrainian parties and civil society have been working so hard. Of course, they’ll block Ukraine’s movement and aspirations towards Europe, the European Union, NATO and integration into the Western world.”

We can only hope that President Zelensky will have the courage to withstand the considerable pressures that will be brought against him in his search for what appears at this time to be an illusory peace settlement.

(This analysis was presented during the event “Trump, Ukraine, and Putin” on October 9th at the University of Victoria)

“Friendship of Nations monument- brothers” by eldan is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

 

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Regarding spontaneity and Spain’s 15M mode of being

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By Pablo Ouziel, Centre for Global Studies

15M-inspired responses to issues/questions raised during the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) Summer School at Burg Feistritz, Austria

Entry number three: ‘Regarding spontaneity and Spain’s 15M mode of being’

Image: “Barcelona – 15M – Asamblea” by Víctor M. Espinosa

During the days at Feistritz castle, Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, repeatedly referred to the wave of protests that occupied public squares across the globe in 2011 as being spontaneous. Thinking-with the findings from my research into Spain’s 15M movement, I agree with Ivan that there is a spontaneous moment in the contestation of such collective presences, when they come together. Nevertheless, I think that staying within a frame of the spontaneous nature of 15M when trying to understand the phenomenon can be misleading.

It is true that following the national DRY (Real Democracy Now!) demonstration of May 15th 2011, in the early hours of May 16th, in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol forty people decided spontaneously to camp: “Many of us did not know each other but being antagonized by police, we quickly established some bonds. Riot police eventually dispersed us and nineteen of us were actually arrested” (Interview with a person being 15M).

The following day (May 17th), 10,000 people took to the streets and encampments were set up in squares across the country in solidarity with the encampment in Madrid. Quickly, Spanish police evicted around 250 people camped in Puerta del Sol. That same afternoon, thousands of people returned to the square and Facebook and Twitter overflowed with messages emphasizing that #acampadasol continued. Across Spain, spontaneously organized encampment general assemblies decided to continue their occupations. Most of them (in over 50 cities across the country) remained until June 12th 2011, when the decision was made in the Madrid general assembly to dismantle the encampment at Puerta del Sol.

This narrative coming from those being 15M clearly speaks to the part spontaneity played in square occupations. Yet, by unearthing a multiplicity of traditions; of historical moments; historical characters; historical songs; historical languages; and historical struggles, that those being 15M themselves speak of, crystalizes the multiverse that nurtures the complex and ever-shifting collective imaginary of 15M. Individuals being 15M establish symbolic connections with disparate times and places through an exercise of historical imagination that conveys an emotional empathy with them. The perspectives on Spanish history those being 15M present in dialogue, cover the multiple pasts underlying individual interviewee’s ‘15M beingness’. This is a powerful resource for their political and ethical self-interpretation. Without implying that those that I interviewed presented one sole and continuing tradition, what they did show, is that struggles in different time periods were not just memories for them. In the narratives of those being 15M, traditions and events actually exist.

In fact, in contemporary Spain, there are still active cooperatives and a cooperative spirit that have survived and have animated generations of engaged citizens (Think of Mondragon, from the Basque country, the largest cooperative in the world). Horizontal organizations in Spain have one century and a half of living history. Grasping this reality is important when discussing collective presences like 15M. It shows the resilience of these modes of being, and crystalizes the fact that, despite their spontaneity, 15M participants possess and are motivated by the historical living memory of the disparate events those being 15M describe.

By exploring the deep roots and routes of 15M, its multifariousness flourishes. From dialogue within 15M, we see how certain events in Spanish history are interpreted by different individuals within 15M. The detailed account of various and disparate events, conflicts, and traditions from the past, suggests that these, and the particular way in which they are remembered, made 15M what it is today. This affirmation stems from those being 15M who, when asked about their histories, responded with a rich multiplicity of traditions. This shows that 15M did not appear out of thin air or with the invention of social media. 15M has deep roots (and routes) in over a century of collective practices of dissent.