Do environmental refugees migrants have a greater right to safety and relocation?

By Sarah Grunert,  student at the Political Science Department at the University of Victoria

Do environmental refugees or migrants have a greater right to safety and relocation? The positivist would argue that because science can observe natural disasters and climate change that there is realistic necessity for groups to relocate due to accelerated environmental change. Despite persistent protest by some individual countries that climate change is a lie, the fact remains that science is saying otherwise. Science has proven the existence of increased drought prevalence, heightened soil acidity in farming regions, or rising sea levels near to coastal towns. These changes put certain populations of people at risk, especially in developing countries that may not have the resources to combat climate change. These are not social constructs or individual truths, but facts.

Let us not be mistaken: There can be facts proving the necessity for people to relocate due to war or poor quality of life that are collected with positivist methods. While it is grim, you can turn body counts into statistical evidence supporting refugee claims. However, there is always concern that individual states may be covering up that sort of evidence, particularly if there is state-involvement behind the reasons for emigration. Similar to denials of climate change, there can be denials of genocide and civil war.

Environmental migration also falls on a strange and fine line between economic (or voluntary) and forced migration. Arguments can easily be made from each side, both for and against environmental migration. On one hand, if environmental changes create such havoc that there is no realistic way for people to survive, then they could declare they were forced from their lands. But others may claim that environmental degradation made some careers impossible to sustain and therefore left to seek employment elsewhere, which could fall under the title of voluntary. There is also the hypothetical question of what if a population is forced from their nation or territory because other outsiders are taking over the land to survive on their own right? Creating a native of who is eligible for refugee claims may be made even more difficult by the fact that there is no singular person or group to blame. Everyone is in some way, shape or form party to climate change.

So we return to the initial question: If there is greater proof that there is reasoning for these immigrants to exist, should that not mean there is greater international support for and acceptance of them? Is it not a collective responsibility to support environmentally displaced people, when every country around the world could be blamed in some part for climate change? Creating a discourse that accepts the legitimacy of environmental refugees will likely prove easier said than done once, especially when you begin to take factors like resource supply and nationalism into account. Water wars are all hypothetical fun and games now, but blindly ignoring their potential is just ignorant.

 

 

The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and turning grief into helping refugees

Franziska Fischer, PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria

The captivating event hosted by the Center for Global Studies on May 29th, 2019  ‘Turning Grief into Helping Refugees’ opened the floor to the director of the Jean Monnet Center at Dalhousie University Dr. Ruben Zaiotti and Tima Kurdi, an internationally recognized spokesperson and founder of the Kurdi Foundation, to speak aboutthe so-called ‘refugee crisis’ that seems to have the world in its grip since 2015. The event differed from its politically charged and academically framed counterparts usually hosted by the University of Victoria, but rather engaged the audience with the emotional and personal story of Tima Kurdi, the aunt of ‘the boy on the beach’, Alan Kurdi, who tragically drowned in the Mediterranean Sea September 2nd of 2015 while crossing the four kilometers between Turkey and Greece. The event was part of the “Canada Europe Dialogue on Migration ” project  and was co-financed by the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union.

Dr. Ruben Zaiotti took the audience back to 2015, to the time of the perceived climax of the so called ‘crisis’, when the numbers of people seeking safety from war torn countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, climbed up towards the millions. The ‘crisis’ became its own agent and entered discussions not only politically, but found its way into economic, and social debates, most curiously, however, not as the representative of the people seeking refuge, but as the concerned voice of the European and North American people, expressing misgivings about the arrival of the newcomers. A growing resentment urged political actors to manage, control, and therefore decrease the numbers of people entering the Occident. The European Union thus launched its efforts for an externalization of the ‘problem’, the problem being refugees arriving at the peripheral borders of the Union, by reinforcing borders, patrolling sea routes, complicating legal procedures and cutting deals with third countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon. And suddenly, the ‘crisis’ was not people fleeing from war, dying on their way to safety, and drowning in the Mediterranean Sea. The ‘crisis’ was the Occident, having to shoulder the burden of sharing their economic abundance, their space, and political stability with people in need. Populist movements and right-wing political parties piggybacked of this public momentum of self-pity and portrayed seemingly easy solutions to the complex and multilayered problem of having to welcome refugees, consisting of the root causes of the conflict in the Middle East, the rise of ISIS, and political and economic actors, facilitating the influx of refugees since 2015. The easy solutions, such as closing all borders, revoking Schengen and deporting refugees, were cheerfully welcomed by a significant amount of European citizen, resulting in step towards the right in many Member-States, and assisting in events such as Brexit.  But where do we go from here? Within all this political, economic and social turmoil it is important to pause, and listen to stories such as the story of Tima Kurdi.

In a time when everyone, especially in the West seems to have a profound opinion about the identity, the agenda and the culture of ‘refugees’, that are perceived as a grey and homogeneous mass, hearing Tima Kurdi speak is a gentle yet urgent reminder, that we are speaking of humans. Humans coming from complex and politically, religious and culturally diverse spaces. She forces to reflect, by painting an all too familiar picture of a comfortable life in Canada or Europe, where leaned back in comfortable armchairs, we witnessed the conflict in the Middle East unfold on our 32” flat screens; scenes not much different from the Blockbuster Hollywood movie we watched the night before. And yet it is reality, and while we speak compassionate about those suffering far away in our safe homes, the compassion rarely translates into action right in front of our door, in our community, or our country. But Tima Kurdi does not point the finger to blame. Instead she asks questions. “Why do they not get the help they need?”, she reflects on her several trips to Turkey and Syria, bringing the Money that she collected through her Foundation directly to the people in need. With her questions she uncovers an uncomfortable situation, in which political actors seems paralyzed by the complexity of international relations, the diversity in public opinion in their nations, and the economic pressure. By trying to please everyone, to stay in favor of the voting majority, help is stalled, redirected, or turned into complicated procedures for people that want to take the reins in helping others. Thus, Tima Kurdi urges; “Put the political aside! Do not wait for someone to step up. Empower yourself, talk to a friend, reach out to a neighbor. Don’t give up. Ask: How can I help?” Her compassion is contagious and her message is one of hope. What makes her message powerful, she calls out to the individual, not to the collective, to find our individual voices. To speak up, not about the refugees, not for the refugees, but to speak OUT for them. And while the individual might not be able to significantly impact the situation as a whole, spreading messages of hope, such as the story of Tima Kurdi is an important step in shifting the public perception and opinion. And it is the public opinion that can act as a driving social force for change in political and economic narratives. As Tima Kurdi said: “Tomorrow will be a better day!”

 

 

European Central Bank (ECB) and the responses to economic crises

Shannon Rabey, EU Study Tour 2019, student at the University of Victoria

Issue: European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision to keep inflation at zero limits the ability to respond to economic crises as non-standard monetary measures do not provide the same ability to stimulate the economy as traditional monetary measures and have long-term implications for the financial system in Europe.

Links with ECB, Bruegel, Bank of Canada, Brexit, Deutsche Bundesbank University

At the ECB visit, our presenter spoke of the necessity of using non-standard monetary measures due to the exhaustion of standard monetary policy (interest rates). The ECB must turn to other monetary policies such as quantitative easing to help stimulate the economy. I posed the question of whether these non-standard monetary policies would be sufficient if another economic crisis occurs and what the long-term implications of leaving interest rates so low are. The presenter seemed to have anticipated the question and spoke to the successes of low interest rates without addressing the key risks associated with periods of prolonged low interest rates or the ECB’s ability to respond to the next economic downturn if standard monetary policy remains unavailable.

Low interest rates constrain the ability of central banks (CB’s) to respond to economic downturns.  The ECB’s current stance is to turn to non-standard monetary policies to help stimulate the economy. These policies include an asset purchase programme (APP), purchasing of debt securities, targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) as a few examples of what was rolled out in a three-phase response to the 2007 financial crisis (ECB, 2019). While the presenter from the ECB did not elaborate on the risks or possible solutions to prolonged low interest rates, Professor Schollmeyer from the Deutsche Bundesbank University discussed other non-standard measures that are being examined, including the elimination of cash transactions to help circulate money through banks.  In addition, fiscal policies have been examined as a possible solution however there have been questions of their effectiveness in comparison to monetary policy due to the current infrastructure in place. This is speaks to the lack of fiscal policy coordination with the 19 euro-area member states who still remain in control of fiscal and macro-prudential policies (Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza, 2018). The lack of euro-area architectural framework for standardised fiscal policy, non-existent stabilization tools and differences in national macro-prudential frameworks limits the ECB’s effectiveness and requires reforms in order to adequately respond to shocks in the financial system (Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza, 2018). The exhaustion of standard monetary policy is especially concerning with the instability seen in current markets. Most prominently in Europe, the instability caused by Brexit as well as US-China trade relations. In a report released by Bruegel, Martin Wolf, the Chief Economics Commentator of the Financial Times, stated that these low interest rates leave little room to manage even a modest cycle or negative shock (Baltensperger, 2019).

The ECB is following in the footsteps of other central banks like the US Federal Bank and Japan. The Bank of Canada (BOC) has laid out concerns with leaving the interest rate so far below the net neutral interest rate that is estimated to range between 2.25 – 3.25% as of April 2019 (Carter, Chen and Dorich, 2019). The current view of many economists is that current economic trends point to the continuation of low interest rates that will lead to a buildup of vulnerabilities and financial stability risks. It should be noted that a scenario of low interest rates accompanied by low growth implies more significant financial stability risks than a scenario of gradually increasing interest rates. The ideal is to follow the Taylor Rule Principle where central banks should, for each percentage increase in inflation, raise the nominal interest rate by a percentage point as well. This presents an issue as many countries are expected to see periods or relatively low growth. Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza address the net neutral rate in Europe suggesting that if the neutral rate is around 0% in the euro-area and inflation remains around the target of 2% that the interest rates would need to be around 2% following the Taylor Rule principle in order to leave central banks the margin required to adequately respond to the next financial crisis (2019).

The authors of ‘A monetary policy framework for the European Central Bank to deal with uncertainty’ recommend significant reforms to strengthen the resilience of the ECB. These recommendations include a tolerance band around the inflation rate target of 2% and closer coordination with national macro-prudential authorities and greater harmonization of fiscal policies (Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza, 2018). These recommendations would allow greater ability to respond to economic downturns and decrease unfavourable outcomes like deflation. Japan is a country stuck in a ‘low interest rate trap’. They began lowering interest rates over 20 years ago and have now reached a period of deflation and act as a warning story for other central banks to examine their policies and adjust accordingly or face the inability to respond to shocks in the financial system. The ECB should follow the recommendations laid out by Claeys, Demertiz and Mazza to ensure the health of the euro-area economy.

 

Sources

Baltensperger, M. (2019). What 2019 could bring: A look inside the crystal ball. [Blog] Bruegel: European Macroeconomics and Governance. Available at: http://bruegel.org/2019/01/what-2019-could-bring-a-look-inside-the-crystal-ball/ [Accessed 29 May 2019].

Carter, T., Chen, X. and Dorich, J. (2019). The Neutral Rate in Canada: 2019 Update. [online] Bankofcanada.ca. Available at: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/04/staff-analytical-note-2019-11/ [Accessed 3 Jun. 2019].

Claeys, G., Demertzis, M. and Mazza, J. (2019). A monetary policy framework for the European Central Bank to deal with uncertainty. Monetary Dialogue 2019. [online] European Parliament Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/157082/Bruegel_FINAL%20publication.pdf [Accessed 1 Jun. 2019].

ECB. (2019). Monetary policy decisions. [online] Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/decisions/html/index.en.html [Accessed 2 Jun. 2019].

Image by moritz320 from Pixabay

Gaps in the System: Absence of Solidarity Principle on Migration

Noel Guscott, EU Study Tour 2019,  student at the Dalhousie University

Migration is a salient European issue. Certain countries such as Italy and Greece were the major landing zones for migrants fleeing the Middle East and North Africa. The consequences of this asymmetrical migrant flow have caused serious political and socio-cultural tensions. Notably, Gattinara (2017) argues that  the ‘refugee’ crisis exacerbated a crisis of legitimacy within the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS). This blog contribution focuses on part of the EU-level legitimacy crisis, arguing that the crisis has shown gaps in the EU’s ability to promote and enforce the principle of solidarity in migration policy.

Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) outlines a common liberal democratic value system where solidarity is noted but lacks a clear definition. According to a policy post by the European Observatory of Working Life (EurWORK), the solidarity principle can be defined as a “… principle based on sharing both the advantages, i.e. prosperity, and the burdens equally and justly among members”. Articles 79 to 81 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) set the legal direction to establish a ‘common’ immigration policy based on the vague principle of this burden-sharing solidarity (Šalamon, 2018, p. 689). Later, the Schengen and Dublin conventions introduced in the 1990s were supposed to outline workable frameworks to manage internal migration and refugee claimants among MS (Guiraudon, 2018).

Italy and Greece – due in part to the first-country mechanism found within the Dublin Regulation – had the national responsibility to process migrants reaching their shores (2017, p. 321). Internal political and socio-cultural opposition to migrant and refugee assistance made it clear that some MS would not respect the principle of solidarity and prevent comprehensive EU assistance, forcing other MS like Germany to step up their relocation and settlement efforts. Domestically, Italian and Greek right-wing parties have used this breach of trust to heighten anti-immigrant messaging for political gain (Gattinara, 2017, p. 325-326). The response of this fragmented European response was limited to rhetoric, and no institutional measures were successful in reversing these national positions (Gattinara, 2017, p. 322, 328).

The cracks are clear in the immigration policy, but at its root is violations of the solidarity principle. Without a clear institutional framework to promote and enforce solidarity, MS have the ability to pick and choose when and how they help on issues with a collective European impact. This, certainly, threatens the legitimacy of the European project in the days to come.

 

References

European Union (2011, May 4). Solidarity Principle. European Observatory of Working Life. Retrieved May 29, 2019 from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/solidarity-principle.

European Union (2016). Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union – TITLE I – COMMON PROVISIONS – Article 2. Retrieved May 30, 2019 from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016M002&from=EN.

European Union (2012). Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C326, p. 77-78. Retrieved May 29, 2019 from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.

Gattinara, P. C. (2017). The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy, Contemporary Italian Politics         , 9(3), p. 318-331.

Guiraudon, V. (2018). The 2015 refugee crisis was not a turning point: explaining plocy inertia in EU border control. European Political Science, 17(1), p. 151-160.

Šalamon, N. K. (2017). The principle of solidarity in asylum and migration within the context of the European Union accession process. Masstricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(5), p. 689.

Image by Jim Black from Pixabay

 

Analytical Reflection of European Integration

By  Malcolm Thomson, EU Study Tour 2019,  BA student at the Political Science Department, University of Victoria

On May 23rd, the European Central Bank (ECB) presented a talk on its increased supervisory role in the Banking Union to a group of students from Canada during the EU Study Tour. 2019  It allowed  me to gain a nuanced understanding of the dynamics that occur in this relatively new area of EU governance. However, while the presentation allowed me to gain a first-hand account of how employees of the ECB view the actions of their institution in a post-Eurozone crisis context, it also left me with some areas of question regarding the overall action of the ECB in the Banking Union. In preparation for this presentation, I returned to previous research that I had conducted on member state non-compliance with Banking Union policies in order to contextualise the position of the ECB in the broader arena of the Banking Union.

I was especially interested in understanding the ECB’s position on whether member state non-compliance with resolution policies could negatively affect the completion of the Banking Union. These questions stemmed from research conducted by Donnelly (2018), who analysed why cases of Italian and Portuguese non-compliance in the Banking Union occurred. According to Donnelly (2018), it was a mixture of institutional “leeway provided for national authorities” and “accommodation from the Commission and Single Resolution Board (SRB)” that allowed for member states to act against the policies set out in the Banking Union if such policies did not fit the member state’s national interest (p.159). Further, it was this lack of institutional and political rigidity that allowed “liberal economic nationalism” the exist within the Banking Union, which significantly decreased the effectiveness of the Banking Union at further breaking the link between private banks and sovereign debt (Donnelly, 2018, p.159-160). Although the political role of the Commission was not directly addressed in the presentation, the presenter’s answers to the question asked regarding member state non-compliance allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of how the ECB sees its role in the Banking Union.

The answer provided by the ECB was focused on showcasing the completed areas of the Banking Union and highlighting that the SRB was a powerful and reliable institution in resolving banks according to EU rules. While this answer showed that the ECB was more focused on its role in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SRM) than the SRB, it was limited in explaining how politics and national preferences by member states can work their way into decisions made in the Banking Union. Though it is understandable that the ECB would not give a political answer to the question, it is interesting to take that apolitical stance and place it in the context of the larger Banking Union. This is because, as Donnelly (2018) showed in his article, the political actions of the Commission and the SRB have had a significant effect in bending guidelines to non-compliant member states, which in turn limits Banking Union’s effectiveness. For the ECB to see itself as an actor completely removed from these political areas of Banking Union highlights disunity in how EU bodies see their relationship with member states in banking policy following the Eurozone crisis. Although, this disunity also creates interesting questions regarding how much national political context should be given to Banking Union resolutions, and how much the EU should take into account member states that will work to be non-compliant given their national government’s views towards European integration. The answers to these questions could be beneficial to understanding the relationship between the EU and its member states in the area of banking policy post-Eurozone crisis.

References

Donnelly, S. (2018). Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 21(2), 159-173. doi: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1400433

The impact of the migrant crisis on human trafficking – insights to the work of PAYOKE

By Jasmine Pathak, EU Study Tour 2019,   student and Director at Large at the University of Victoria Students’ Society

Payoke is a civil society organization (CSO) offering aid to victims of human trafficking and victims of smuggling with aggravating circumstances. During the second week of the European Union (EU) Study Tour 2019 I was able to participate in a presentation on how CSOs operate in the public arena and contribute to political and social development within the context of the EU.  The presenter focused mostly on the methods through which Payoke aids victims of human trafficking.

Firstly, Payoke outlines the Belgian legal system to victims and can support them to launch complaints against their traffickers. Secondly, Payoke helps victims to integrate into Belgian society by including the requirement of social skill development and learning the norms and values of Belgian life. This individual counselling helps them to integrate into the professional world while finding a suitable job. Moreover, Payoke also offers psychological support to help victims heal from any experienced trauma.

A significant point that I had not previously considered before visiting was the impact of the migrant crisis on human trafficking. For example, our speaker outlined how traffickers have capitalized on the migrant crisis by offering fraudulent, and often dangerous, services to transport migrants. In addition, we also discussed the challenges faced by EU leaders in responding to human trafficking cases on a supranational level, as some states wish to help victims upon arrival in Europe, whereas others would rather address the root causes. This point is supported by Gattinara (2017, p. 328) who argues that “EU leaders have been incapable, if not unwilling, to grasp the interconnectedness between the political, economic and ideological crises that the [migrant] community is facing” and that the EU must examine how different crises (such as the financial crisis, Brexit, and climate change) intersect with migration. I found this point interesting to compare with sentiments voiced in a later seminar with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), which stressed that effective migration policy is cross-cutting and multifaceted.

Finally, our speaker from Payoke highlighted the lack of European media attention to human trafficking, which also holds true in Canada. In fact, this visit encouraged me to conduct further research on the human trafficking of refugees in Canada. Overall, I was impressed by the number of services offered by Payoke, as the organization appeared to be operating on limited staff and resources, and I learned more about the role of civil society in the EU.

References

Gattinara, Pietro Castelli (2017).  ‘The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy’.  Contemporary Italian Politics, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 318-331

Russia-EU Relations May Not Be As Bleak As They Seem

By Alina Sobolik,  EU Study Tour 2019, student at the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria

Introduction: Why Talk About It?

The EU and Russia are both significant actors on the world stage, both in the size of their economies and the values that they represent. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Liberal Democracy has been the law of the land, and Human Rights have been the hot topic. However, is it possible that this is only because those nations that felt otherwise were too weak at the moment to protest? And do these kinds of values have any place in bilateral economic agreements?

Through my studies on the European Union and my participation the University of Victoria’s European Union Study Tour and Internship Program, I have observed what I believe may be a shift in this global dynamic. A primary example for me is the transforming relationship between Russia and the EU. As their relationship has faced several obstacles in recent years, resulting in sanctions from the EU and a failure to re-negotiate an agreement, observers have concluded that the relationship is dead, with no future in sight.

I disagree. The relationship as it was born is dead, however I believe that there is a future for EU-Russia relations that reflects the changing power dynamics between them as Russia regains its ground as a global actor. This new relationship would be one that does not include ideological conditions from either side, but is based purely on economic and strategic benefit.

 From Friends to Enemies?

In Hiski Haukkala’s journal article titled “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations,” he outlines the events that contributed to the freezing of Russia-EU relations. Furthermore, he argues that the relationship cannot be recovered due to Russia’s insistence to establish a sphere of influence.[1]

He states that through its relationship with Russia, the European Union “…has sought to lock Russia into a highly institutionalized, indeed post-sovereign arrangements with a view of creating an essentially unipolar Europe based on the EU’s liberal norms and values.[2]” This is in part because of the circumstances under which the relationship was formed following the fall of the Soviet Union, with Russia recovering from complete failure of government and undergoing a process of state formation while the EU was consolidating power as a world actor.[3] What resulted was a relationship wherein the European Union was able to integrate ideological and moral values into the relationship on a conditional basis.

This is reflected in the nature of the 1994 Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, which actually includes the goal of “gradual integration” between Russia and the EU, with an article (2) on respect for democracy and human rights as well as mention of the “community values” making it clear that this integration would take a Eurocentric form.[4]

Someone Has Got To Budge

Haukkala argues that the EU’s “Common Neighborhood Policy” forced a face-off of the two powers by encroaching on what Russia perceives to be its sphere of influence, with the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union as proof of tension between powers.[5]

Furthermore, various events, including actions on the ground in Chechnya, the election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia, and Russian action in the Ukraine resulted in the ‘freezing’ of Russia EU relations and the establishment of sanctions from both sides.[6]

While I agree with Haukkala that “…the years of intense interaction between the two have brought to the fore and perhaps even accentuated the differences in underlying worldviews between the EU and Russia,” I also believe the relationship will resume.[7] This is due to the unique opportunity I have had as a participant in the EU Study Tour two consecutive years in a row. In both years we were able to meet with representatives from the Russian Mission to the EU and from the EU Desk Officer to Russia. However, the tone of the presentations was drastically different this year than in 2018.

The Reality On the Ground

In 2018, both presenters approached the situation as a dilemma, a stalemate not likely to be broken. When asked about future relations, the Russian representative essentially stated that Russia had done all that it could and was waiting on the EU to ‘accept’ its ‘attempts at cooperation.’ She did not seem optimistic about the probability of a resolution because Russia would not be willing to compromise on the Minsk Agreement (calling for Russia to remove its military forces from the Ukraine).[8]

The EU representative had a similar sentiment, stating that the EU would maintain its sanctions until Russia adhered to the conditions of the Minsk Agreement. This year, both sides focused their presentation and tone not on the importance of the Minsk Agreement as a sticking point in negotiations but on the cooperation that has managed to continue regardless.

The Russian representative stated that there is a “common understanding that they [Russia and the EU] remain neighbors and major trade and economic partners.” She also stated that “political dialogue” between the two parties is active and that meetings are taking place regularly.

The representative from the EU also mentioned the smaller, bilateral relations that continue in various sectors outside of security as well as the trade that continues between Russia and the EU despite sanctions. He explained that while EU leaders like Tusk no longer meet with Putin, ministers from both sides still cooperate regularly.

When discussing the remaining sanctions, he implied that the EU may have considered reducing them if not for several unfortunately timed incidents, and that he was hopeful going into future discussions on the possibility of reducing sanctions.

I questioned if this could be possible, a gradual renewal of the relationship without adherence to the Minsk Agreement and he stated “Minsk or no Minsk, we will reconsider.”

 What Does This Mean?

This serves as evidence that while we are in fact seeing a turning point for Russia EU relations, the ideological differences may not serve as an existential threat to the relationship. It may result in a shift in the relationship’s dynamics rather than its complete destruction.

Rather than the EU coming from a position of influence over Russia, they may interact as two equal actors who stand to benefit from each other regardless of fundamental ideological differences, taking ideology and establishment of norms out of the relationship as a result.

Notes

Haukkala, Hiski. “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:1 (2015): 25-40, DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2014.1001822

Schläpfer, Christian. “Ukraine Crisis and Mediation.” Security and Human Rights 27, no. 3-4 (2016): 327-341.

[1] Hiski Haukkala, “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:1 (2015): 37

[2] Ibid., 25.

[3] Ibid., 26.

[4] Ibid., 27.

[5] Ibid., 32.

[6] Ibid., 29-35.

[7] Ibid., 31.

[8] Christian Schläpfer, “Ukraine Crisis and Mediation,” Security and Human Rights 27, no. 3-4 (2016): 327-341.

Volunteering in a Refugee Camp in Greece

By Franziska Fischer, PhD candidate, Political Science, University of Victoria

After dedicating most of my academic career intellectualizing and theorizing about migration flows and trying to understand and explain social, political and economic reactions to sudden influxes of people due to conflict or natural disasters I took the opportunity between my Master degree and my PhD to leave the books behind and spend some time working on the ground with the organization ‘Lifting Hands International’ in Greece in a Community Center and Accommodation for Refugees.

Perception of a situation is a powerful tool to create social reaction, and I hope a series of experience reports from different volunteers and first responders in Greece may assist in balancing an often fear driven narrative created by the media. The following experience reports are highly subjective and personal glimpses into a sphere of interaction between refugees and dedicated individuals, who have donated their time and energy to improve the often dire circumstances in the refugee camps in Greece.

My personal experience brought me to the northern Greek town Serres in early 2018.

Cold Weather – Warm People

Serres is a small town of 80,000 people tucked at the base of the Vrontous mountain range, one hour northeast of Thessaloniki by car. It is actually closer to Bulgaria than it is to Thessaloniki. It is a typical Greek town, meaning great food, friendly people, and a lot of politics. It’s hot and humid during the summer and brutally cold in the winter. When I arrived in Serres it was early January, and while there was fortunately little snow on the ground, the temperatures barely rose above freezing levels.

Yazidi Refugees

Most residents of the refugee camp, which was organized by the local Greek municipality, were Yazidi. Targeted by ISIS as a religious minority, the Yazidi community has endured a grim period of genocide and is by now almost completely wiped out due to violent takeovers in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. If you are interested in the Yazidi community and their stories please read through at the first third of the UN’s report on the genocide of Yazidis, in order to understand what the residents of Serres camp have been through and what sets them apart. In a nutshell Yazidis are member of a Kurdish religious minority found primarily in northern Iraq, their official language is Kurmanji and after the invasion of the IS in their region and their vicious persecution, their culture got almost entirely wiped out as the survivors had to flee over the Sinjar mountain range to escape genocide.

During my time in Serres, I took over the German lessons, as the previous language teachers Kathi and Corinne were departing back to Germany and Switzerland. Many Yazidis already have families in Germany and are just waiting to join them, which unfortunately can take several years with the current backlog in European bureaucracy and the ongoing disputes between the Member States of the European Union to find a coherent system to deal with the refugee influx.

My goal was to utilize the time I had with the Yazidi community to give them a solid understanding of language and habits of the German life to allow a smooth arrival in the anal German bureaucracy as well as navigate the jungle or rules that is the German language with fun and exciting lessons. During my time in Serres I offered Beginner German, Advanced German, German for the Babas (Dads) and the Mamas (Moms). I also initiated an ABC class, designed to teach people not familiar with the Latin Alphabet. Additionally, I started a band project with the Yazidis to combine their countless talents on the guitar, ukulele, piano, drums and singing to a wonderful band-project, the Blue-Hearts, we called ourselves. Some members of our little band requested to cover Justin Bieber songs, and even though I do not feel strongly about that request, it just showed me, they are just normal teenagers, identifying with some of the same cultural phenomena as any western teenager. Music is such powerful tool to connect people and it reminded me time and again, instead of always searching for differences; how is that person distinct from me – we can find s many beautiful connections through similarities, may it even be a terrible taste in music. After about a week of rehearsal, there was not a single person in the camp, who was not able to hum along to Justin Biebers ‘Love yourself’ as we practiced everyday for over an hour, outside around the fire, for everyone to hear and participate.

Even though I was offering four different levels of German classes, from ABC to Advanced, the levels and especially the age gap is tremendous in my groups, which makes it very challenging, but often just as much fun. The group dynamic is such a wonderful thing to observe when you witness some of the babas (Dads) erupting in a petty little disputes about who said a word first and correct, or some of the teenage girls maturely navigating their advanced understanding of the alphabet to the benefit of the whole group. My heart jumped with joy when we played charades and I was barely done painting a hardly identifiable jacket, and 15 people almost fell over from leaning forward and yelling at me from the top of their lungs: “JACKE, JACKE, JACKE.” When I then held my finger up and asked: “Artikel?” they group resumed yelling: “DIE JACKE; DIE JACKE; DIE JACKE.” They brought so much passion, devotion and ambition to class, I could hardly wish for a more wonderful group of people to teach German too. Not rarely did some of them sneak into the tents before or in between classes to write words on the whiteboard and ask me to correct them and to give tips.

Our Goals

We wanted to make a positive impact and help the people to heal from their tremendously dangerous journey and experiences. We wanted to help create an environment in which the people can thrive and develop their wonderful personalities and talents. We hoped to provide a space in which the many kids and teenagers can grow safely and hopefully soon will find a more permanent home. What happened during my time in Serres was however much more balanced. It was a give and take, it was a collaboration between people, not a hierarchy. The atmosphere was coined by respect, by gratitude and by trust on both sides. We were invited to eat and drink chai (tea) and play games, sing songs and craft beautiful decorations together. As they slowly learned German, I slowly learned Kurmanji.  Everyone helps, everyone participated with learning each other’s customs, languages, with building the constructions and providing the energy, the time and the love to create a community more than anything else.

If my time in Serres has done one thing, it has humbled me to the core and showed me, there is no need for a continuation of coloniality, for othering and for xenophobia. However, it is time to listen.

It is time to listen

We often find ourselves talking instead of listening, assuming instead of knowing. The confidence of our western understanding of the world drowns the expertise, the wisdom, and the tales from other parts of this world. It is time to listen

Especially coming from an academic background on migration and refugee studies, I am used to fancy, renowned and established scholars, usually stemming from a western university or education institution explaining, describing and analyzing a situation. And in the same line of learning, I have adapted and taken in this linear way of communication knowledge and understanding. I can intellectualize my hypocrisy, but here in Serres I actually learn to shut up and listen. It is not about me, it is not about theories, about abstract concepts and fancy names. It is a about humans that have so much to tell. And it is a privilege to listen, I am humbled by their willingness to share with me their tales, their knowledge and their unbroken spirits, optimism and positivity.

Let this be a reminder to us all, to speak to each other instead of speaking for someone. Let this be a reminder to listen and hear what is said, instead of assuming what we already know. Let this be an invitation to bring together people of different realities and knowledges to share with ne another, instead of condemning otherness. It is an opportunity – lets treat it as such and not as a threat to a construct in our heads.

 

Democracy in the Age of Surveillance

By Alexandra Crabtree, 4th year political science undergraduate student at the University of Victoria

Surveillance has become an activity people choose to engage with. We surrender personal information without thought of consequences or broader societal implications. Entering a digital era, technology has become an inescapable feature of our lives requiring us to forfeit privacy liberties in exchange for access. We consent to engage because otherwise we are cut off from the benefits of this transformative era.

Political campaigning has always involved access to voter information. The ability to communicate and deliberate with the electorate is a crucial component of any democratic process. In order for a political party to operate, they have to know what the voters want. Yet as the recent Cambridge-Analytica scandal exposes, there is a fine line between democratic deliberation and data-driven campaigns built off of personal information. As free and fair elections are the bedrock of any democratic society, should big data play a role in campaigns?

Political parties create a “vital link between the citizen and the state” (ICO, 17). With the proliferation of social media and digital advertising, there has been a notable shift in the way parties interact with the electorate. Following the Brexit vote, debates have emerged over the use of data in political campaigns in the UK. By “microtargeting,” political parties can select certain demographics, locations, or behaviors to target with their campaign.

Following the Analytica scandal, the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has released a series of recommendations to keep political processes transparent and lawful when using data analytics. The ICO calls for an “ethical pause” to allow parliament, regulators, and political parties the time to “reflect on their responsibilities in respect of the use of personal data in the era of big data, before there is a greater expansion in the use of new technologies” (ICO, 3).

The UK operates under significantly more regulated laws in terms of the harvesting and sharing of data than the US (under the General Data Protection Regulation). Yet, parties in the UK have significantly increased their investment in data-driven campaigning after seeing how effective it was in the 2015 general election. As Colin Bennett notes, “these practices are far less common in countries that have multi-party systems in elections based on proportional representation.”

Data-driven campaigns are far more effective in countries that operate under first-past-the-post voting systems because they typically result in two-party majorities. In which case, targeting and creating a campaign for a profiled electorate is much simpler. When there are multiple political parties, profiling the electorate is much harder to do because predictive analytics are less effective as there are a wider variety of interests.

In an era of populist parties and decaying democracy, regulating access to personal information is crucial. As seen in the 2016 US election, microtargeting enabled Trump to create and target a platform of specific groups. The ICO’s ethical pause gives regulators the opportunity to come up with effective data analytic campaign laws to prevent populist parties entering parliament through tailored campaigns.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bennett, Colin. 2018. Island Voices: Proportional Representation Isn’t All About the Data. November. Accessed 2019. https://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/op-ed/island-voices-proportional-representation-isn-t-all-about-the-data-1.23484578.

Lunden, Ingrid. 2018. UK’s Information Commissioner Will Fine Facebook the Maximum £500k Over Cambridge Analytica Breach. Accessed 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/10/uks-information-commissioner-will-fine-facebook-the-maximum-500k-over-cambridge-analytica-breach/.

Macintyre, Amber. 2018. United Kingdom: Data and Democracy in the UK. Accessed 2019. https://ourdataourselves.tacticaltech.org/posts/overview-uk/.

Nivens, Sergey. n.d. D: 486793459. Accessed 2019. https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/camera-keep-eye-on-woman-mixed-486793459?src=8e_s9a-UJALesvITvyZUkA-1-0.

Office, Information Commissioner’s. 2018. Democracy Disrupted? July. Accessed 2019. https://ico.org.uk/media/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf.

Picture Credit:  By Sergey Nivens