Ukraine is heading for the membership in the EU and NATO

By Serhy Yekelchyk, Professor of Slavic Studies and History, University of Victoria, President of the Canadian Association for Ukrainian Studies

Ukraine’s Constitution Now Spells out the Nation’s Intent to Join the EU and NATO

On 7 February the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill on inserting into the country’s Constitution several statements about Euro-Atlantic integration as the nation’s paramount aim in the field of foreign relations. The additions to three articles define reaching full membership in the EU and NATO as Ukraine’s “strategic goal,” and charge the president with overseeing its implementation. The change to the Preamble proclaims this strategic course “irreversible.”

It is unprecedented for a candidate-country to enshrine such priorities in the Constitution, but Ukraine’s situation is equally unprecedented. Nearly five years after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the start of the Russian-sponsored war in the Donbas, the goals of the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013–14 remain elusive. Russia’s attack on Ukrainian navy ships in the Black Sea in November 2018 brought home the ever-present danger of conflict escalation. With the economy still crippled by corruption and the EU continuously lukewarm on Ukrainian aspirations for membership, popular disappointment in the political class is growing. Just two months before the presidential elections, a comedian with no political experience or clear program is leading in the polls.

President Petro Poroshenko, who is currently polling third, has been trying desperately to boost his rating with largely declarative measures, such as the introduction of martial law for a month in November (which was never really implemented) or the changes to the Constitution. Potentially more significant was his leadership in establishing a new national Orthodox Church in opposition to the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church. This move, which caused a spectacular split in October between the patriarchs of Moscow and Constantinople, is proving instrumental in the construction of a new Ukrainian identity as separate from Russian.

Yet, the voters are likely to judge Poroshenko on his dismal record of economic reform and combatting corruption. With this in mind, ambassadors of Western nations organized a closed-door meeting with the comedian-candidate, trying to determine whether Ukraine is set for the triumph of populist rhetoric not unlike the one a few Western countries have already experienced.

Picture credits:  © Аимаина хикари | Wikimedia Commons

Alternative Identities

By Robert Gould

The title of this blog contribution is a reference to the name of the far-right party in Germany Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany: AfD) now represented in the parliaments of all sixteen individual states (Bundesländer) of Germany and in the Bundestag.

In the elections in Andalusia on 2 December 2018, Vox España (a new far-right party whose name can readily be understood as the ‘Voice of Spain’) won 12 seats in the Andalusian Parliament, the first time it had achieved any parliamentary representation.  This was enough to give it significant leverage in the selection of a new premier to set the direction for the parliament and government of Andalusia.  It is now quite conceivable that later this year (2019), after the wave of elections on May 26th, Vox could be represented in the parliaments of the majority of Spain’s sixteen autonomous communities and in the European Parliament.  These ‘autonomous communities’ play a large role in Spanish government and political life and possess many of the characteristics and responsibilities of a German Bundesland or a Canadian province.  And, like the AfD, Vox is certainly proposing an alternative identity for Spain.

Beginning some years ago, I started a series of analyses on discourses of national identity in individual member states of the European Union as presented in parties’ election platforms and official statements.  It quickly became clear that ‘identity’ was of increasing significance as one moved from parties of the centre-right such as the CDU or CSU towards, for example, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, the Rassemblement national in France and the Alternative für Deutschland.  This is a phenomenon also shared by parties on the Right of the political spectrum which are now taking on more prominence in other countries across the EU.  And within this concern for national identity and the desire to cultivate, strengthen and protect it, the topic of religion receives increasing political attention – at a time when, paradoxically, reliable statistics indicate that in many European countries Christianity is playing an ever-decreasing role in people’s lives.

These two factors of ‘national identity’ and religion link the positions of both AfD and Vox, and also other right-leaning parties.  ‘Identity’ is usually represented by an idealised and sometimes distant past which all citizens share, and also by the feeling of being part of a region and sharing local customs and practices.  This is summarised in the German-speaking areas by such terms as Heimat (the area of the individual’s origin and emotional attachment) or (deutsche) Leitkultur (the defining culture which produces German-ness), or by arraigo (rootedness) or hispanidad  (Spanishness) in Spain.  All of these factors have led, we are told, to the realisation of the ‘nation state’ and the creation of a unity and commonality of which all citizens can / should / must be proud.

As alluded to above, the key term in much of this political discourse is ‘protect’.  But protect from what or who?  As was all too often the case in the past, it is protection from difference or from ‘outsiders’ who are widely defined as constituting a threat to ‘our’ identity and values: migrants / immigrants (whether from within the EU or from third countries), Islam in Europe, and the EU itself.  These are all cited as unwelcome factors for changes which should be repudiated.

Thus, both implicitly and explicitly, the existing parties of centre-left or centre-right are branded as being incapable of protecting the Nation as the larger focus of identity and the Local as the closer or personal element of identity.

In addition, and arising from a definition of democracy and the attribution of greater importance or relevance to the nation state, increasing emphasis is being placed on the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ (where ‘popular’ refers to the ethnic people / nation) or ‘national sovereignty’.  Logically, this stands in contrast to the transfers of significant political power and decision-making to supranational organisations in Europe which have been occurring over the past several decades.

All of the above are also related to a return to an earlier view of the position of women in society and the nature (and function) of the family.  This is now defined in what can be regarded as very conservative terms: wife-plus-husband-plus-several-children.  One function of this is economic — to provide more workers of the right background for the national economy, and the other is political – to provide more voters of the right background (i.e. not of immigrant families) for the nation state.  Both these trends would also reduce the need for immigration. For the sake of promoting this view of women as primarily belonging in the home, one force which has to be combatted is, it is claimed, the EU with its ‘gender ideology’ or ‘gender mainstreaming’.

And where is Islam in this?  It is presented as an anti-model: an anti-model of women’s and human rights, an anti-model to the European way of thinking and to the bases of European society, and an anti-model to an open and plural society [the reader will grasp the irony in some of these statements].  Just as national politicians and Brussels are an enemy within and without, so also is Islam: present in traditionally Christian Europe but representing an alien invasion.

Ever since Germany and Spain emerged from the destruction of war and from their separate traumatic and traumatising authoritarian pasts, each has been defining itself as a ‘normal’ European country.  Led from above by political elites, the two countries have been integrating into a broader economic and political European community, developing and emphasising shared characteristics, and attempting to put aside as atavistic those facets of national self-understanding which divide.

In contrast, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Voice of Spain (Vox España) are suggesting that they are voices from below with a political orientation and a view of the nation and its values closer to those which people really hold, or want to hold, but have been deprived of by out-of-touch elites.  And one aspect of these voices from below, the most important one, is the deliberate and explicit weakening of ties to the European Union in the name of a more distinct alternative national identity.

Represented by UKIP and the Leave campaign, these were also the voices from below which have led to the fantasy and folly of Brexit, the disturbing ramifications of which are now becoming ever clearer.

Seville, January 2019

For an analysis of AfD’s five election manifestos in 2017: https://www.upo.es/investiga/demospain/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.10.22_DT.Demospain_2018.003.pdf

For a commentary on the election of Vox España to the Andalusian parliament and its implications for European politics, see:  https://carleton.ca/ces/?p=11034

For more analyses by Robert Gould: https://carleton.ca/slals/people/gould-robert/

Photo by Daniel von Appen

Navigating the global jungle full of political, economic, and social interactions

By Franziska Fischer, PhD student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria

Globalization has us all moving closer together. Space has become a relative concept, which is overcome through technology, through economic agreements and political collaborations on a global scale.

But while in many aspects this transgression of physical and imagined space is celebrated and supported under the slogan of progress, a  different aspect has emerged that produces anxiety and uncertainty in the population and in the political and economic landscape. Issues over security, inequality, environmental degradation, migration and questions concerning the interrelationship between global and national politics have shaped the contemporary discussion on globalization.

We can witness these issues rise, especially after moments of crisis, whether that takes the shape of a terrorist attack, human rights violations, rising unemployment and a widening gap between rich and poor, natural disasters due to climate change and an influx in migration and refugees due to conflict and war. What follows these nodal points are the installment of mechanisms of control that aim to contain these issues, and to provide some relief for the uncertainty and anxiety that evolved around globalization.

These mechanisms of control may take various shapes and forms through law, policy-making, economic and political agreements and even the shaping of perception through various media channels. They are initiated on a local, national or global level, within communities, by nation-states, and through supranational or international organizations or cooperation, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, just to name a few.

But how do we navigate this global jungle full of political, economic, and social interactions that make it very difficult to find a clear path towards the solution to our current problems, while providing an encompassing understanding of the pros and cons, and all the ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ that rise with every new turn we take? One point of departure may be to focus on these mechanisms of control that emerge out of crisis and that shape the ongoing direction of political and economic agendas, that determine the future tone and attitude towards the issues, and that provide an understanding of the uncertainties and anxieties different societies deal with. We can split these mechanisms of control into three different subsections, dealing with the public perception of a crisis reflected in media channels, the legislative approach that may already be in place, and emerging public policies as a result of a crisis. All the mechanisms are highly interactive and regularly depend on each other or evolve as a consequence of each other. Thus, the public perception may impact the policy-making process, laws may shape the public standpoint on an issue, and policies may contradict or support legislative agreements.

Pics by Oscar Nilsson

Canada’s border and Migration policies in comparative perspective

by Franziska Fischer, PhD student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria

On Tuesday, November 13th, 2018 the Jean Monnet Network  at UVic brought together a network of scholars, lawyers and practitioners in order to discuss Canada’s border and migration policies in comparative perspective. The focus of the workshop emphasized the interconnection between public and political narratives and policy-making in a Canadian and European Union context and its effect on border-regimes. Three different Panel discussion and a concluding Roundtable discussion brought together the different perspectives of the participants on recent migration trends in Canada and the EU and offered a glimpse into potential policy-making approaches, and its obstacles and issues.

Dr. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly introduced in his opening remarks the overarching theme of the workshop: the tension arising between migration and the concept of freedom and mobility that consequently results in a divergence between legislation and practice. This we can be witnessed in the European Union, as well as in Canada, where the perception of a refugee ‘crisis’ resulted in new interpretations of established border policies, such as the Schengen-Agreement in the EU and the safe-third-country agreement between Canada and the United States.

But how come we see these changes most recently? While migration has increased in volume over the past century, it has not increased in proportion to the world population. Thus, the trigger for recent changes sociopolitical trends concerning managing migration must be identified, rather than in demographic facts, in the perception of recent migration trends. The perception is that of a crisis, which is created, enhanced, reproduced and exploited through several channels to the public and the political landscape, including the media, legal definitions and political actions amongst many more. This constructed discourse regarding migrants and especially refugees in the recent years has created a path leading towards distinct policies.

The first Panel set the context by addressing ethical questions and humanitarian issues regarding global border and migration policies, critically evaluating the frames and labels that facilitate the creating of the current perception on migration in Canada and the EU. In Canada, migration and specifically the arrival of refugees is aimed to be connected to economic potential and progress, while in the European Union the perception is rather connected to an economic burden of the Member States to accommodate the influx of people. Nevertheless, in both contexts, regardless of the perception of economic potential or burden, migration is inherently connected to a security threat. Failure of existing institutions and policies to address this perception resulted in the theme of a ‘crisis’, with which recent refugee migration is now instantly connected to. The frame ‘crisis’ supports the notion of an existential threat and attaches a criminal identity to refugees by them simply crossing the border. This then results in an increase in police force, border patrols and even the closing of borders in both Canada and the European Union. The perception fails to distinguish between different types of migration, initiated through different types of conflict, economic necessity or climate change, which are all individually in need of distinguished policy consideration. National and international institutions and policies already in place fail to manage these different policy needs. Concluding the first Panel was the recognition of issues in the framing the situation that leads to a discourse which pushes for certain policy changes, such as the securitization of the border which will or is failing to respond to the situation.

The second Panel addressed already existing national policies in place in Canada and in the European Union and identified their shortcomings based on a flawed perception of the situation. The national policies in place within the Member States of the European Union differ from those in Canada, as the European Union provides an overarching political framework that ought to administer and manage the implementation of national policies based on a European Union wide standard encoded in its legislation. While all Member States initially agreed to a certain policy structure regarding migrants and refugees, we can witness three distinctions in national reactions within the European Union: Welcome-culture nations; Status-Quo nations, and Refusal countries. However, within all three reactions there were changes implemented in their national adaptation of the EU policy in direct answer to the perception of the security threat through migration. Consequently, two major EU legislations are at stake, the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention and the concept of freedom of mobility in the European Union is no longer perceived as an advantage. Canada, being in a geographically different position that European Union Member States, nevertheless struggled to contain an anti-immigrant rhetoric. This resulted in a decline in the admission of Permanent Residents under the Family and the refugee categories in addition to the declining levels of government assistance in contrast to a rise in privately sponsored refugees. While Prime Minister Trudeau urged to the public that ‘diversity’ is Canadas strength, other voices connecting crime and migration are very loud in the Canadian political landscape. This leads to the questions: what can really explain this refusal attitude? Is it based in history, culture, populism, discourse or economic factors? And if policy is created based on a flawed perception how can we in academia ‘through sand’ into the mechanisms of policy making?

The final Panel added different perspectives from the field to the academic debate about policy-making based on public perception. The evolution of the US-Canada border underlines the increasing role of technology within border-policy-making. Biometric necessities and identification procedures are on the rise as tools to cope with the fear driven perception of an increasing migration trend in Canada as well as in the European Union. Administratively, in both Canada and the European Union we can witness huge backlogs of any refugee and asylum claims, as well as other entry classification categories, which now take up to 20 months in Canada and in some cases in the European Union have reportedly been on the shelf for more than four years. The solution for these huge backlogs seems to be in many instances sought in closing the borders rather then dealing with it administratively. What ultimately plays into the perception of the situation that calls for a refusal attitude mirrored in national policy is the representation of the situation in the media.

 

But how can we deal with this issue over fact and fiction in the perception of migration and refugees? How can we shape opinions and perceptions and direct them towards a more fact-based understanding? Would this necessary result in a different knowledge production that inherently leads down a different policy path? Or is there a different point of entry to this issue rather than discourse and meaning-making? By shedding light and connecting important dots regarding the creation of narratives and producing policy-outcomes, this workshop has set a very comprehensive framework in order to move forward creating a more distinguished soil for growing policy-recommendations. All participants deem it crucial to address the discourse and perception regarding migration and refugees before implementing policies and urge to acknowledge the potential for political actors to exploit a certain refusal perception for their agenda. As further steps, we now need to find methodologies and tools to disrupt and unlearn, what has been produced out of a place of fear, rather than compassion, or even merely a fact-based understanding of the situation.

Canadian Displacement Dates: When will you become environmentally displaced?

UVic Student, Isolde Murdoch – March 11, 2017

Compared to the majority of the world, those living in Canada enjoy a nation high in resources and a climate favourable to agricultural production. Due to the rapid increase of climate changes and environmental depletion, this will become even more apparent over the next couple of decades. Although, we will find ourselves in a much more comfortable and stable position, than much of the world – which has begun to, and will increasingly experience extreme weather, followed by high levels of famine, conflict and migration – this does not in any way mean that Canada will not feel the direct and indirect effects of environmental changes.

There are Canadian populations who will be forced to flee their homes in search of protection from climate changes and environmental disasters. In particular, low coastal regions, such as those living on Canada’s Arctic and Pacific coastal areas, will continue to see rapidly rising sea levels, which will result in more severe flooding, and ultimately, these areas could become uninhabitable as they are consumed by the sea. If the land in highly populated areas is washed away, such as in some areas of Greater Vancouver, this will result in massive numbers of environmentally displaced persons. Also, severe environmental events, such as the Fort McMurray wildfire in 2016 or the storm in 2013 that forced 100,000 Albertans to flee their homes due to flooding, will become more prevalent and harsh, resulting in greater incidences of temporary displacement. Even though Canadians will be displaced, temporarily or permanently, it is likely that these people will be able to relocate within Canada. This is not going to be the case for the rest of the world, most of whom will have no choice but to flee their countries out of a desperation to survive.

With this said, it is highly likely that Canada will increasingly be seen as a desired country of relocation, and soon, one of the only liveable countries with an adequate level of resources; particularly that of water. Furthermore, history has shown that when a nation, particularly a developed nation, has depleted their own resources, they turn around and deplete the resources of another. As nations are faced with the inability to provide the necessities of life to their citizens, it is to be expected that extreme measures would be taken to acquire such resources. Rather than hypothesize on the horrifying measures that could taken against Canada, I question: what measures can be taken to combat climate change from occurring so rapidly, as well as to help nations adapt to the realities of severe environmental events and to assist populations to stay in their home countries, or receive support to relocate when necessary? Without policies and plans in place to deal with the catastrophic effects of environmental changes, Canada will inevitably face a precarious future.

Although Canadians may not experience imminent displacement from climate change, it seems very probable that without prompt and sufficient action, that Canadians could find themselves displaced due to the effects of conflict or war between Canada and countries starving for resources.

What is your displacement date?

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) asylum claims in Canada

by Bridget Woods, UVic Student

The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) has recently updated its ‘Guideline 9’ on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression.

The new guidelines have come from concerns identified from past proceedings from the IMB that relate to claim refusal. The new guidelines maintain that those who experience persecution based on their sexual orientation or gender identity and expression qualify as a social group, which enables them to be considered under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Another asset to the guidelines is its acknowledgement of the spectrum of sexual and gender characteristics, going so far as to call standard terminologies deficient in their scope and understanding of global and societal variety. The guidelines make particular mention of the importance of understanding country of origin information, focusing on the on the ground reality rather than statutory law. In addition to its progressive use of definitions and language, the guideline is apt to recognize intersections of sexual and gender identities with identifiers such as race, class, religion, and age. Particular attention is given to unique threats for children with SOGI expression, which is a precedent setting move in the global arena of SOGI based refugee claims. Although these changes are promising, there are also shortcomings with the new Canadian guidelines. One example comes from the guidelines understandings of persecution. If same-sex acts are criminalized in a country, the guidelines do not consider that environment as grounds for persecution, however- if someone has to conceal their sexual or gender identity, that may be considered persecution. These dubious parameters leave too much room for refusal for those experiencing repressive regimes. Overall, the guidelines signal a positive move towards recognizing the intricacies of claims based on SOGI expression, and if it can be clarified accordingly, it may lead the way for global recognition of SOGI based refugee claims.

Canada’s Responsibility for Climate Refugees

UVic Student, Isolde Murdoch – Feb 11, 2017

As the number of people who are displaced from climate-related environmental disasters, such as droughts and hurricanes, rises exponentially across the globe, the question of responsibility arises. Many people think that the governments of the people experiencing displacement due to environmental factors should be held accountable to care for their “own” people. Why should we have to spend our financial resources helping other countries deal with their problems? That is their problem, isn’t it? Take care of our own first, right? But what if, we are responsible for the existence of climate refugees?

As a wealthy, developed nation, Canada is a large contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, as well as a leader in extracting the natural resources of other nations, and by means of doing so, causes environmental degradation that forces people to flee their land. Canada has a history of displacing persons from their land – notably, the First Nations. European settlers have, and continue to, segregate First Nations in deplorable living conditions, deplete their resources, take away their livelihoods and erase their culture and identities. It is not until recently that these atrocities have been put in the spotlight, and discourses around reparation have occurred.

Will is take just as long for the Canadian government to take ownership over their role in creating vast numbers of global environmentally displaced persons? Unfortunately, the devastating effects of climate change and environmental destruction are occurring, and time is not a luxury we have. Without the actions of Canada – and the international community – the creation of climate refugees could result in being the largest epidemic of ethnic cleansing that the world has ever seen.