Category: Foreign Policy

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Ukraine and the Peace Initiative with Russia

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By Derek Fraser, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria

The combination of Ukraine’s inexperienced and naive President, Ukrainian weariness with the unremitting war in the Donbas, pressure from France and Germany,  and American ambiguity, is pushing  Ukraine  to accept peace with Russia on terms that threaten Ukrainian independence.

Analysis

To understand the pass in which Ukraine finds herself we must go back to the events of 2014 when the overthrow of the venal, dictatorial, and pro-Russian  president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, led  Russia, in an attempt to prevent Ukraine from moving West, first to seize Crimea, and then to seek to provoke uprisings in a broad band of  Ukrainian territories from Donets and Luhansk, known as the Donbas, in the South-East, Kharkiv  and the industrial belt of Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the Centre, to Odessa in the South-West. An influential voice on Russian foreign policy, Sergey Karaganov, the Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, and a Kremlin adviser on Russia’s relations with the other former Soviet republics, stated at the time Russia wants “a united, federative Ukraine, if possible. Only this arrangement will maintain the formal integrity of the state, but Ukraine as a full-fledged state will be a distant historical memory.” “This scenario will ensure Russia’s de facto dominance in east and southeast Ukraine and semi-autonomy for the country’s west.”

The failure of the Russians to kindle revolt in any part of Ukraine save the Donbas, did not change Russian plans. The Donbas, to remain controlled by Russia and largely autonomous of Ukraine, was nevertheless to maintain its representation in the Ukrainian parliament, allowing it to influence Ukrainian policy, including any move to Ukrainian membership in Western treaties and organizations.

Ukraine fared badly in the fighting that followed the uprising in the Donbas. The Protocol that emerged from the Minsk I and the Minsk II negotiations in September 2014 and February 2015   between Russia and Ukraine, with the participation of Germany, France, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has had little effect. The   ceasefire the Protocol stipulated has repeatedly been broken, although fighting is at a lower level that it was before Minsk II. The Protocol provided for local elections and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, actions that were to lead to the return of separatist regions to Ukraine’s control. None of these measures have been acted on.

Part of the problem may have been that the Protocol did not indicate in which order the steps should be taken. The German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier filled this gap when he presented, with French support and involvement, in October 2015 a Formula for carrying out these provisions.

Under the Steinmeier Formula, Ukraine would introduce in the constitution a special autonomous status for the Russian-controlled part of the Donbas that would give it representation in the Ukrainian parliament.

In addition, the terms for the municipal-level elections that, under the Minsk Protocol, were to be carried out in accordance with Ukrainian law, were instead to be negotiated with the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,”

Ukraine would bring the special autonomous status for the region into effect temporarily on the date of those elections and then on a permanent basis if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found that those elections had “on the whole” respected international standards.

The elections were to take place before any withdrawal of any foreign forces. The departure of foreign forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control on the Ukrainian-Russian border on the east of the Donbas  were instead matters to be negotiated separately after the political steps had been taken.

Unlike the Minsk Protocol, the Steinmeier Formula did not have any official status.

The Ukrainian government did try to introduce legislation in 2015 to decentralize its constitution in reponse to the Minsk II Protocol, but gave up in face of a parliamentary and popular revolt.

It has always refused to contemplate holding elections in the rebel areas without the prior withdrawal of armed forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border.

It has also insisted that any elections should be held in accordance with Ukrainian law. The special law for elections in the Donbas would provide for Ukrainian and international election observers, the participation of all willing political parties, freedom of political campaigning, access to Ukrainian media for the residents, the freedom of Ukrainian media to report on the election campaign, and voting rights for the one and a half million refugees who had fled the Donbas.

Since the rejection by Ukraine of the terms of the Steinmeier protocol, there had been, up until the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine last April, a stalemate in diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Russia; but a stalemate accompanied by repeated violations of numerous ceasefires and the use of prohibited weapons on the battle field, the seizure of Ukrainian naval ships in the sea of Azov last November, and the application of economic sanctions.

The announcement by the newly elected President that he wanted to reach a peace settlement within a year has led to an increase in Russian political and military activity and economic pressure.

The Russians revived the Steinmeier Formula. In October 1, after weeks of negotiation, and under pressure from Germany and France, President Zelensky finally gave in and accepted the Steinmeier Formula as a basis for a settlement. His move was greeted with hostile demonstrations across the country, and a condemnatory letter signed by Ukrainian notables, including former foreign ministers.

At the same time, however, as he accepted the Steinmeier Formula, Zelensky effectively undermined it by issuing a declaration reaffirming the traditional Ukrainian position that there could be no internationally recognized elections in the Donbas without the prior withdrawal of armed forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border.

We doubt whether Zelensky’s declaration will be accepted by the Russians. Putin’s top adviser, Yurii Ushakov on September 13 had demanded a “written codification of the Steinmeier Formula” at the leaders’ summit, as well as finalization of the summit’s concluding document ahead of the event itself, with its implementation guaranteed by an “iron agreement”.

We do not know either whether the Germans, and especially the French, will support any Ukrainian derogation from the Steinmeier Formula. President Macron stated in a speech on 27 August that “pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic mistake.” The EU had to make a new strategic offer to Russia.

Perhaps because of French and German pressure, the Ukrainians had earlier indicated their desire to bring the Americans and British into the negotiations. While the State Department has always supported the Ukrainian position on elections, President Trump has repeatedly called on the Ukrainians to settle their differences with the Russians. Then of course, he held up almost $400 million in military aid.

If the Russians refuse to accept Zelensky’s declaration, it is hard to see what interest the Ukrainians have in maintaining their acceptance of the Steinmeier Formula. As things now stand, the peace process is not likely to lead to the recovery of the Donbas for Ukraine, but instead to leave the Russians in control of a Trojan horse seeking to destroy Ukrainian independence.

In the first place, the Russians apparently consider that the two governments, together with their military organizations, of the  “people’s republics” in the Donbas would remain in place, unaffected by the outcome of the municipal elections. The people’s republics have already indicated that control of the borders was their responsibility and not that of the Ukrainian government.

In addition, we should have no illusions about what the Russians are after:

The Russian online newspaper Vzglyad  stated on Oct 3 that the adoption of the Steinmeier Formula will effectively turn Ukraine into a loose confederation, which Russia may gobble up piece by piece.

The Russian economist and former adviser to President Putin, Andrei Illarionov has stated that Putin sees in the Steinmeier Formula  “a historic chance to implement the program that he’s reiterated since 2014, namely to restore full control over Ukraine”.

“Ukraine will get a ticking time bomb, because the launch of this mechanism will mean the implementation of the first and second Minsk Agreements, as a result of which two quasi-state entities are integrated into the state body of Ukraine. These two entities will make Ukraine’s political system implode from within. They will block any attempts to bring about concrete internal developments, towards which pro-Ukrainian parties and civil society have been working so hard. Of course, they’ll block Ukraine’s movement and aspirations towards Europe, the European Union, NATO and integration into the Western world.”

We can only hope that President Zelensky will have the courage to withstand the considerable pressures that will be brought against him in his search for what appears at this time to be an illusory peace settlement.

(This analysis was presented during the event “Trump, Ukraine, and Putin” on October 9th at the University of Victoria)

“Friendship of Nations monument- brothers” by eldan is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

 

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Matteo Salvini and Italy’s government instability (again!)?

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By Julian Campisi, University of Toronto

Italians have come accustomed to expressing their dissatisfaction in political leaders and the system at large. Economic growth has been stagnant for two decades, unemployment, especially among youth, is stubbornly high, infrastructure is crumbling, bureaucracy is stifling, and government debt is growing. Time and again, new parties, leaders, and coalitions promise change, reform, progress and growth, yet they inevitably arrive at the same place: government instability and fresh elections. There have been over 60 different governments voted in since the 1950s, roughly one per year. This time it is Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini of the League (Lega) who is at the precipice of bringing down another government and potentially leading the next one as the Prime Minister.

How did we get here?

March 2018 elections in Italy produced a hung parliament with no clear majority among parties or coalitions, resulting in (after two months of stalemate) the formation of an odd governing partnership between two parties previously pitted against one another: The League, a right-wing, pro-business, anti-immigration party with roots in the industrial north, and the 5-star movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle-M5S) led by Luigi di Maio, an anti-establishment, pro-environment and ideologically incoherent group of novice Parliamentarians that was formed only a few years prior by former comedian Beppe Grillo amidst an anti-EU and anti-corruption uproar. The League won 18% of the vote and the M5S won 33%, together putting them above the 50% threshold to form government. The uneasy ‘governing coalition’ between the two sides was premised on a ‘contract’ for change based on the electorate’s apparent antipathy towards the two traditional coalitions of centre right (around Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party) and centre left (around Matteo Renzi’s Democratic Party- PD).

Salvini and Di Maio compromised on the selection of a neutral PM Giuseppe Conte, and both remained as Deputy PMs trying to push their respective agendas. Policy-wise, the contract for change was far-reaching, broadly attempting to: set up a universal basic income plan (to appease the M5S southern Italian voters), institute a flat tax (a nod to the business community/northern regions), fight the European Commission over budgetary rules (deficits/debt), overhaul the Dublin regulation and fair burden sharing of migrant arrivals amongst all EU member states, and a host of other difficult promises that would prove hard, if not impossible, to keep. Perhaps the only common ground the two parties held was firstly, an anti-EU/anti-elite sentiment, and secondly, being in constant campaign mode. But from the outset in June 2018, Salvini quickly outmaneuvered Di Maio and manipulated the government narrative to his own liking, with the so-called migration ‘crisis’ at front and centre of the discourse. Over the year, the electorate responded well to Salvini, and poorly to Di Maio. In the EU Parliamentary elections of May 2019, their respective vote shares basically flipped, with the Lega earning 34% and the M5S just 17%. In this period, the M5S, which essentially started as a protest party, has shown to be inept at influencing governance in partnership with a strong-man leader, and has been losing support from both right and left.

Where are we now and what happens next?

After barely 14 months in government, Salvini, with an eye on his ascendant popularity, in early August decided to pull the plug on the governing coalition and threatened to withdraw his ministers based on an ‘unworkable government’, due to constant disagreement with the M5S and their final decision to not support the high speed TAV rail link between Italy and France. Critics and the M5S have decried his opportunistic dash to become PM at the expense of Italian stability, especially given the upcoming negotiations with the EU in which Italy must demonstrate that it is following budgetary rules. Salvini, however, has doubled down and his party issued a motion of non-confidence in PM Conte, which will be debated in Parliament soon. Things are moving quickly and are very fluid, but at this moment there is much uncertainty over what happens next. A number of possibilities remain, and only the President of the Republic, Mattarella, has the power to dissolve Parliament and decide what path to follow. Although hehind-the-scenes dealings have started, if the non-confidence motion on PM Conte passes in the next weeks, a few options are possible:

  • Mattarella can look for another majority in Parliament with a coalition of other parties, likely M5S and PD, but the political splintering in both parties, in addition to the windfall it would give to the right-wing parties in a future election, makes this option tricky;
  • Mattarella can call for new elections within 70 days, but this would coincide with delicate plans for the Italian 2020 budget preparations, its presentation to Parliament and subsequent negotiations with the EU Commission;
  • Mattarella can convene another ‘technocratic’ government and appoint a neutral PM, with the support of the majority of Parliament, in order to pass a viable 2020 budget this Autumn, and then proceed with elections in early 2020;
  • Other Autumn election alternatives that involve a reduction in 345 Parliamentarians and their salaries (an M5S proposal) before agreeing to a vote.

Whichever set of options materialize there are a number of political implications to consider. As Salvini has governed as a Deputy PM with Di Maio, it has enabled him to use his position to strengthen his electoral base on contentious issues such as security and migration. This has allowed him to maximize his popularity and he wants to take advantage of this immediately. Any talk of the President’s government of technocrats, or a new PD-M5S coalition, will likely be manipulated by Salvini to appeal to his base that the elites are trying to prevent his ascendance to the highest office, and stop him from finally ‘changing’ Italy for the better. Salvini also knows that his main opposition is divided on which course of options to pursue – technocratic, partnership, or elections; and this reaffirms his desire for immediate elections. The PD and M5S are down in the polls, and are rightly worried about an imminent vote, which might mean more politicking amongst them. Berlusconi may prove to be important yet again, if he promises to support Salvini as head of the right wing coalition (which is by no means guaranteed), or if he decides to support another type of coalition in the current Parliament. Still, Salvini’s gamble may backfire, note many experts, and Italians may not forgive him at the polls for creating another political crisis in government at a delicate economic time. Regardless, the outcome will likely coincide with further instability, which seems to be the only constant in Italian politics. President Mattarella will again have to be at his creative best in order to carefully navigate this difficult period, until the next one…

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Analytical Reflection of European Integration

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By  Malcolm Thomson, EU Study Tour 2019,  BA student at the Political Science Department, University of Victoria

On May 23rd, the European Central Bank (ECB) presented a talk on its increased supervisory role in the Banking Union to a group of students from Canada during the EU Study Tour. 2019  It allowed  me to gain a nuanced understanding of the dynamics that occur in this relatively new area of EU governance. However, while the presentation allowed me to gain a first-hand account of how employees of the ECB view the actions of their institution in a post-Eurozone crisis context, it also left me with some areas of question regarding the overall action of the ECB in the Banking Union. In preparation for this presentation, I returned to previous research that I had conducted on member state non-compliance with Banking Union policies in order to contextualise the position of the ECB in the broader arena of the Banking Union.

I was especially interested in understanding the ECB’s position on whether member state non-compliance with resolution policies could negatively affect the completion of the Banking Union. These questions stemmed from research conducted by Donnelly (2018), who analysed why cases of Italian and Portuguese non-compliance in the Banking Union occurred. According to Donnelly (2018), it was a mixture of institutional “leeway provided for national authorities” and “accommodation from the Commission and Single Resolution Board (SRB)” that allowed for member states to act against the policies set out in the Banking Union if such policies did not fit the member state’s national interest (p.159). Further, it was this lack of institutional and political rigidity that allowed “liberal economic nationalism” the exist within the Banking Union, which significantly decreased the effectiveness of the Banking Union at further breaking the link between private banks and sovereign debt (Donnelly, 2018, p.159-160). Although the political role of the Commission was not directly addressed in the presentation, the presenter’s answers to the question asked regarding member state non-compliance allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of how the ECB sees its role in the Banking Union.

The answer provided by the ECB was focused on showcasing the completed areas of the Banking Union and highlighting that the SRB was a powerful and reliable institution in resolving banks according to EU rules. While this answer showed that the ECB was more focused on its role in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SRM) than the SRB, it was limited in explaining how politics and national preferences by member states can work their way into decisions made in the Banking Union. Though it is understandable that the ECB would not give a political answer to the question, it is interesting to take that apolitical stance and place it in the context of the larger Banking Union. This is because, as Donnelly (2018) showed in his article, the political actions of the Commission and the SRB have had a significant effect in bending guidelines to non-compliant member states, which in turn limits Banking Union’s effectiveness. For the ECB to see itself as an actor completely removed from these political areas of Banking Union highlights disunity in how EU bodies see their relationship with member states in banking policy following the Eurozone crisis. Although, this disunity also creates interesting questions regarding how much national political context should be given to Banking Union resolutions, and how much the EU should take into account member states that will work to be non-compliant given their national government’s views towards European integration. The answers to these questions could be beneficial to understanding the relationship between the EU and its member states in the area of banking policy post-Eurozone crisis.

References

Donnelly, S. (2018). Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 21(2), 159-173. doi: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1400433

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Russia-EU Relations May Not Be As Bleak As They Seem

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By Alina Sobolik,  EU Study Tour 2019, student at the Department of Political Science, University of Victoria

Introduction: Why Talk About It?

The EU and Russia are both significant actors on the world stage, both in the size of their economies and the values that they represent. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Liberal Democracy has been the law of the land, and Human Rights have been the hot topic. However, is it possible that this is only because those nations that felt otherwise were too weak at the moment to protest? And do these kinds of values have any place in bilateral economic agreements?

Through my studies on the European Union and my participation the University of Victoria’s European Union Study Tour and Internship Program, I have observed what I believe may be a shift in this global dynamic. A primary example for me is the transforming relationship between Russia and the EU. As their relationship has faced several obstacles in recent years, resulting in sanctions from the EU and a failure to re-negotiate an agreement, observers have concluded that the relationship is dead, with no future in sight.

I disagree. The relationship as it was born is dead, however I believe that there is a future for EU-Russia relations that reflects the changing power dynamics between them as Russia regains its ground as a global actor. This new relationship would be one that does not include ideological conditions from either side, but is based purely on economic and strategic benefit.

 From Friends to Enemies?

In Hiski Haukkala’s journal article titled “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations,” he outlines the events that contributed to the freezing of Russia-EU relations. Furthermore, he argues that the relationship cannot be recovered due to Russia’s insistence to establish a sphere of influence.[1]

He states that through its relationship with Russia, the European Union “…has sought to lock Russia into a highly institutionalized, indeed post-sovereign arrangements with a view of creating an essentially unipolar Europe based on the EU’s liberal norms and values.[2]” This is in part because of the circumstances under which the relationship was formed following the fall of the Soviet Union, with Russia recovering from complete failure of government and undergoing a process of state formation while the EU was consolidating power as a world actor.[3] What resulted was a relationship wherein the European Union was able to integrate ideological and moral values into the relationship on a conditional basis.

This is reflected in the nature of the 1994 Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, which actually includes the goal of “gradual integration” between Russia and the EU, with an article (2) on respect for democracy and human rights as well as mention of the “community values” making it clear that this integration would take a Eurocentric form.[4]

Someone Has Got To Budge

Haukkala argues that the EU’s “Common Neighborhood Policy” forced a face-off of the two powers by encroaching on what Russia perceives to be its sphere of influence, with the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union as proof of tension between powers.[5]

Furthermore, various events, including actions on the ground in Chechnya, the election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia, and Russian action in the Ukraine resulted in the ‘freezing’ of Russia EU relations and the establishment of sanctions from both sides.[6]

While I agree with Haukkala that “…the years of intense interaction between the two have brought to the fore and perhaps even accentuated the differences in underlying worldviews between the EU and Russia,” I also believe the relationship will resume.[7] This is due to the unique opportunity I have had as a participant in the EU Study Tour two consecutive years in a row. In both years we were able to meet with representatives from the Russian Mission to the EU and from the EU Desk Officer to Russia. However, the tone of the presentations was drastically different this year than in 2018.

The Reality On the Ground

In 2018, both presenters approached the situation as a dilemma, a stalemate not likely to be broken. When asked about future relations, the Russian representative essentially stated that Russia had done all that it could and was waiting on the EU to ‘accept’ its ‘attempts at cooperation.’ She did not seem optimistic about the probability of a resolution because Russia would not be willing to compromise on the Minsk Agreement (calling for Russia to remove its military forces from the Ukraine).[8]

The EU representative had a similar sentiment, stating that the EU would maintain its sanctions until Russia adhered to the conditions of the Minsk Agreement. This year, both sides focused their presentation and tone not on the importance of the Minsk Agreement as a sticking point in negotiations but on the cooperation that has managed to continue regardless.

The Russian representative stated that there is a “common understanding that they [Russia and the EU] remain neighbors and major trade and economic partners.” She also stated that “political dialogue” between the two parties is active and that meetings are taking place regularly.

The representative from the EU also mentioned the smaller, bilateral relations that continue in various sectors outside of security as well as the trade that continues between Russia and the EU despite sanctions. He explained that while EU leaders like Tusk no longer meet with Putin, ministers from both sides still cooperate regularly.

When discussing the remaining sanctions, he implied that the EU may have considered reducing them if not for several unfortunately timed incidents, and that he was hopeful going into future discussions on the possibility of reducing sanctions.

I questioned if this could be possible, a gradual renewal of the relationship without adherence to the Minsk Agreement and he stated “Minsk or no Minsk, we will reconsider.”

 What Does This Mean?

This serves as evidence that while we are in fact seeing a turning point for Russia EU relations, the ideological differences may not serve as an existential threat to the relationship. It may result in a shift in the relationship’s dynamics rather than its complete destruction.

Rather than the EU coming from a position of influence over Russia, they may interact as two equal actors who stand to benefit from each other regardless of fundamental ideological differences, taking ideology and establishment of norms out of the relationship as a result.

Notes

Haukkala, Hiski. “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:1 (2015): 25-40, DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2014.1001822

Schläpfer, Christian. “Ukraine Crisis and Mediation.” Security and Human Rights 27, no. 3-4 (2016): 327-341.

[1] Hiski Haukkala, “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:1 (2015): 37

[2] Ibid., 25.

[3] Ibid., 26.

[4] Ibid., 27.

[5] Ibid., 32.

[6] Ibid., 29-35.

[7] Ibid., 31.

[8] Christian Schläpfer, “Ukraine Crisis and Mediation,” Security and Human Rights 27, no. 3-4 (2016): 327-341.

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Unlocking borders like smartphones – Can digital identities fill a void in the global governance of mobility?

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Linda Tippkaemper, Marie Skłodowska-Curie PhD Fellow, Université Sorbonne Paris Cité

Unlocking borders like smartphones – Can digital identities fill a void in the global governance of mobility?

 

Whenever I check-in my bag at an airport and it eventually disappears, I always wonder for a moment how it is going to travel through those dark tunnels below the counter, how it will be x-rayed somewhere, barcoded and scanned. How it will travel left and right, in and out of airplanes, only to be spit back out again at the baggage carousel, sometimes at the other end of the world.

The handling of baggage, even across different airlines and borders, works thanks to the International Air Travel Association (IATA). Since 1945, the organization serves its 290 member airlines as a coordinating mechanism for security and logistical issues. Airline staff worldwide can consult IATA’s “Baggage Tracking Implementation Guide” and participate in standardized seminars. In a way, the organization ensures the successful global governance of bags.

Processing baggage owners in a comparably efficient and coordinated manner, however, is a much greater challenge. With an expected 100% increase of air travel within the next 15 years, it is essential for airlines to also “simplify and enhance the passenger process” (IATA 2018). Yet, airlines cannot just put barcode tags on their customers. They depend on state-issued travel documents to identify their passengers.

Passports vs. barcodes

Modern states invented international passports only after the First World War to enforce their “monopoly over the legitimate means of movement” (Torpey 2000). At that time, passports were only paper sheets. Nowadays, airlines can retrieve passenger data from passport booklets and match it automatically with the data stored in their booking information system. In this regard, airlines profit from states’ efforts to standardize travel documents, which are led by a specialized UN agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). While IATA works for its member airlines, ICAO assists 192 member states as a global governance mechanism for civil aviation standards. Under this mandate, the organization has developed a detailed guide on the state-of-the-art Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD).

Alphanumerical data in MRTDs can be digitally read out by states and airlines alike. However, states profit from a modern security feature that is still mostly withheld from airlines: biometrics. Airlines could use fingerprints and facial recognition just like an organic barcode tag for their passengers and thus increase efficiency in passenger handling significantly.

One digital identity – “One iD”

To foster this, IATA presented its initiative One iD in early 2018. It entails the development of a digital identity platform for travelers which can be fed with passengers’ alphanumeric and biometric passport data. IATA claims that the system could increase airport security and bring advantages for travelers, who would not have to repeatedly juggle with numerous paper documents like passports, visas and boarding passes, but could instead use their fingerprint and face as an ‘open sesame’ at each airport checkpoint (IATA 2018).

In cases where the traveler so requires, One iD could also entail digital visas, verified by governments. Currently, airlines must check visas manually and can be fined by states under the so-called carrier sanctions, if they transport an unproperly documented passenger across the border. However, with almost 200 states and territories imposing different entry regulations towards each other’s citizens, the global visa regime resembles a giant maze of opaque regulations. As a service to its member airlines, IATA already stores these complex rules in its “TIMatic database”. The automated matching of digital visas from One iD against this database could replace manual checks and reduce the amount of time and cost dedicated to the training of airline staff.

Challenging states: The “Known Traveler Digital Identity” (KTDI)

IATA however, is not the only private organization that struggles with and therefore actively challenges the current status-quo of state-governed mechanisms to manage people’s identities across borders. Last year, the World Economic Forum (WEF) presented the “Known Traveler Digital Identity” (KTDI), which also comprises the storage of relevant individual data in one “digital envelope”, just like One iD.

When it comes to the issue of visas, the KTDI concept goes even one step further. While IATA sees the acquisition of digital entry permits as a pre-requisite for the use of One iD, the WEF rightly identifies “visa application and screening” as an important “key pain point” in a traveler’s journey. The digital platform is therefore not only designed to speed up airport procedures, but it is meant to serve as a potential decision-making tool for certain countries’ pre-vetting procedures.

The global visa regime, which has only grown within the last couple of decades alongside passports, limits hassle-free movement not only for “weak passport”[i] holders, but also for citizens traveling between economically dependent states and regions like China and the EU. To put it simply, visa requirements concern many employees and potential customers of the businesses that the WEF represents. These businesses often have their own visa desks dedicated to help staff with their applications, or they even outsource this task to special visa agencies, where “international mobility managers” guide the way through the jungle of fragmented national rules.

Filling a void?

Thus far, no public global government mechanism has even dared to steer towards a standardization of these rules and requirements, because border security is considered as an issue of national sovereignty. On the one hand, ICAO’s contribution in that field was to make visas machine-readable like passports, but the organization never overstepped its mandate to events happening outside the airport. IATA, on the other hand, as a non-public organization lobbying for airlines, never had the interest, nor the mandate to influence the policies that it only stores as a reference. Then again, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) became a UN institution only in 2016, while previously serving rather as a service provider for immigration countries and not as a global governance mechanism.

With the KTDI, the WEF aims to counter the fragmentation of national procedures. As the WEF’s concept report recognizes, “beyond the immediate efficiency gains of digitization […], emerging technologies can be used to unlock changes in policy design and the mechanisms government agencies use to ensure the secure movement of people across borders” (WEF 2018).

According to the KTDI concept, the digital identity can be complemented with attestations from “trusted entities” like employers, universities or banks, thereby building a digital “known traveler” status. The “authenticated identity claims” shall then serve as the individual’s “backbone of trust and the basis of reputation”. Instead of preparing a new visa application file for each trip according to consulates’ often confusing requirements, individuals could provide them with a uniform digital file which can be updated and re-used for each trip.

In essence, the WEF wants to detach individuals from the old, national way of constructing and screening identities by introducing a global blueprint for this purpose. This may also be considered as an attempt to bridge the gap that has developed as companies are becoming increasingly international, while their employees or customers stay confined to their nation state.

Turning the paper wall of visas into a digital one?

However, even a harmonized digital tool cannot change the fact that travelers will remain subject to states’ scrutiny. In this context, the concept possibly underestimates the current complexity of documenting and screening people’s legal, social and professional identities across borders. Today’s visa requirements represent the states’ attempts to gap the borders that exist not only between countries, but also between data. Consulates rely on a multitude of actors who must testify to the individual’s identity and intention and for whom they shall offer their endorsement. And even so, the quality and reliability of information gained during these procedures is often questioned.

The reality is that no matter what blueprint countries would be given for their vetting procedure, suspicions towards certain groups of travelers will remain and the authenticity of the uploaded documentation may be questioned just as the paper documents are questioned today. Should all the countless actors involved in compiling paperwork for digital visa procedures get an official account to digitally authenticate it? Without an elaborate solution for this, the KTDI might inevitably run into the same problems and complexity characterizing the present visa procedures. That the concept is currently being tested by the Canadian and Dutch governments, not in a visa-restricted context, is hopefully not a sign of surrender to this challenge.

After all, the KTDI could be a stepping stone for the more “integrated, secure and coordinated manner” of managing extra-territorial borders, which is one of the objectives of the UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. A solution that the public global governance mechanisms, which seem to focus mainly on what happens at the airport, have yet to come up with.

 

 

 

__________

WEF (World Economic Forum): The Known Traveler, Unlocking the potential of digital identity for secure and seamless travel. [Online] 2018. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Known_Traveler_Digital_Identity_Concept.pdf

IATA (International Air Transport Association): One iD Concept Paper Version 1. [Online] 2018. https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/passenger/Documents/OneID-concept-paper.pdf

Torpey, John (2000). The invention of the passport. Surveillance, citizenship and the state. Cambridge University Press.

 

Linda Tippkaemper is an INSPRIE doctoral fellow at University Paris 13, Paris Sorbonne Cité and receiving funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 665850.

http://www.cofund-inspire.eu/fellow/linda-tippkaemper/

 

[i] For a global ranking of weak and powerful passports see the Henley Passport Index, a yearly publication on countries’ “visa-free scores,” which usually grabs media headlines: https://www.henleypassportindex.com/assets/2019/q2/Full%20Q2%20Ranking.pdf (accessed on March 28th 2019).

 

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Observations from Cyprus: Border Walls and the Idea of the “Other”

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By Tiana Geukdjian,  student at the University of Victoria

As a young teenager, I spent a lot of time on one side of a border wall. After growing up in Canada, my family moved to the south side of the island of Cyprus when I was nine, and I was introduced quickly to the idea of the “other” and of “us versus them”. Much like the current refugee crisis in Europe and the immigration issue in the United States, there was little discussion about the people on the other side of the wall; the focus was instead on the collective whole. The Turkish invaders. The unwelcome. The unjust. My Cypriot family members never referred to the people in the north as Cypriot. They were outsiders. They were invalid.

The border in Cyprus is not like the border in Canada – there is a palpable tenseness, of imminent action. There is a Turkish flag on a mountain, created out of painted oil barrels driven into the ground, that is visible from most of the main areas in the south. It lights up at night, to remind everyone: we are here. As a child, I would sit and watch it at night after dinner, beginning to feel somehow wronged without understanding why, without even fully comprehending the history of the war. My family would watch next to me as the flag lit up, as they shook their heads and then averted their eyes.

When we walked through the main city of Nicosia during the day, there was always a jarring moment when exploration was halted by border guards standing next to barbed wire and piles of sandbags. The wall divides the city itself in half – it is not only out in the countryside, away from everyday exposure. Each day, both sides of the wall were reminded of its presence.

What does this do for reunification? For facilitating a conversation between both parties? It has been over fifty years since the war in Cyprus, and yet the idea of a solution has never been more than a hope. A border wall is not only a physical barrier, but a conversational one. This lesson has followed me, as we look at the border walls being erected throughout the world today. Specifically, in parts of Europe that are using them as a means to deal with the migrant crisis, or in the southern United States as a means to deal with illegal immigration.

Securing the borders with walls merely reinforces the idea of the “other”, even if that “other” is not fully understood. It prevents insight and humanism, two things that are key if there is hope of a solution in the future. Instead, it merely promotes categorization into groups we can dismiss or invalidate. Shaking our heads and averting our eyes does not solve the crisis, just as it did not solve the division of Cyprus.

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Ukraine is heading for the membership in the EU and NATO

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By Serhy Yekelchyk, Professor of Slavic Studies and History, University of Victoria, President of the Canadian Association for Ukrainian Studies

Ukraine’s Constitution Now Spells out the Nation’s Intent to Join the EU and NATO

On 7 February the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill on inserting into the country’s Constitution several statements about Euro-Atlantic integration as the nation’s paramount aim in the field of foreign relations. The additions to three articles define reaching full membership in the EU and NATO as Ukraine’s “strategic goal,” and charge the president with overseeing its implementation. The change to the Preamble proclaims this strategic course “irreversible.”

It is unprecedented for a candidate-country to enshrine such priorities in the Constitution, but Ukraine’s situation is equally unprecedented. Nearly five years after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the start of the Russian-sponsored war in the Donbas, the goals of the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013–14 remain elusive. Russia’s attack on Ukrainian navy ships in the Black Sea in November 2018 brought home the ever-present danger of conflict escalation. With the economy still crippled by corruption and the EU continuously lukewarm on Ukrainian aspirations for membership, popular disappointment in the political class is growing. Just two months before the presidential elections, a comedian with no political experience or clear program is leading in the polls.

President Petro Poroshenko, who is currently polling third, has been trying desperately to boost his rating with largely declarative measures, such as the introduction of martial law for a month in November (which was never really implemented) or the changes to the Constitution. Potentially more significant was his leadership in establishing a new national Orthodox Church in opposition to the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church. This move, which caused a spectacular split in October between the patriarchs of Moscow and Constantinople, is proving instrumental in the construction of a new Ukrainian identity as separate from Russian.

Yet, the voters are likely to judge Poroshenko on his dismal record of economic reform and combatting corruption. With this in mind, ambassadors of Western nations organized a closed-door meeting with the comedian-candidate, trying to determine whether Ukraine is set for the triumph of populist rhetoric not unlike the one a few Western countries have already experienced.

Picture credits:  © Аимаина хикари | Wikimedia Commons