Category: Migration

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The Brexit vote: a clear example of politicizing migration

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By Kate Korte, Student at the Political Science Department at the University of Victoria

In June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) startled the world by voting to leave the European Union (EU) in a public referendum. Although the majority of voters voted to leave, the margin was small — 52 per cent voted leave, and 48 per cent voted to remain. Since then, politicians in the UK and EU have been struggling to meet a deal, to no avail. On Jan 31 of this year, the UK left the EU officially.

During the Brexit campaign, immigration was a key focus. The leave campaign, in particular, used the perceived threat of increased migration with EU membership to steer voters in their direction.

It’s peculiar, however, to think that this would amass a majority of the public’s support. The United Kingdom never signed on to the Schengen Agreement, so it actually held more power over its borders than many other member states. The United Kingdom is also one of the farthest removed countries in the EU from the Mediterranean Sea. It has not seen a vast influx of refugees. This begs the question: why would voters resonate so strongly with the leave campaigns message of a migration threat?

The leave campaign capitalized off of the perceived, not actual, threat they saw migration posing to the EU’s economy and culture. Like many other countries in the EU, voters routinely overestimate the amount of migrants their country welcomes. Campaigns like the Leave campaign are able to capitalize off this innumeracy by feeding into the fears without articulating any real migration data. This could explain part of the reason voters opted to leave.

All areas in Wales opted to vote leave. This strikes as odd, given that Wales is one of the most economically worse off areas in the United Kingdom and benefits from a lot of EU money. Importantly, Wales doesn’t see a lot of migration. Despite these two facts, Welsh voters still resonated with the Leave campaign’s message enough to vote to leave and effectively vote to cut themselves off from a significant amount of EU funding.

On the other hand, areas in London that see a lot of migration voted to remain in the EU. Some have linked this to the general young, educated, and cosmopolitan nature of the city. In a big city like London, there is a high cost of living and a lot of people to compete for employment. Alas, London seems to welcome newcomers and voted to remain. Even though more migrants set their sites on London than on Wales, Londoners were less willing to listen to the argument that migrants hurt the economy.

Of course, as is the case with both London and Wales, other factors are clearly at play here. It’s certainly not the case that everyone who voted to leave did so out of a perceived threat of migration. But given the campaign’s heavy emphasis on migration and its impact on the economy, it’s worth questioning how unfounded voter’s perceptions of migration data are.

Brexit is still a staple issue in British politics, with Boris Johnson echoing his slogan, “get brexit done” at nearly every opportunity. In the 2019 election, a lot of the areas that switched from Labour to Johnson’s Conservative party were rural areas in Britain — and areas that don’t see a lot of migration. For as long as Brexit is relevant, migration will remain part of the political discourse. Whether or not voters’ fears are founded in reality is something worth exploring, as it draws to light how politicized migration has become in the UK.

The Brexit vote is broken down by area here. Migration data by area can be found here.

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What does ‘Safety’ mean?

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By Franziska Fischer, Phd candidate at the Department of Political Science, the University of Victoria

We have come full circle, from the boy on the beach (Alan Kurdi, drowning on September 2nd, 2015, trying to cross the 4 km between Turkish and European soil by boat), to Óscar Ramírez and his daughter Valeria drowning in the Rio Grande, trying to swim towards a safer future. After September 2nd, when the world looked down on the small body of Alan Kurdi being washed up on a Greek beach, we have pledged to do better. Four years later the pledge we made has nothing to show for it.

Between Alan Kurdi and Óscar and Valeria Ramírez, thousands have died, and millions are caught in limbo between their dangerous past in war-torn regions and their hopeful future in ‘safe’ and ‘stable’ countries such as the US or Europe. People, humans, parents and their children are fleeing unsafe conditions in South America, Africa, and the Middle East. They are “fleeing a hell the US helped create”, as the Guardian put it, drawing on the violence and inequalities that US political and economic actors helped to create, perpetuated and reproduced through ongoing actions. I do not write this text to point fingers, even though one might rightfully do so. I do not write this text to get caught in the intricacies of why we are, where we are. I do not write this text to find blame. I write this text to find hope, to find my sanity and to find the belief in humankind. Because what I see, read and hear tears me apart. I have shared some of the articles underneath this text, there are thousands more.

Two ‘cornerstone events’ of Alan Kurdi and Óscar and Valeria Ramírez, framing a humanitarian crisis that has the world in its tight grip, illuminating just how drastic we have successfully split our world into two. Safe and unsafe, developed and undeveloped, successful and failed, stable and conflict. However, this dichotomous perception of our messy world is beginning to crumble, the lines between safe and unsafe are blurring. Can we with a straight face say, detention camps on the Mexican/US border are safe? Is crossing the Mediterranean Sea safe? Is it safe to rightfully claim asylum in a welfare state, with a stable democracy? What does safe mean? Having a place to sleep, being able to keep yourself and your children clean, being able to eat? Then No, the US is not safe, Europe is not safe, because none of these things are guaranteed when a human in need enters these territories. Organizations, Non-profits, and individual people try to make up for the failure of the governments, of the state officials, which are caught in the bickering of who will take on the ‘burden’ to provide the most basic needs.

I am not claiming to be able to relate but I can only imagine the devastation, fear and absolute horror, as well as the hope for a better future, that will convince a parent to give themselves and their children to the goodwill of human smugglers, to trust a little rubber dingy, or swim across a vicious river, all in hope for better conditions on the other side. But for those who actually make it to ‘safety’ and don’t become tragic figures of our contemporary world order, the journey through hell has only just begun.

I will direct my focus here towards the detention camps at the Mexico/US border, but by no means do I want to belittle the horrors, the terrible conditions and lack of resources in other places of this world. For me, the recent reports from detentions camps in Clint, Texas or El Paso amongst many more, feel personal, they hit home.

I read about people being held in tiny rooms or big storage facilities without windows; for days and for weeks. I witness the governments denying it is happening. I see families ripped apart for the benefit of bureaucratic processes and separated for months. I hear about children being pulled away from their mothers, and my heart breaks. The stories are endless, and I will share several of them under this text, as many others have done a much between job than me to illustrate the tragedies. This is when I get up from my computer and I sneak into the room next to me, just to lay down next to my napping five-month-old daughter, to hear her breathe, to wake her up just to see her happy little toothless smile and her chubby little arms grabbing onto me. Silent tears running down my face, half heartache for these women who are denied giving their love to their children, to make sure they are healthy and happy, clean and fed; literally the only thing a mother wants to do (I speak from experiences). The other half of my tear’s origins in unbelievable gratefulness and humbleness to be able to be with my daughter, to watch her grow, to know her safe and fed. This unbelievable privilege revealed by the horrors of stories of other mothers just one country to the south happening right now. As a German citizen, the resemblance to concentration camps in Germany in the Third Reich is uncanny. People keep asking how Germany could allow this to happen? We are allowing it to happen right now. And it needs to STOP!

I sit in my little office, reading books about Political Theory, Development, Economy, all part of my PhD program at the University of Victoria. And all I can think of is, what is it for? All this knowledge, all this wisdom, wrapped in books sitting neatly on my shelf. This is when I want to get up, grab my daughter and hop in the car to drive down to Texas. To drive a hole in the wall of the detention camps? To protest in front of their gates? To throw diapers above the fence? All of the above? The fear of bringing my own daughter near a place that allows for such terrifying things to happen and the grip of hopelessness has me paralyzed. What can we do?

Internet research readily provides lists of organizations that are on the ground, trying to help. It feels barely enough to send a few dollars through electronic channels, to somehow make the difference between a child living or dying. It feels detached and provokes an odd sensation of guilt! Is this doing my due diligence? Is it so I can sleep at night without having nightmares? Or is it the most effective and efficient thing that I could be doing at this moment in time in my position, being a 28-year-old German PhD student, living in Canada with my little baby girl. I honestly don’t know. Maybe I will find myself in Texas soon, maybe I won’t. But what I do know is that I want to help make this stop.

Please share with me your thoughts. What can we do? What are we doing? Do you know for any particular organization or individual that is on the ground and needs help? Needs funds? If you have now considered this but were thinking of doing something nice for me for my birthday, do something else instead, as I don’t need anything. Donate to the people on the ground. Vote for an administration that will not allow this to happen. Go down to Texas.

And please, someone more courageous than me, drive a hole into these walls.

https://www.newyorker.com/…/the-lasting-trauma-of-mothers-s…

https://www.refinery29.com/…/help-migrant-children-at-borde…

https://www.newsweek.com/migrant-children-share-heartbreaki…

https://www.theguardian.com/…/central-america-migrants-us-f…

 

 

 

 

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The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and turning grief into helping refugees

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Franziska Fischer, PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria

The captivating event hosted by the Center for Global Studies on May 29th, 2019  ‘Turning Grief into Helping Refugees’ opened the floor to the director of the Jean Monnet Center at Dalhousie University Dr. Ruben Zaiotti and Tima Kurdi, an internationally recognized spokesperson and founder of the Kurdi Foundation, to speak aboutthe so-called ‘refugee crisis’ that seems to have the world in its grip since 2015. The event differed from its politically charged and academically framed counterparts usually hosted by the University of Victoria, but rather engaged the audience with the emotional and personal story of Tima Kurdi, the aunt of ‘the boy on the beach’, Alan Kurdi, who tragically drowned in the Mediterranean Sea September 2nd of 2015 while crossing the four kilometers between Turkey and Greece. The event was part of the “Canada Europe Dialogue on Migration ” project  and was co-financed by the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union.

Dr. Ruben Zaiotti took the audience back to 2015, to the time of the perceived climax of the so called ‘crisis’, when the numbers of people seeking safety from war torn countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, climbed up towards the millions. The ‘crisis’ became its own agent and entered discussions not only politically, but found its way into economic, and social debates, most curiously, however, not as the representative of the people seeking refuge, but as the concerned voice of the European and North American people, expressing misgivings about the arrival of the newcomers. A growing resentment urged political actors to manage, control, and therefore decrease the numbers of people entering the Occident. The European Union thus launched its efforts for an externalization of the ‘problem’, the problem being refugees arriving at the peripheral borders of the Union, by reinforcing borders, patrolling sea routes, complicating legal procedures and cutting deals with third countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon. And suddenly, the ‘crisis’ was not people fleeing from war, dying on their way to safety, and drowning in the Mediterranean Sea. The ‘crisis’ was the Occident, having to shoulder the burden of sharing their economic abundance, their space, and political stability with people in need. Populist movements and right-wing political parties piggybacked of this public momentum of self-pity and portrayed seemingly easy solutions to the complex and multilayered problem of having to welcome refugees, consisting of the root causes of the conflict in the Middle East, the rise of ISIS, and political and economic actors, facilitating the influx of refugees since 2015. The easy solutions, such as closing all borders, revoking Schengen and deporting refugees, were cheerfully welcomed by a significant amount of European citizen, resulting in step towards the right in many Member-States, and assisting in events such as Brexit.  But where do we go from here? Within all this political, economic and social turmoil it is important to pause, and listen to stories such as the story of Tima Kurdi.

In a time when everyone, especially in the West seems to have a profound opinion about the identity, the agenda and the culture of ‘refugees’, that are perceived as a grey and homogeneous mass, hearing Tima Kurdi speak is a gentle yet urgent reminder, that we are speaking of humans. Humans coming from complex and politically, religious and culturally diverse spaces. She forces to reflect, by painting an all too familiar picture of a comfortable life in Canada or Europe, where leaned back in comfortable armchairs, we witnessed the conflict in the Middle East unfold on our 32” flat screens; scenes not much different from the Blockbuster Hollywood movie we watched the night before. And yet it is reality, and while we speak compassionate about those suffering far away in our safe homes, the compassion rarely translates into action right in front of our door, in our community, or our country. But Tima Kurdi does not point the finger to blame. Instead she asks questions. “Why do they not get the help they need?”, she reflects on her several trips to Turkey and Syria, bringing the Money that she collected through her Foundation directly to the people in need. With her questions she uncovers an uncomfortable situation, in which political actors seems paralyzed by the complexity of international relations, the diversity in public opinion in their nations, and the economic pressure. By trying to please everyone, to stay in favor of the voting majority, help is stalled, redirected, or turned into complicated procedures for people that want to take the reins in helping others. Thus, Tima Kurdi urges; “Put the political aside! Do not wait for someone to step up. Empower yourself, talk to a friend, reach out to a neighbor. Don’t give up. Ask: How can I help?” Her compassion is contagious and her message is one of hope. What makes her message powerful, she calls out to the individual, not to the collective, to find our individual voices. To speak up, not about the refugees, not for the refugees, but to speak OUT for them. And while the individual might not be able to significantly impact the situation as a whole, spreading messages of hope, such as the story of Tima Kurdi is an important step in shifting the public perception and opinion. And it is the public opinion that can act as a driving social force for change in political and economic narratives. As Tima Kurdi said: “Tomorrow will be a better day!”

 

 

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Gaps in the System: Absence of Solidarity Principle on Migration

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Noel Guscott, EU Study Tour 2019,  student at the Dalhousie University

Migration is a salient European issue. Certain countries such as Italy and Greece were the major landing zones for migrants fleeing the Middle East and North Africa. The consequences of this asymmetrical migrant flow have caused serious political and socio-cultural tensions. Notably, Gattinara (2017) argues that  the ‘refugee’ crisis exacerbated a crisis of legitimacy within the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS). This blog contribution focuses on part of the EU-level legitimacy crisis, arguing that the crisis has shown gaps in the EU’s ability to promote and enforce the principle of solidarity in migration policy.

Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) outlines a common liberal democratic value system where solidarity is noted but lacks a clear definition. According to a policy post by the European Observatory of Working Life (EurWORK), the solidarity principle can be defined as a “… principle based on sharing both the advantages, i.e. prosperity, and the burdens equally and justly among members”. Articles 79 to 81 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) set the legal direction to establish a ‘common’ immigration policy based on the vague principle of this burden-sharing solidarity (Šalamon, 2018, p. 689). Later, the Schengen and Dublin conventions introduced in the 1990s were supposed to outline workable frameworks to manage internal migration and refugee claimants among MS (Guiraudon, 2018).

Italy and Greece – due in part to the first-country mechanism found within the Dublin Regulation – had the national responsibility to process migrants reaching their shores (2017, p. 321). Internal political and socio-cultural opposition to migrant and refugee assistance made it clear that some MS would not respect the principle of solidarity and prevent comprehensive EU assistance, forcing other MS like Germany to step up their relocation and settlement efforts. Domestically, Italian and Greek right-wing parties have used this breach of trust to heighten anti-immigrant messaging for political gain (Gattinara, 2017, p. 325-326). The response of this fragmented European response was limited to rhetoric, and no institutional measures were successful in reversing these national positions (Gattinara, 2017, p. 322, 328).

The cracks are clear in the immigration policy, but at its root is violations of the solidarity principle. Without a clear institutional framework to promote and enforce solidarity, MS have the ability to pick and choose when and how they help on issues with a collective European impact. This, certainly, threatens the legitimacy of the European project in the days to come.

 

References

European Union (2011, May 4). Solidarity Principle. European Observatory of Working Life. Retrieved May 29, 2019 from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/solidarity-principle.

European Union (2016). Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union – TITLE I – COMMON PROVISIONS – Article 2. Retrieved May 30, 2019 from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016M002&from=EN.

European Union (2012). Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C326, p. 77-78. Retrieved May 29, 2019 from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.

Gattinara, P. C. (2017). The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy, Contemporary Italian Politics         , 9(3), p. 318-331.

Guiraudon, V. (2018). The 2015 refugee crisis was not a turning point: explaining plocy inertia in EU border control. European Political Science, 17(1), p. 151-160.

Šalamon, N. K. (2017). The principle of solidarity in asylum and migration within the context of the European Union accession process. Masstricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(5), p. 689.

Image by Jim Black from Pixabay

 

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The impact of the migrant crisis on human trafficking – insights to the work of PAYOKE

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By Jasmine Pathak, EU Study Tour 2019,   student and Director at Large at the University of Victoria Students’ Society

Payoke is a civil society organization (CSO) offering aid to victims of human trafficking and victims of smuggling with aggravating circumstances. During the second week of the European Union (EU) Study Tour 2019 I was able to participate in a presentation on how CSOs operate in the public arena and contribute to political and social development within the context of the EU.  The presenter focused mostly on the methods through which Payoke aids victims of human trafficking.

Firstly, Payoke outlines the Belgian legal system to victims and can support them to launch complaints against their traffickers. Secondly, Payoke helps victims to integrate into Belgian society by including the requirement of social skill development and learning the norms and values of Belgian life. This individual counselling helps them to integrate into the professional world while finding a suitable job. Moreover, Payoke also offers psychological support to help victims heal from any experienced trauma.

A significant point that I had not previously considered before visiting was the impact of the migrant crisis on human trafficking. For example, our speaker outlined how traffickers have capitalized on the migrant crisis by offering fraudulent, and often dangerous, services to transport migrants. In addition, we also discussed the challenges faced by EU leaders in responding to human trafficking cases on a supranational level, as some states wish to help victims upon arrival in Europe, whereas others would rather address the root causes. This point is supported by Gattinara (2017, p. 328) who argues that “EU leaders have been incapable, if not unwilling, to grasp the interconnectedness between the political, economic and ideological crises that the [migrant] community is facing” and that the EU must examine how different crises (such as the financial crisis, Brexit, and climate change) intersect with migration. I found this point interesting to compare with sentiments voiced in a later seminar with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), which stressed that effective migration policy is cross-cutting and multifaceted.

Finally, our speaker from Payoke highlighted the lack of European media attention to human trafficking, which also holds true in Canada. In fact, this visit encouraged me to conduct further research on the human trafficking of refugees in Canada. Overall, I was impressed by the number of services offered by Payoke, as the organization appeared to be operating on limited staff and resources, and I learned more about the role of civil society in the EU.

References

Gattinara, Pietro Castelli (2017).  ‘The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy’.  Contemporary Italian Politics, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 318-331

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Volunteering in a Refugee Camp in Greece

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By Franziska Fischer, PhD candidate, Political Science, University of Victoria

After dedicating most of my academic career intellectualizing and theorizing about migration flows and trying to understand and explain social, political and economic reactions to sudden influxes of people due to conflict or natural disasters I took the opportunity between my Master degree and my PhD to leave the books behind and spend some time working on the ground with the organization ‘Lifting Hands International’ in Greece in a Community Center and Accommodation for Refugees.

Perception of a situation is a powerful tool to create social reaction, and I hope a series of experience reports from different volunteers and first responders in Greece may assist in balancing an often fear driven narrative created by the media. The following experience reports are highly subjective and personal glimpses into a sphere of interaction between refugees and dedicated individuals, who have donated their time and energy to improve the often dire circumstances in the refugee camps in Greece.

My personal experience brought me to the northern Greek town Serres in early 2018.

Cold Weather – Warm People

Serres is a small town of 80,000 people tucked at the base of the Vrontous mountain range, one hour northeast of Thessaloniki by car. It is actually closer to Bulgaria than it is to Thessaloniki. It is a typical Greek town, meaning great food, friendly people, and a lot of politics. It’s hot and humid during the summer and brutally cold in the winter. When I arrived in Serres it was early January, and while there was fortunately little snow on the ground, the temperatures barely rose above freezing levels.

Yazidi Refugees

Most residents of the refugee camp, which was organized by the local Greek municipality, were Yazidi. Targeted by ISIS as a religious minority, the Yazidi community has endured a grim period of genocide and is by now almost completely wiped out due to violent takeovers in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. If you are interested in the Yazidi community and their stories please read through at the first third of the UN’s report on the genocide of Yazidis, in order to understand what the residents of Serres camp have been through and what sets them apart. In a nutshell Yazidis are member of a Kurdish religious minority found primarily in northern Iraq, their official language is Kurmanji and after the invasion of the IS in their region and their vicious persecution, their culture got almost entirely wiped out as the survivors had to flee over the Sinjar mountain range to escape genocide.

During my time in Serres, I took over the German lessons, as the previous language teachers Kathi and Corinne were departing back to Germany and Switzerland. Many Yazidis already have families in Germany and are just waiting to join them, which unfortunately can take several years with the current backlog in European bureaucracy and the ongoing disputes between the Member States of the European Union to find a coherent system to deal with the refugee influx.

My goal was to utilize the time I had with the Yazidi community to give them a solid understanding of language and habits of the German life to allow a smooth arrival in the anal German bureaucracy as well as navigate the jungle or rules that is the German language with fun and exciting lessons. During my time in Serres I offered Beginner German, Advanced German, German for the Babas (Dads) and the Mamas (Moms). I also initiated an ABC class, designed to teach people not familiar with the Latin Alphabet. Additionally, I started a band project with the Yazidis to combine their countless talents on the guitar, ukulele, piano, drums and singing to a wonderful band-project, the Blue-Hearts, we called ourselves. Some members of our little band requested to cover Justin Bieber songs, and even though I do not feel strongly about that request, it just showed me, they are just normal teenagers, identifying with some of the same cultural phenomena as any western teenager. Music is such powerful tool to connect people and it reminded me time and again, instead of always searching for differences; how is that person distinct from me – we can find s many beautiful connections through similarities, may it even be a terrible taste in music. After about a week of rehearsal, there was not a single person in the camp, who was not able to hum along to Justin Biebers ‘Love yourself’ as we practiced everyday for over an hour, outside around the fire, for everyone to hear and participate.

Even though I was offering four different levels of German classes, from ABC to Advanced, the levels and especially the age gap is tremendous in my groups, which makes it very challenging, but often just as much fun. The group dynamic is such a wonderful thing to observe when you witness some of the babas (Dads) erupting in a petty little disputes about who said a word first and correct, or some of the teenage girls maturely navigating their advanced understanding of the alphabet to the benefit of the whole group. My heart jumped with joy when we played charades and I was barely done painting a hardly identifiable jacket, and 15 people almost fell over from leaning forward and yelling at me from the top of their lungs: “JACKE, JACKE, JACKE.” When I then held my finger up and asked: “Artikel?” they group resumed yelling: “DIE JACKE; DIE JACKE; DIE JACKE.” They brought so much passion, devotion and ambition to class, I could hardly wish for a more wonderful group of people to teach German too. Not rarely did some of them sneak into the tents before or in between classes to write words on the whiteboard and ask me to correct them and to give tips.

Our Goals

We wanted to make a positive impact and help the people to heal from their tremendously dangerous journey and experiences. We wanted to help create an environment in which the people can thrive and develop their wonderful personalities and talents. We hoped to provide a space in which the many kids and teenagers can grow safely and hopefully soon will find a more permanent home. What happened during my time in Serres was however much more balanced. It was a give and take, it was a collaboration between people, not a hierarchy. The atmosphere was coined by respect, by gratitude and by trust on both sides. We were invited to eat and drink chai (tea) and play games, sing songs and craft beautiful decorations together. As they slowly learned German, I slowly learned Kurmanji.  Everyone helps, everyone participated with learning each other’s customs, languages, with building the constructions and providing the energy, the time and the love to create a community more than anything else.

If my time in Serres has done one thing, it has humbled me to the core and showed me, there is no need for a continuation of coloniality, for othering and for xenophobia. However, it is time to listen.

It is time to listen

We often find ourselves talking instead of listening, assuming instead of knowing. The confidence of our western understanding of the world drowns the expertise, the wisdom, and the tales from other parts of this world. It is time to listen

Especially coming from an academic background on migration and refugee studies, I am used to fancy, renowned and established scholars, usually stemming from a western university or education institution explaining, describing and analyzing a situation. And in the same line of learning, I have adapted and taken in this linear way of communication knowledge and understanding. I can intellectualize my hypocrisy, but here in Serres I actually learn to shut up and listen. It is not about me, it is not about theories, about abstract concepts and fancy names. It is a about humans that have so much to tell. And it is a privilege to listen, I am humbled by their willingness to share with me their tales, their knowledge and their unbroken spirits, optimism and positivity.

Let this be a reminder to us all, to speak to each other instead of speaking for someone. Let this be a reminder to listen and hear what is said, instead of assuming what we already know. Let this be an invitation to bring together people of different realities and knowledges to share with ne another, instead of condemning otherness. It is an opportunity – lets treat it as such and not as a threat to a construct in our heads.

 

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Unlocking borders like smartphones – Can digital identities fill a void in the global governance of mobility?

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Linda Tippkaemper, Marie Skłodowska-Curie PhD Fellow, Université Sorbonne Paris Cité

Unlocking borders like smartphones – Can digital identities fill a void in the global governance of mobility?

 

Whenever I check-in my bag at an airport and it eventually disappears, I always wonder for a moment how it is going to travel through those dark tunnels below the counter, how it will be x-rayed somewhere, barcoded and scanned. How it will travel left and right, in and out of airplanes, only to be spit back out again at the baggage carousel, sometimes at the other end of the world.

The handling of baggage, even across different airlines and borders, works thanks to the International Air Travel Association (IATA). Since 1945, the organization serves its 290 member airlines as a coordinating mechanism for security and logistical issues. Airline staff worldwide can consult IATA’s “Baggage Tracking Implementation Guide” and participate in standardized seminars. In a way, the organization ensures the successful global governance of bags.

Processing baggage owners in a comparably efficient and coordinated manner, however, is a much greater challenge. With an expected 100% increase of air travel within the next 15 years, it is essential for airlines to also “simplify and enhance the passenger process” (IATA 2018). Yet, airlines cannot just put barcode tags on their customers. They depend on state-issued travel documents to identify their passengers.

Passports vs. barcodes

Modern states invented international passports only after the First World War to enforce their “monopoly over the legitimate means of movement” (Torpey 2000). At that time, passports were only paper sheets. Nowadays, airlines can retrieve passenger data from passport booklets and match it automatically with the data stored in their booking information system. In this regard, airlines profit from states’ efforts to standardize travel documents, which are led by a specialized UN agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). While IATA works for its member airlines, ICAO assists 192 member states as a global governance mechanism for civil aviation standards. Under this mandate, the organization has developed a detailed guide on the state-of-the-art Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD).

Alphanumerical data in MRTDs can be digitally read out by states and airlines alike. However, states profit from a modern security feature that is still mostly withheld from airlines: biometrics. Airlines could use fingerprints and facial recognition just like an organic barcode tag for their passengers and thus increase efficiency in passenger handling significantly.

One digital identity – “One iD”

To foster this, IATA presented its initiative One iD in early 2018. It entails the development of a digital identity platform for travelers which can be fed with passengers’ alphanumeric and biometric passport data. IATA claims that the system could increase airport security and bring advantages for travelers, who would not have to repeatedly juggle with numerous paper documents like passports, visas and boarding passes, but could instead use their fingerprint and face as an ‘open sesame’ at each airport checkpoint (IATA 2018).

In cases where the traveler so requires, One iD could also entail digital visas, verified by governments. Currently, airlines must check visas manually and can be fined by states under the so-called carrier sanctions, if they transport an unproperly documented passenger across the border. However, with almost 200 states and territories imposing different entry regulations towards each other’s citizens, the global visa regime resembles a giant maze of opaque regulations. As a service to its member airlines, IATA already stores these complex rules in its “TIMatic database”. The automated matching of digital visas from One iD against this database could replace manual checks and reduce the amount of time and cost dedicated to the training of airline staff.

Challenging states: The “Known Traveler Digital Identity” (KTDI)

IATA however, is not the only private organization that struggles with and therefore actively challenges the current status-quo of state-governed mechanisms to manage people’s identities across borders. Last year, the World Economic Forum (WEF) presented the “Known Traveler Digital Identity” (KTDI), which also comprises the storage of relevant individual data in one “digital envelope”, just like One iD.

When it comes to the issue of visas, the KTDI concept goes even one step further. While IATA sees the acquisition of digital entry permits as a pre-requisite for the use of One iD, the WEF rightly identifies “visa application and screening” as an important “key pain point” in a traveler’s journey. The digital platform is therefore not only designed to speed up airport procedures, but it is meant to serve as a potential decision-making tool for certain countries’ pre-vetting procedures.

The global visa regime, which has only grown within the last couple of decades alongside passports, limits hassle-free movement not only for “weak passport”[i] holders, but also for citizens traveling between economically dependent states and regions like China and the EU. To put it simply, visa requirements concern many employees and potential customers of the businesses that the WEF represents. These businesses often have their own visa desks dedicated to help staff with their applications, or they even outsource this task to special visa agencies, where “international mobility managers” guide the way through the jungle of fragmented national rules.

Filling a void?

Thus far, no public global government mechanism has even dared to steer towards a standardization of these rules and requirements, because border security is considered as an issue of national sovereignty. On the one hand, ICAO’s contribution in that field was to make visas machine-readable like passports, but the organization never overstepped its mandate to events happening outside the airport. IATA, on the other hand, as a non-public organization lobbying for airlines, never had the interest, nor the mandate to influence the policies that it only stores as a reference. Then again, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) became a UN institution only in 2016, while previously serving rather as a service provider for immigration countries and not as a global governance mechanism.

With the KTDI, the WEF aims to counter the fragmentation of national procedures. As the WEF’s concept report recognizes, “beyond the immediate efficiency gains of digitization […], emerging technologies can be used to unlock changes in policy design and the mechanisms government agencies use to ensure the secure movement of people across borders” (WEF 2018).

According to the KTDI concept, the digital identity can be complemented with attestations from “trusted entities” like employers, universities or banks, thereby building a digital “known traveler” status. The “authenticated identity claims” shall then serve as the individual’s “backbone of trust and the basis of reputation”. Instead of preparing a new visa application file for each trip according to consulates’ often confusing requirements, individuals could provide them with a uniform digital file which can be updated and re-used for each trip.

In essence, the WEF wants to detach individuals from the old, national way of constructing and screening identities by introducing a global blueprint for this purpose. This may also be considered as an attempt to bridge the gap that has developed as companies are becoming increasingly international, while their employees or customers stay confined to their nation state.

Turning the paper wall of visas into a digital one?

However, even a harmonized digital tool cannot change the fact that travelers will remain subject to states’ scrutiny. In this context, the concept possibly underestimates the current complexity of documenting and screening people’s legal, social and professional identities across borders. Today’s visa requirements represent the states’ attempts to gap the borders that exist not only between countries, but also between data. Consulates rely on a multitude of actors who must testify to the individual’s identity and intention and for whom they shall offer their endorsement. And even so, the quality and reliability of information gained during these procedures is often questioned.

The reality is that no matter what blueprint countries would be given for their vetting procedure, suspicions towards certain groups of travelers will remain and the authenticity of the uploaded documentation may be questioned just as the paper documents are questioned today. Should all the countless actors involved in compiling paperwork for digital visa procedures get an official account to digitally authenticate it? Without an elaborate solution for this, the KTDI might inevitably run into the same problems and complexity characterizing the present visa procedures. That the concept is currently being tested by the Canadian and Dutch governments, not in a visa-restricted context, is hopefully not a sign of surrender to this challenge.

After all, the KTDI could be a stepping stone for the more “integrated, secure and coordinated manner” of managing extra-territorial borders, which is one of the objectives of the UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. A solution that the public global governance mechanisms, which seem to focus mainly on what happens at the airport, have yet to come up with.

 

 

 

__________

WEF (World Economic Forum): The Known Traveler, Unlocking the potential of digital identity for secure and seamless travel. [Online] 2018. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Known_Traveler_Digital_Identity_Concept.pdf

IATA (International Air Transport Association): One iD Concept Paper Version 1. [Online] 2018. https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/passenger/Documents/OneID-concept-paper.pdf

Torpey, John (2000). The invention of the passport. Surveillance, citizenship and the state. Cambridge University Press.

 

Linda Tippkaemper is an INSPRIE doctoral fellow at University Paris 13, Paris Sorbonne Cité and receiving funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 665850.

http://www.cofund-inspire.eu/fellow/linda-tippkaemper/

 

[i] For a global ranking of weak and powerful passports see the Henley Passport Index, a yearly publication on countries’ “visa-free scores,” which usually grabs media headlines: https://www.henleypassportindex.com/assets/2019/q2/Full%20Q2%20Ranking.pdf (accessed on March 28th 2019).

 

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Borders, Security, and Migration

Posted on by eucanet

By Malcolm Thompson and Alina Sobolik, University of Victoria

Introduction: the Situation

The recent EUCANET Webinar titled “Borders, Security, and Migration” raised several interesting points of discussion regarding the importance of borders on the European and American continents. Specifically regarding the recent migration crisis that struck Europe in the mid-2010s, it was stated that this crisis highlighted the ‘paradoxical effect’ of the EU’s border security, in that there has been an ‘ever closer degree of cross-border mobility within Europe, but also an increased securitization of the external EU border.’ However, statements made in the webinar also highlighted how the migration crisis has contradicted this effect, causing individual EU member states to increase securitization of their internal borders. This blog post looks to highlight this contradiction, and show the economic and non-economic impacts that it increasing internal border checks in the Schengen zone, the area of internal free movement of people in Europe, has had as a result of the migrant crisis. This blog post will also highlight the existential challenges that the migration crisis has posed to the Schengen system and what this could mean for the future of the union.

The Schengen zone is a fundamental feature of the EU’s single market, allowing for the free movement of people internally between EU member states and 4 non-EU countries. However, the recent migrant crisis has called into question the support of this cross-national freedom to continue. As both The Economist (Oct 25, 2018) and Fisher (2018) explained, the increase of immigrants wishing to come into Europe since the beginning of the decade coupled with the impacts of the Eurozone crisis has caused a significant public opposition to the idea of a free internal movement of people, with individual states undermining the Schengen agreement by instituting internal border controls. As of late 2018, these internal border controls “have become more or less permanent in six European countries” (The Economist, Oct 25, 2018). The presence of border securitization within the Schengen zone has led to friction between the functioning of the EU and the national desires of its members. Importantly, this movement away from a fully operational Schengen zone have created fears of economic and political ramifications that could significantly impact the ability of the EU to further ingrate. As the next sections will show, both a breakdown of the Schengen zone could lead to troubles for the EU both economically and politically.

Economic argument

The nature of the Schengen zone as a core feature of the EU’s single market means that increased inefficiencies in the movement of people around Europe has a direct impact on the functioning of the EU’s economy. As Fisher (2018) stated, complications to Schengen resulting from an increase in internal border securitization would affect several “of the union’s most popular perks – ease of travel for work, vacation or family – and undercut trade and labor transfers, weakening the single market economy.” Bringing back stronger borders between Schengen members would constitute a significant cost, as is established by The Economist (Oct 25, 2018), which echoed findings by the European Parliament, and stated that “reintroducing border controls in the Schengen area could cost up to €20bn in one-off expenses and €2bn in annual operating expenses”. However, the economic impacts of rolling back the freedoms of the Schengen agreement reach deeper into the functioning of the EU’s economy, posing a serious potential impact to the operation of many EU businesses.

Speaking in extremes, Zalan (2016) highlighted predictions by the European Commission, and stated that “losing Schengen altogether could cost as much as an €18 billion drop in the EU’s annual GDP”. This, as Zalan, 2016 noted, would mean that the EU’s GDP could be reduced by 0.13% should Schengen fall apart completely. However, there are still significant effects on the EU’s economy should the Schengen zone experience increased complications but still remain intact. This would be seen both in terms of increased expenses for the 1.7 million workers in the Schengen zone that commute between states daily (euobserver, 2016); should internal borders become increasingly guarded, there would be a “lower[ing] of the economic output of the 27 EU countries by 0.19 percent to 0.47 percent on a yearly basis.” (Zalan, 2016)[1]. This decrease would cost the individual European citizen upwards of €130 a year (Zalan, 2016).

Thus, even if Schengen does maintain intact, complications to its functioning would severely affect both European businesses and citizens.

Non-economic implications:

When people feel under crisis, they turn to a strong identity for protection (Fisher, 2018). The desire to belong to a solid group of insiders is a basic human survival instinct (Fisher, 2018).The architects of the European Project had hoped that they could impose a European identity on their citizens through integration but they did not account for the various crises and how they would challenge this project. The people were not made privy to the blueprints for Europe. The migration crisis showed the member state citizens the reality of what was happening behind the scenes in Europe, the fact that integration doesn’t only mean free movement of goods and people but a limitation on member state sovereignty (Fisher, 2018).

To compensate for this sacrifice of sovereignty and ease the concerns of member states regarding security, FRONTEX was created to bolster the external security of the EU. However, RPPs have managed to establish internal borders as a symbolic representation of the nation-state and therefore, the people (The Economist, 2018). Ensuring the people that the EU will do a sufficient job of keeping them safe and that they do not need internal borders is a difficult task with the presence of RPPs who are able to point to various violent and emotionally powerful incidents and claim that it is because the EU is vulnerable, and the nation state must protect itself.

Because the EU does not have a prominent mouthpiece in domestic politics, it is necessary for member state politicians to defend the government’s decision to participate in integration if the project is to remain alive. However, what we’ve seen as a reaction to the various crises is that Politicians lack the “political will to bolster and support the Schengen system in crisis” (Traynor, 2016). Rather than articulating the wealth of benefits that member states receive as a result of the Schengen system, or highlighting the very real challenges to everyday life that a disintegration of the system would result in, politicians have acted to protect their vote, appealing to nationalist sentiments where it serves their electoral purpose (Traynor, 2016). This is not without consequence.

Perhaps the most dangerous impact of RPPs on Europe is not their direct effects on the migration crisis or the temporary closure of borders, but the residual sentiments of nationalism that have no decreased with the slowing of migration. As shown previously, member states benefit exponentially from the Schengen system, but ‘limit Schengen’ sentiments have continued past the immediate demands for control over the migration crisis (Fisher, 2018). The EU is experiencing a “crisis of trust” amongst the member states that fosters a divide between Northern European and Southern European states (The Economist, 2018). This divide, nationalist sentiments, and a desire for the return of member state sovereignty are all incompatible with the project of integration.

Going forward:

It is difficult to predict what will happen to the Schengen system going forward, given the facts that RPPs have established themselves in the political institutions of the member states and that the ideals they broadcast: sovereignty of member states and nationalism, are not compatible with integration.

Three possible outcomes that we have identified are a complete transfer of control over external borders to the EU, a regression of the system into various smaller free movement zones, or the end of the Schengen system (The Economist, 2018; Fisher, 2018; Traynor, 2016).

It is unlikely that, in this current political climate, member states would be willing to surrender control over the external borders to the EU, as shown in the negative reactions to the European Commission’s proposal to establish an EU border guard with authority over national border guards (Fisher, 2018). As well, strengthening external borders helps only to address the migration crisis (Fisher, 2018). What we’ve seen is that challenges to the Schengen system have evolved beyond a response to the migration crisis and established nationalist sentiments that are far more powerful. Supporters of RPPs would not likely support a measure such as this even if it could guarantee the security of external borders because of the implications to national sovereignty and identity.

The creation of smaller areas of passport-free travel opens possibilities to accommodate the ‘cultural’ argument made by RPPs, and allows ‘culturally similar’ member states to enjoy freedom of movement amongst themselves, while erecting borders along lines of variation. This could be a way in which the EU adapts to the presence of and leadership by nationalist RPPs.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/06/23/europes-passport-free-zone-faces-a-grim-future

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/world/europe/europe-borders-nationalism-identity.html

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/is-the-schengen-dream-of-europe-without-borders-becoming-a-thing-of-the-past

https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/10/25/border-checks-are-undermining-schengen

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-temporary-reintroduction-of-border-control-at-internal-borders

https://euobserver.com/business/133253

[1] Croatia is excluded in this count.

Picture: Quim Gil

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Separation Anxiety

Posted on by eucanet

By Robert Gould

On March 14th while living in Seville I listened to and watched the online EUCanet seminar Borders, Security and Migration.  Thinking about some of the questions and exchanges, including the conceptualisations alluded to, I was considering writing a blog post about the anxiety surrounding a possible new border appearing in north-east Spain.  However, the following headlines in the press on the same day persuaded me to write about a different situation, one arising from irregular migration across the Mediterranean and the EU’s land borders with Africa in the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

First it should be explained that Spain is in an election year.  In 2017 Germany had what was called a Superwahljahr, a super election year, when four of the states elected new parliaments, followed by the Bundestag elections.  In 2019 Spain is now having a GIGANTIC election year: on April 28th there are elections for the Cortes Generales, i.e. the national parliament, and also for Les Corts Valencianes, the parliament of the autonomous community (think ‘province’ in Canadian terms, or Bundesland in Austrian or German terms) of Valencia.  On May 26 there will be elections for every municipality in the country, the parliaments of 12 of the 16 autonomous communities, and the Spanish members of the European Parliament.  The basically two-party system of Partido Popular (PP: conservative and catholic) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE: centre-left) has broken down.  In addition to some regional parties, nationally there are now three new parties: Podemos (far left), Ciudadanos (centre-right but without the Catholic background and in competition with the PP), and the new and far-right Vox (see the earlier blog post on this site and the commentary Vox Expaña, an alternative Identity for Spain[1]).  The party landscape is crowded, the competition is fierce, the situation is  hyper politicised, and although the campaigns have not officially started, of course they have in reality.

In addition, what is also at stake is the control of the Senate, composed partly of elected members and partly of members designated by the parliaments of the autonomous communities.  At this stage in Spanish political life this control is of particular importance because of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution.  This article is modelled exactly on Article 37 of the German Grundgesetz.  With the approval of the Bundesrat, and only the Bundesrat, it gives the federal cabinet the power to suspend the government of a Bundesland if it is failing to fulfil its constitutional obligations.  Similarly, with the approval of the Senate of Spain, and only the Senate, the national cabinet may suspend the powers of the government of an autonomous community and impose its own authority.  It did so following the illegal independence referendum of 1 October 2017 in Catalonia.  The PP and Ciudadanos take a particularly hard line on Catalan separation and are already speaking of using the power again, but they can only do so if they control the Senate.

The headlines in question are the following, first from the centre-left El País, which is also the newspaper of record in Spain (and also has a small online English-language edition); then in the conservative, Catholic and monarchist newspaper ABC, (close to the Partido Popular).

El País: “El PP propone retrasar la expulsión de mujeres inmigrantes que den a su hijo en adopción”:  https://elpais.com/politica/2019/03/13/actualidad/1552506632_424707.html

English edition: “PP proposes delaying deportation of pregnant migrants who opt for adoption”: https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/14/inenglish/1552551266_621264.html

ABC: “El PP propone que las mujeres inmigrantes que den a un hijo en adopción no sean expulsadas mientras dure el proceso”: https://www.abc.es/sociedad/abci-pp-propone-mujeres-inmigrantes-hijo-adopcion-no-sean-expulsadas-mientras-dure-proceso-201903141235_noticia.html

“The PP proposes that women migrants who give up a child for adoption should not be deported during the [adoption] process”.

The headlines emerged in the context of the announcement by Pablo Casado, National President of the PP, of a proposal to create an “Act for the Support of Motherhood” (Ley en Apoyo a la Maternidad), designed, among other things, to “promote a culture of life”, to reduce the rate of abortions, increase the birth-rate, and confront what he and others call “the demographic winter” (Spain has the second-lowest birth-rate in the EU, below even that of Germany).

In other words, the headlines suggested that the migrant woman is not wanted, but her child is.  The child will be brought up Spanish, but the mother will still have to leave, having severed all legal ties to the child.  This system, the press related, already existed in the autonomous community of Madrid.  Presumably the mother who stays in the country until the adoption formalities are completed after the birth of the child will benefit from the pre-natal, childbirth and post-natal care provided by the Spanish health service, rather than taking her chances in transit to where she came from.  This could be a significant inducement to agree to the adoption.  Another inducement would be that even if she could not achieve her dream of living and prospering in the security of Europe, at least her child could.

Elisabeth Vallet spoke of the high level of sexual violence suffered by women making the trek northwards to try to enter the United States via its southern border.  One can reasonably assume that the same thing is happening on the way north to Europe.  Undesired pregnancies accompany the migration of desperation.

In the present hyper politicized atmosphere news of the announcement led to the spread of an interpretation that the PP was promising residence papers to migrant women who gave up their newborns for adoption.  This was hotly denied as “fake news”, as it no doubt was.  Later, the PP clarified that all that was being proposed was that there would be absolute confidentially concerning the personal details of an irregular migrant given in the adoption process, and thus they could not be used against her and lead to her immediate expulsion.

Thus in this one brief episode of headlines and corrections we have a number of the conceptualisations relating to borders, migration and migrants mentioned in the seminar.  (1) The performance of a degree of compassion for women migrants and their (unborn) children (particularly following the massive demonstrations, which no politician can ignore, all over Spain on Friday 8 March in support of female equality), (2) questions of inclusion and exclusion, (3) migrants as pawns in an election campaign in which more than usual is at stake: In the face of the continuing separation movement in Catalonia and the desire to create a new border, it is being asserted on the political right (PP, Ciudadanos, and Vox) that nothing less than (4) the very existence and identity of the Spanish nation are endangered.

Sadly, one is also reminded of an earlier episode of family separations in the course of expulsions to North Africa.  When people of North-African background were expelled from the territory of what is now Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth century, in some circumstances young children were separated from their parents and had to remain behind.  This was because of the view that they could be raised as completely Spanish, thus contributing to the population numbers and in no way endangering national identity.

Seville, 15 March 2019

[1] URL:  https://carleton.ca/ces/wp-content/uploads/Commentary-Vox-An-Alternative-Identity-for-Spain-by-Robert-Gould-February-2019.pdf

Photo credits to CJ 1000