Media in Turkey: a testing ground of censorship and control

By Fazila Mat (PhD candidate, University of Victoria) and Sofia Verza (PhD candidate, University of Perugia)

Four years after the attempted coup of 15-16 July 2016, the space for media pluralism in Turkey continues to shrink. Numerous pro-government media, owned by companies which have investments in several other sectors, dominate the scene. The presidential system introduced in July 2018, during the state of emergency declared immediately after the attempted coup, legally tied any public institution to the presidency, including the body that issues the cards proving journalists’ membership of their professional association.

The criminalisation of journalism is widespread and the country is currently the largest prison for journalists in the world, with over 80 media workers in detention.   The Covid-19 pandemic seems to have provided yet another opportunity to criminalise thought. A recent Amnesty International report explains that criticisms of the authorities’ management of the health emergency led to charges attracting prison sentences of between two and four years. In addition, a recent package of reforms, introduced to reduce the risk of Covid-19 infection in Turkish prisons, set free 90,000 people excluding journalists, activists, and others charged with political crimes.

Online media outlets – TV channels on YouTube, news websites and podcasts – have proliferated in a bid to evade state control and offer an alternative narrative. However, the Internet has also become a target for censorship, often through the takedown of content and the blocking of web pages – as it the case of Wikipedia, which was inaccessible in Turkey for almost three years – or through new laws and licencing rules. The trajectory of state intervention online appears to have gone through all three “generations of control” of the Internet identified by Deibert and others in Access Controlled (2020) – from imposing a complete block to indirect interference in the production of content.

While the country stands out for the frequency with which it requests user data from Facebook, in the last few years the authorities set up a “Social Media Monitoring Unit” and an app that allows citizens to report posts they consider terrorist propaganda. Finally, on 29 July, the Turkish parliament approved a law that obliges social media companies to have legal representatives in Turkey and to store users’ data in the country. Those who refuse to comply could see their bandwidth slashed, and be subject to monetary penalties. The courts will also be able to order the removal of online content, not just block access to it.

The full article has been published by the European Journalism Observatory (EJO) in collaboration with Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT).

 

 

 

How COVID-19 is eroding civil liberties and damaging society 

By Javier Dichupa, student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria

Civil liberties are essential in the proper functioning of any democracy. The unprecedented scale of the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities in our democracies. The situation in Spain and Italy during the peak of their pandemics highlighted the ease in which governments were able to suspend the civil liberties of their people. Questions should be raised regarding what happens when civil liberties are suspended for extended periods and democratic legitimacy.

The suspension of civil liberties in Spain and Italy was justified by the public health crisis occurring. The strict lockdown in these countries undoubtedly saved many lives and slowed the spread of the virus. Furthermore, it bought time for the beleaguered health care systems in their fight against the virus.

Unfortunately, how the governments of Spain and Italy went about enforcing their lockdowns was very problematic. In Spain, crippling fines were threatened and levied against those who broke the new restrictions. As the pandemic progressed, the armed forces were also used to aid the government in enforcing the lockdown. This approach relied heavily on coercion to achieve its objective, and coercion can only ever be used as a short-term solution.

As with Spain, Italy’s approach to enforcing its lockdown was similar. Police and military personnel were heavily relied on to keep people at home. Fines were also used as a tactic to implement the lockdown. Italy was one of the first European countries to face a large-scale outbreak. therefore, it has had to endure one of the longest lockdowns in the Union.

Coercion was a common factor in the Italian and Spanish lockdowns. As such, the use of fear and intimidation to achieve the objectives of the government is dangerous. Coercive force degrades the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of the people. When civil liberties are suspended, people’s right to express themselves is also curbed. Making it difficult for governments to gain insight from their people.

Another unintended consequence of the heavy-handed lockdowns was the effect they had on the poorer members of society. The use of security forces to keep people indoors was especially problematic for those who did not have the option to work from home or were ineligible for benefits. This further stigmatized many groups as they were subsequently forced to use means outside the law to survive. These issues were seen in the less prosperous south of Italy and among the temporary worker communities in Spain.

The decline in civil liberties has far-reaching effects that touch on all parts of society. These reductions make it difficult for people to express themselves, eroding the relationship between the authorities and people. Once civil liberties are reduced or removed, it is very difficult to restore them. As such, the president set regarding the suspension of civil liberties during the COVID-19 pandemic is problematic.

We live in unprecedented times, and the spread of COVID-19 must be stopped if life is to return to normal. We must remain critical of the actions being taken to deal with the virus. Governments need to walk a fine line balancing civil liberties and public health. Though, if they continue to do so while curbing the civil liberties of their people, it could create long term issues for the health of their democracies.

Citations:

Studdert, David M., & Hall, Mark A. “Disease Control, Civil Liberties, and Mass Testing – Calibrating Restrictions during the Covid-19 Pandemic.” The New England Journal of Medicine 1, no. 1 (2020): 1-3. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp2007637

“Photos and videos reveal brewing unrest in southern Italy as lockdown make people desperate for cash and food.” BuinsessInsider, 25 May. 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/italians-desperate-for-cash-food-amid-coronavirus-lockdown-2020-4.

“650,000 fined for breaking Spain’s Coronavirus lockdown.” The Olive Press, 25 May. 2020, https://www.theolivepress.es/spain-news/2020/04/13/650000-fined-for-breaking-spains-coronavirus-lockdown/.

Pic: Civil Rights 50th Anniversary March / Photo credit Sinn Féin

Can COVID-19 Be Taken as An Opportunity to Improve our policies?

By Ethan Quilty, student in Computer Science and Marine Biology at the University of Victoria

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19

The onset of the COVID19 pandemic has been swift. In just a few months, the world is a completely different place than the one we knew in 2019. We now face a long period of uncertainty. When will we travel again? When can we go to school again? But, most importantly, when will we stop this virus? Amidst all the uncertainty and ambiguity of this period, it is important to use the old cliché and look at the positives. As a self-proclaimed optimist, I believe there are many.

Being confined to your home is not an ideal situation; Furthermore, being unable to meet friends and family in person is equally upsetting. The loss of physical contact and activity is extremely difficult, and many see the confinement as an empty time to be filled with media consumption and make-work projects. I argue that it is an opportunity to learn from the mistakes that led to this situation and prevent such a tragedy from reoccurring, or at the very least, to be prepared for the next one. In addition to instigating a catastrophic global tragedy, the pandemic has exposed some areas of particular political importance. Namely, the environmental crisis has seen some positive impacts from this virus. Reduced vehicular traffic, scarce air travel and fossil fuel operations have all contributed to vastly reduced emissions levels in some of the hardest-hit countries, namely China and Western Europe. Here in British Columbia, reduced marine traffic has seen Salish Orcas and some juvenile whales travelling further into the port of Vancouver than they have been seen in hundreds of years. These are only some of the many examples that can be found of positive environmental impacts that are the result of this pandemic.

HOW WE CAN IMPROVE

The implementation of policies reducing vehicle usage and fossil fuel consumption could help us get on track to improving the environment. These types of actions will require policies that take a new approach; putting the environment first. Should policies be implemented that do not favor large companies and infinite economic growth, we could see a rise in environmental stewardship and improvement work. Studies have shown that climate instability has caused a great increase in zoonotic diseases like SARS CoV2. This really is only the beginning. Perhaps one more great thing to come from this pandemic is how it has shown the ability of nations to work together and get things done. Opposing political parties are more unified in pushing forward aid programs and directives than ever before – so why couldn’t this be applied to the environmental crisis? If a unified and directed approach can be taken on this, many of the problems we face could be lessened or eliminated altogether.  Though COVID19 can be labelled as a public health crisis, its roots are far deeper than that. It has shown that if we cannot improve our practices, such as seriously fighting climate change or limiting our insatiable economic consumption,then humanity will certainly encounter more pandemics.

Citations:

Zambrano-Monserrate, M. A., Ruano, M. A., & Sanchez-Alcalde, L. (2020, April 20). Indirect effects of COVID-19 on the environment. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969720323305

 

 

A return to the people? The case against populist politics

By Laurence Claussen, MA Political Science, University of British Columbia

Populism must be considered a long-term threat to democracy. I say ‘long-term’ because it is plausible that many intransigent problems democratic systems face might be temporarily addressed through a populist show of force. The rise of sub-national separatism in Europe, declining turnout numbers in industrialized democracies, foreign interference in elections, backlashes against the global flow of migrants, and a quickly diverging wealth gap all call for some kind of answer. Rallying the people and clarifying a nation’s goals might not entirely resolve these issues, but it would indicate action and forward-progress.

But, inevitably, populist change is unstable. It creates space for future discord and weakens the institutional architecture upon which democracy, regardless of context, inherently depends.

Our systems of government and society need improvement; this improvement demands reflection and at times brutal honesty. Thomas Jefferson summarized this idea best, arguing that “institutions must advance […] and keep pace with the times.” To not do so represented political naivety: “we might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy” (Jefferson to H. Tompkinson (AKA Samuel Kercheval), July 12, 1816).

The degree to which necessary progress has be made is up for debate. But given the widespread perception – made clear by most political commentators and myriad of 2019 protest movements – that traditional politics have fallen short it seems reasonable that popular pressure must be channeled in order to secure new and vital sources of political capital. Alarm bells triggered because of new reports by the EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) and Freedom House entrench such sentiments. As the latter bluntly put it in their Freedom in the World 2019 Report, the “surge of progress has now begun to roll back” (Freedom House, 2019).

No issue captures this situation better than Climate Change, and the Swedish teenager turned Times Person of the Year leading the call to action. Greta Thunberg has led a kind of righteous politics fueled by an upswell of passionate young people. Her name has become synonymous with Climate Change activism in the popular lexicon. Many frustrated observers laud these efforts, believing that such a movement is needed if we are ever to correct the flaws of a stagnant, broken system.

Since this movement is premised on a popular figure and has so far operated on grassroots support and protest, many might label it populist. After doing so, some might conflate its methods and rhetoric with a general political toolbox needed to tackle other problems.

But I do not see Greta and the forces she represents as true populism. In facing climate change, income inequality, police brutality and economic mismanagement, politicians and activists are right to criticize and agitate. Urging accountability upon the powerful and expressing frustration through protest is responsible democracy.

Labeling any kind of socio-political movement dependent on mass-involvement as populism – a common reality these days – is unhelpful and dangerous because it obscures through normalization a threatening political phenomenon.

True populism can be distinguished and identified in two significant ways: the dangerous simplification of national problems and the reliance on categorization to establish political capital. There has never been a populist movement that did not divide society into the righteous and the corrupt and recast delicate dilemmas as quests to vanquish the corrupt. The politics that follow never ‘correct’ the system in place but rather seek narrowly defined reprieves for those newly in charge. Populists do not deal in systemic change, although they speak often of it. Instead they orient themselves entirely against the concerns of the present and those groups believed complicit in them. To agitate and uproot requires the closure of dialogue, and the recasting of tribe.

We see these patterns in the current line-up of populist politicians: Bolsonaro, Duterte, Salvini, Farage, Modi and Trump. All of them adhere to the same political handbook, and all represent the end-product of political ecosystems that nurtured and legitimized populism. Populism is a threat to democracy because those who have been elected or held power through populist means have weakened democracy wherever they rise.

When we bemoan the decline or death of democracy, it is not that citizens no longer express themselves at the ballot box, or that a series of military coups have secured power all over the world. It is the newfound manifestation of a political rhetoric and approach to problem solving that corrupts mature consensus-building. It is the determination not to play the political game, to side-step institutions and discredit the inherent legitimacy of any contrary opinions that unites the populists in power. Observers of democracy have noted this phenomenon repeatedly. In the same report that spoke of the roll back of progress, The Freedom House exclaimed: “Most troublingly, even long-standing democracies have been shaken by populist political forces that reject basic principles like the separation of powers and target minorities for discriminatory treatment.”

But why now? This argument, after all, must be placed in a specific political moment, not left to abstraction or theory. Populism has existed on or below the surface of society and will continue to do so. But what makes it a relevant and dangerous contemporary force is that it taps into and takes advantage of the defining political problems of our age. This is the encroachment of dualistic identity politics. Almost every political question has succumbed to a polarization of opinion. The space for agreement has shrunk, and the terms in which we address those who disagree with us have intensified. This is a parallel development to populism’s resurgence, but the two go hand in hand. The reality of dualistic politics has created fertile soil for populist politics to flourish.

Social media has been the fertilizer to this flourishing. Opinions are shared and multiplied with great frequency; and the algorithms of the platforms through which this marketplace exists puts us in boxes with those who share similar views. Agitated by the need to prove fidelity to the cause, all manner of opinions become intensified. This has made disagreement more contentious and intractable. Truth and empiricism, foundations of past decades, have become fluid concepts. David Greenberg, writing about the Bush administration’s ‘post-truth’ mentality, labeled the development “epistemological relativism;” I think this is a fitting description.

Populism by necessity is an exercise of identity politics; clashing and conflicting identities founded on sets of ideas. To pursue populist change is to devolve democracy into a contest of identities. In the modern age of social media and hyperpolarization, this is a contest from which states could not easily emerge.

This is no fringe development; it spreads widely in a receptive body politic. It should therefore be considered an exacerbation of an already widespread malice. The divisiveness that existed in the United States before Trump, that already had the nation folding in on itself, is focused and sharpened with a populist at the helm. Because of this, no current democracy can rely on populism to correct its worst impulses, because the originating energy for both is one and the same. It is an indication of the dire straits we find ourselves in, that populism is considered by some our saving grace.

Our current models and systems emerged since the end of WWII through careful work, historical patience, and unglamorous effort. Democracy reached its zenith in the last eighty years without a single populist leader or party leading the way. The gains of our day were not secured in any other manner, and the countries most associated with successful democracy today all achieved their status through compact and compromise.

Steven Pinker, whose work embodies the ideas expressed here, reminds us that humanity’s moral development “is a consequence of the interchangeability of perspectives and the opportunity the world provides for positive-sum games” (Pinker, Better Angels of Our Nature, 182).

Unless change for the sake of change – because we cannot bear the alternative any longer – is the only metric, maximalist politics cannot go well. Analyzing Bernie’s brand of Democratic politics, Paul Krugman recently observed that “Obama raised taxes on the wealthy more than most people realize – by 2016 the average federal tax rate on the 1 percent was almost as high as it was pre-Reagan – but he did so quietly, without much populist rhetoric.” And “everything we know suggests that a progressive who insists on going for broke will end up, well, broke” (Krugman, ‘Bernie Sanders is Going for Broke’, NYT Online March 5).

I suspect a reliance on populism for the day’s problems carries within it the seeds of its eventual unraveling. Implicit in a dependence on populism is the notion that government legitimacy is questionable and mistrust universal. Populists leave themselves vulnerable to politicians and counter-movements that utilize similar tactics; once outsiders become insiders, they lose the singular appeal they once had. More importantly, those gripped by one populist wave can just as easily fall back again to the spot they first found themselves. That is because the act of moving as a populist follower is a momentary exertion of angst and an expression of hope; briefly, the world is made plain and possibilities seem endless. But it cannot last. The well-known early worker-activist Eugene Debs iterated this truth when he spoke against messianic, idealistic leaders meant to save the workers of the world. To Debs, change had to be seized by those who most needed it, and it needed to grow from the determination within, not the rhetoric without. He captured this sentiment eloquently: “I would not lead you out if I could; for if you would be led out, you could be led back again” (Ray, The bending cross; a biography of Eugene Victor Debs, 244).

My argument is not that populism plays no role in the historical progress of government and society, nor that certain problems of the day might not be best addressed with populist elements. Instead, I believe that the growing politics of populism are not suited for the present political and historical moment. A reliance on populism will eat away at the foundations of democracy by inviting and legitimizing new categories of disagreements and harmful ideological methods.

Populism can only tear down, it cannot craft. We cannot tailor society’s new coat and build new institutions with expressions of fury, opaque goals, and hierarchies of the virtuous.

The democratic limits of “ant-populism”

By  Thibault BiscahiePhD Candidate at York University

Since the 2008 global financial collapse and the subsequent deep sovereign debt crises and austerity measures experienced in various EU countries, the term “populism” has been widely used to account for the rise of anti-establishment movements across the continent. It has also been widely contested. Indeed, the “populist” epithet tends to amalgamate a myriad of different political tendencies, from the radical-right to the radical-left. This has led some to argue that the term has come to encompass too many political persuasions to remain analytically meaningful. An intense concept-stretching would thus be at play, especially when the term leaves academic circles to be mobilized by pundits, editorialists and (mostly centrist) politicians. In consequence, this essay argues that there is a clear distinction to be made between the academic understanding of populism – which is not consensual but relies on a prolific and diverse literature – and the far more deficient journalistic and political conceptions of populism, that do not designate a meaningful political category but fall rather within the realm of value judgment.

My essay posits that “populism” does not constitute a threat or a corrective to democracy in and of itself. Instead, whether populist forces threaten or renew democracy eventually depends on the specific socio-cultural context in which they emerge and develop. As the first section of this essay demonstrates, populism can be seen as an ideology, as a discourse, or as a strategy, and this has implications for assessing its effects on the political system. Secondly, against widespread anguish regarding the “populist surge”, this essay analyzes the democratic consequences of “anti-populism” as a political discourse, strategy, and ideology in Western European countries, and in particular in France. Referring to one’s adversary as a “populist” is always pejorative and aims to discredit, neutralize and delegitimize any political claim that does not conform to the status quo. In that sense, “anti-populism” has detrimental effects on democracy inasmuch as it socially constructs political deviance through simplistic dichotomies and thus places considerable discursive framing limits on what is politically possible on ideological grounds. Ultimately, the populist zeitgeist leads – under the pressure of both “populist” and “anti-populist” political actors – to a symbolic weakening of traditional political cleavages and to their replacement by unhelpful, superficial binary categories such as “nationalists” versus “progressives”.

Please read the full essay and feel free to comment

Populism and the politics of migration

By Oliver Schmidtke, Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria

Migration figures prominently in the political mobilization of right-wing populism. Anti-immigrant sentiments are at the very core of this actor’s rallying cry and popular campaigns. Yet, how are we to understand the link between populism and migration? Are immigration and growing cultural diversity to blame for populist forces that advocate an exclusionary form of nationalism? For instance, has the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015-16 triggered or even caused the series of extraordinary electoral achievements of the populist right? In my view, this link between populism and migration is more indirect and multidimensional in nature. Here are some ways to conceptualize this link:

Migrants as easy scapegoats: It is one of the essential tools in (electoral) politics to assign blame and, by assigning responsibility for social ills, design politics based on the exclusion of the undesirable group. In politics, this form of scapegoating works so effectively for mobilizing purposes because it allows complex issues – such as unemployment, social inequality, housing, or crime – to be addressed in a highly simplistic fashion. Ascribing blame to a particular group like migrants steers a general, unspecific sense of frustration with politics towards a concrete adversary and frames intricate political issues in a simplistic logic of Us versus Them. Migrants are an easy target for such scapegoating practices also because they have a very limited public and political voice in particular in European societies. And right-wing populists can build on latent xenophobic feelings that are deeply rooted in the historic legacy of the European nation-state and its colonial practices.

Migrants as the threatening Other: Populists need a tangible sense of who is threatening the people and their well-being. Their very political identity is organized around the image of an urgent threat directed at ordinary people. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Twenty-First Century Populism, 2008) define populism as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.” The practice of depicting migrants as the ‘dangerous others’ is instrumental in providing the people with a collective identity (in the case of right-wing populism primarily defined in terms of an ethno-cultural nationalism) and identifying those depriving the ‘virtuous people’ and their community in fundamental ways. With the anti-immigrant rhetoric, the alleged threat to the wellbeing of the own community is given a face, an easily identifiable reference point for directing dissatisfaction and political aspiration.

Migrants as a tool for a mobilizing collective identity: The racialization of the non-national other is a highly productive way of political mobilization drawing on the friend-enemy dichotomy that Carl Schmitt depicted as the very essence of politics. In his book The Concept of the Political (1932: 26, 38), he describes the friend-enemy distinction as speaking to the “utmost degree of intensity … of an association or dissociation.” Right-wing populism exploits this distinction and the emotional, or even existential power it displays. In this regard, populists can challenge the often frustratingly unresponsive and stale routine of liberal democracy with an emotionally charged fight for the security, if not the survival of the own community. Migrants are indispensable for the form of identity politics based on which right-wing populism challenges traditional competitive party politics. The resurgence of exclusionary nationalism and anti-immigrant forces itself has the potential of developing into a veritable threat to the viability of liberal democracies in general and the rights of minorities in particular.

 

Not by accident these three interpretations focus on how populist actors use migration for their political mobilization rather on the challenges posed by migration itself. My underlying hypothesis is that the political and policy issues related to migration (security, long-term integration of newcomers, accommodation of cultural diversity, etc.) cannot explain the rise of right-wing populism. Rather, the politics of migration regularly follows a different logic. Consider the 2015/16 ‘refugee crisis’: The number of irregular border crossings has dropped dramatically and the number of asylum seekers coming to Europe has gone back to pre-crisis levels. Still, the political debate in many European countries is still dominated by anti-immigration rhetoric deliberately staged by right-wing populists to exploit a divisive issue for their political mobilization.

Are the three approaches to conceptualizing the link between migration and populism the most fruitful and relevant ones? What aspects do these three interpretations leave out? Please feel free to add to the conceptual discussion or contribute with some empirical observations.

Catalonia-Spain: Seminar “Self-determination: failures and successes”

By Pablo Ouziel, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria

On December 5th, I attended the seminar Self-determination: failures and successes at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. This international seminar was the closing event of a Research Project lead by Joan Vergés-Gifra (Universitat de Girona), Ivan Serrano (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya), and Peter Kraus (Universität Augsburg). I found the event to be a tremendous contribution towards the dialogical resolution of the political conflict between Catalonia and Spain and the social conflict existing within Catalonia. Only in June, I gave a talk in the Universitat Pompeu Fabra around the 15M movement and the occupations of public squares in Spain in 2011. During that talk, I had the pleasure of meeting some of the speakers that participated in the event I attended last week. From June until today, I have witnessed palpable differences in the way in which these academics speak about Catalonia and the current political crisis. The main differences from my perspective are, a broadening of the imaginary of possibility for resolution of the conflict, and a genuine commitment to listening to the other side while undergoing self-critique. Despite the fact that everyone in last week’s seminar defends the idea of self-determination, there is a clear intent at critical reflection of the steps taken by those defending the Catalan independence process. This is not to say that all of a sudden, pro-independence academics in Catalonia are shifting the blame from the Spanish State to the Catalan pro-independence leaders. Like myself, these academics are very clear about the authoritarian practices of a Spanish State that carries with it fascistic legacies from its dictatorship. Nevertheless, we all acknowledge that not everything on the pro-independence side was exemplary.

The conversation in this seminar on self-determination was initiated by Andreas Oldenburg (Freie Universität Berlin). The title of his talk was “Constitutional Politics of Peoples”. Oldenburg began his contribution citing James Tully and his understanding of “freedom as non-domination”. This was his attempt at walking towards a constitutional politics of the people by giving the constituent people their say through the organization of deliberative mini-publics. In these spaces citizens would decide on things like what kind of referendum should Catalonia have and what kinds of questions should be asked. This Oldenburg reminds us, is what Tully calls the first phase of negotiation. This phase is followed by a second, in which the negotiation with the rest of the state opens up. As Oldenburg interprets Tully, this avoids moves towards unilateral secession without seeking consensual agreement with the State. What Oldenburg means by this is that if the State does not agree once there has been genuine deliberation with the Catalan people, then Catalan’s have a right to civil disobedience. This is the groups right to constituent self-determination following a democratic process in which all claims are negotiated. For Oldenburg, there is a constitutional right to secede because constituent people come before the constitution. Despite this acknowledgment of the right to secede, Oldenburg actually defends federalism as a better option. Although he reserves the final choice to the constituent people.

Kraus was the discussant to Oldenburg’s paper. His main question was: What to do if the federal option does not work? From Kraus’ perspective there is no level of ‘federality’ in Spain to protect a minimum of sovereignty. Therefore, he asks: What are the minimum levels of ‘federality’ required for freedom as non-domination to be actual? He then follows this with the following question: What are the consequences if these levels are not granted? For Kraus, sucession has to be taken very seriously, Catalonia and Spain are part of the EU, so in a sense, Catalonia’s independence is like an internal secession of part of a polity within the EU. With this secession, the constitutional rules and capitalism would stay within the parameters delineated by the EU. Through such secession there could even be the pertinent economic compensations to Spain. Kraus ultimately thinks that despite the fact that we exist in a complex multi-identity world, in a normative sense nationality is the kind of collectivity we need to stabilize republican commitments. For him, as a non-nationalist, nationality aims at institutional completeness. This final point from Kraus, Oldenburg refutes by arguing that there are more genuinely political alternatives to nationalism as a point of unity. Oldenburg defends more cosmopolitanism as an antidote to nationalism. This is what he thinks is required in order to address the global problems that we face.

Following this very stimulating session, we went into a short coffee break prior to resuming our multilogue with a talk by Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra). The title for his contribution was: “Quandaries of legitimacy in the German unification process”. The aim of bringing German unification was to evaluate the ways in which legitimacy could be obtained for the demands of the Catalan Independence movement. Nagel, described the way in which exceptions are always made when there is interest in processes moving forward. For example, he spoke of the fact that before unification West Germany as part of the EU traded with East Germany without having to pay levies for dealing with a foreign power. This, despite the fact that East Germany was not in the EU and all transactions with non-EU countries had a levy attached to them. In addition, with unification East Germany did not become the 13th state to join the EU, but entered through the back door. This is why con-federal arguments during the process were ignored as they would force East Germany to join the EU through the normal application channels. This was agreed upon, because West Germany said that it would pay for unification and not the EU. Adhesion was carried out through article 23 of the West German constitution and unification could be considered legitimate by federal pact. It was federal money which financed it. Nagel, also spoke of legitimacy by consent. According to him, there was explicit and implicit consent before, during, and after unification. This one can observe according to Nagel, through the study of prior election results, the ratification of treaties, the foundational elections of the unified Germany, and post-unification public opinion polls.

Sören Keil (Canterbury Christ Church University) was the discussant for this intervention. For Keil, the main concern was determining who actually was the source of legitimacy during German unification. As he pointed out, in the West it was clear because it was the Länder but in the east identifying this legitimacy is more complicated because of the East German relation with the Soviet Union.

Keil’s second point had to do with sovereignty. As he put it, at the time neither of the German states was actually fully sovereign. Due to the post-War settlement, unification happened in a framework linking German unification with the transference of powers to Brussels. This led Keil to ask to what extent sovereignty was a variable worth looking at when thinking about German unification.

Keil also discussed different forms of legitimacy. The fact that there was no referendum for unification was not a problem in Germany but it would have been a problem in other places. As Keil puts it, there is legitimacy at different points in time, therefore, legitimacy as a theoretical tool is problematic; it risks looking back and re-writing history.

Finally, Keil asked: What can we learn from German unification? For him it was a successful German revolution. As he put it, German’s are not good at revolution, yet if one studies the unification process, it is clear, at least in the East, that protests for democracy quickly became protests for unification. This crystalizes, as Keil pointed out, with the shift in the language of a slogan popular at the time from “We are the people” to “we are a people”.

Both Nagel’s talk and Keil’s critique generated a long debate. Joan Vergés-Gifra (Universitat de Girona), asked which of the lines of legitimacy presented by Nagel was the most important. Oldenburg asked whether legitimacy could best be seen as legitimacy by welfare. In the sense, that in East Germany people just wanted to have all the beautiful products they knew were available in the West. If there had not been this promise of welfare, he argues that the process of unification would have required other steps. Finally, Pau Bossacoma (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) brought the question back to the demands of the Catalan people, by pointing out that the Maastricht treaty was treaty reform and that what the Catalan and Scottish pro-independence voices want is a treaty revision through article 48 of the European Constitution, not changes through article 49.

The next speaker in the event was Jule Goikoetxea (Universidad del País Vasco/EHU). The paper she was intending to present was: “Self-determination processes in the Basque Country: new discourses and strategies”. However, by the time she arrived to the talk she realized she wanted to talk about privatizing democracy in Europe. She mixed political theory with case studies, and her main argument was that there existed a causal connection between neo-liberalism and secession. According to her, the growing privatization of democracy was causing people to want to secede. The demands of movements like 15M, Occupy and the anti-austerity movements in Latin America were being grouped under demands for self-determination. For Goikoetxea, sovereignty demands are going to be re-defined during the 21st century but ultimately this is the democratic demand of governing oneself. In the case of Catalonia and the Basque country, this is a demand against privatization which in Spain is being carried out through centralization. The kind of sovereignty demands she is seeing in Spain are learning with non-patriarchal sovereignties found within the country’s feminist movements. Goikoetxea understands the EU as part of the neoliberal privatization project, she argues that EU integration has led to stronger states. What she means by this is stronger executives with a stronger judicial system to support these executives. Goikoetxea finished her talk by reminding us that in 2006 federalism was the main demand to Spain coming from Catalonia, and as she points out, this has changed to secession because of privatization and centralization.

The Discussant for Goikoetxea’s paper was Ivan Serrano (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya). Serrano praised Goikoetxea’s contribution and spoke of the de-democratization spoken of by Wendy Brown. He also spoke of the gamification of the political process by movements like Tsunami democratic in Catalonia. This is a de-centralized movement that organizes through an app called Telegram and which has conducted a series of actions including blocking Barcelona’s airport through a mass demonstration.

Keil asked regarding self-determination if the goal was to be better off or to be able to do things differently. Vergés-Gifra emphasized that rather than speaking of a causal relationship between independence demands and neoliberal privatization, it would be more accurate to speak of a correlation in certain cases. As he pointed out, all the demands in the new statutes for autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque country have been democratic demands. All related to having more political capacity.

Goikoetxea responded to this discussion by emphasizing that the causal link she was referring to was in regards to what leads to big mobilizations taking place. The main demands are for more democracy and the anger is coming because people are losing power. For Goikoetxea the causal relation is the loss of power, the fact that people are unable to govern themselves.

Following a lunch break the afternoon sessions began with an intervention by Vergés-Gifra: The title was: “An ethnicity bias in Catalan independentism? An analysis of its discourses and legislative actions”. According to Vergés-Gifra, the critique against the pro-independence movement in Catalonia goes something like this: It is top-down, elite led, non-urban, non-cosmopolitan, populist, xenophobic and ‘ethnicist’. He has developed a case against all these lines of criticism, yet, during his talk he focused only on responding to those speaking of the Catalan pro-independence movement as an ‘ethnicist’ political movement. The reason he was interested in speaking about this, is the fact that he considers this a critique that is growing in popularity. He considers it a part of the revisionist turn in studies on the Catalan pro-independence movement. As he points out, before it was presented as an exemplary civic kind of nationalism which was set apart from Basque nationalism which was described as ethnicist by mainstream commentators. This dichotomy, Vergés-Gifra does not find useful, he does not think it holds. As he puts it, in Catalonia there is no ethnicist dimension to the Catalan pro-independence movement. Being Catalan, he says, has nothing to do with being a nationalist, but has to do instead with contributing to the forging and creation of a Catalan nation. Vergés-Gifra argues that if one studies all the institutional and legal moves towards independence in Catalonia since 2010, one actually sees how there has been a tremendous attempt at broadening the scope of people who can be part of the Catalan nation. This he says is clear in laws passed, like the covenant of immigration and reception of 2010 which made Catalonia into a receiving nation. It is also clear in how Catalonia grew from 3,6 million people in 1997 to 7,5 million people in 2010, predominantly through immigration. As Vergés-Gifra argues, the more political the Catalan process has become, the less ethnicized pro-independence parties have become. Having said this, and despite defending the fact that there has been no ethnic conflict so far, Vergés-Gifra does acknowledge that ethnic conflict is possible if something changes.

Following Vergés-Gifra’s talk and a response by Goikoetxea in a feminist key, Keil, asked why Spain was so keen on calling the Catalan independence movement ethnicist when everything Spain has done towards Catalonia is ethnicist. Of course, he is not surprised. He understands that many Spanish intellectuals call those defending independence ethnicist in order to delegitimize them.

Finally, Bossacoma, gave us the last session with a paper titled “Coercion and Accommodation in Spain. The case of Catalonia”. As a lawyer for the Catalan government, Bossacoma spoke of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional court regarding referendums. As he emphasized, referendums are allowed, but the process necessary in order to have a referendum makes it almost impossible to be able to have one. That is, anything that alters the constitution is required to follow of article 168 of the Spanish constitution. With article 167 which is an ordinary procedure it is fairly easy to have a referendum, but when 168 is required, it is very rigid and it actually protects constitutional articles and not ideas. If there were to be a referendum on independence for Catalonia, it would require a 2/3 majority in the Spanish congress and a 2/3 majority in the Spanish senate. Then it would require the dissolution of parliament and once a new parliament is formed another 2/3 majority in congress and a 2/3 majority in the senate. Only then could a referendum be held and it would be one in which all Spanish people would have the right to vote.

Bossacoma acknowledges that in 2017, there was not a genuine attempt at reaching consensus on the referendum. It is also true, he says, that the move in 2015 to call plebiscitary elections in Catalonia was also used by Franco during the Spanish dictatorship. Bossacoma also points out that although during the election of 2015 secessionist obtained the majority of seats they did not obtain the majority of votes. Notwithstanding, what has happened since then, is that with the self-determination act and the beginning of the process of disconnection of Catalonia from Spain a particular legal logic has been followed. Under the philosophy of law applied by those who defended the unilateral declaration of independence, it was the people who decided on independence through the referendum, and the politicians only followed suit by abiding to their mandate to govern for the people. Bossacoma describes the unilateral declaration of independence as staged and liquid. From this lens, the declaration of independence was not a call for an uprising, yet, the Supreme court of Spain says that there was an uprising. It was not rebellion but sedition says the court. These are both uprisings but rebellion requires that the uprising be violent. According to the supreme court what we witnessed in Catalonia was a tumultuous uprising.

Bossacoma finished his talk with a thought on the fact that the Spanish government will defend the sentence against the Catalan independence leaders by arguing that although it seems quite rigid Spain has a lax penitentiary system. This coupled with the fact that prison competencies are in the hands of the Catalan government, means in effect, the Spanish government will argue, that the pro-independence leaders will soon be enjoying very relaxed prison sentences. This Bossacoma emphasizes, is the reason why him and other lawyers are advising the Catalan government to keep the convicted pro-independence leaders in prison a little while longer without privileges. This is a recommendation made, keeping in mind that the Spanish government might use this as a defense when the sentence is judged outside of Spain in the different international courts.

As discussant, Macià Serra (Universitat de Girona) took the conversation back to the idea of a referendum approved through the Spanish government. He pointed out that in the last 200 years just three Catalans have been president of Spain; all of them during the time of the Second Republic. This he said, explained the difficulty of obtaining a referendum on self-determination in Catalonia through the means set out in the Spanish constitution.

Sören, responded to the point made by Bossacoma about the lax penitentiary system, by saying that people who have done nothing wrong should not be in prison. This he followed with these questions in the form of closing remarks: What is next? A permanent state of crisis? More radicalization? More violence?

I think the questions on which Sören closed the seminar, are indicative of what many in Catalonia and in Spain are feeling. Yet, as I stated at the beginning of this text, I think that the fact that people are in dialogue opens up the possibilities for resolution in the long term for a conflict which appears to have no near-term solutions. As many of the participants in this event highlighted, this is a conflict in which people are demanding more democracy. This is a reoccurring demand across the globe. Therefore, despite reluctance by those governing the status quo to address the issue in a meaningful, forward looking and virtuous manner, this demand is re-shaping the way in which we understand democratization processes and practices in the 21st century.

Photo by Toimetaja tõlkebüroo on UnsplashPhoto by Toimetaja tõlkebüroo on Unsplash

Ukraine and the Peace Initiative with Russia

By Derek Fraser, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria

The combination of Ukraine’s inexperienced and naive President, Ukrainian weariness with the unremitting war in the Donbas, pressure from France and Germany,  and American ambiguity, is pushing  Ukraine  to accept peace with Russia on terms that threaten Ukrainian independence.

Analysis

To understand the pass in which Ukraine finds herself we must go back to the events of 2014 when the overthrow of the venal, dictatorial, and pro-Russian  president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, led  Russia, in an attempt to prevent Ukraine from moving West, first to seize Crimea, and then to seek to provoke uprisings in a broad band of  Ukrainian territories from Donets and Luhansk, known as the Donbas, in the South-East, Kharkiv  and the industrial belt of Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the Centre, to Odessa in the South-West. An influential voice on Russian foreign policy, Sergey Karaganov, the Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, and a Kremlin adviser on Russia’s relations with the other former Soviet republics, stated at the time Russia wants “a united, federative Ukraine, if possible. Only this arrangement will maintain the formal integrity of the state, but Ukraine as a full-fledged state will be a distant historical memory.” “This scenario will ensure Russia’s de facto dominance in east and southeast Ukraine and semi-autonomy for the country’s west.”

The failure of the Russians to kindle revolt in any part of Ukraine save the Donbas, did not change Russian plans. The Donbas, to remain controlled by Russia and largely autonomous of Ukraine, was nevertheless to maintain its representation in the Ukrainian parliament, allowing it to influence Ukrainian policy, including any move to Ukrainian membership in Western treaties and organizations.

Ukraine fared badly in the fighting that followed the uprising in the Donbas. The Protocol that emerged from the Minsk I and the Minsk II negotiations in September 2014 and February 2015   between Russia and Ukraine, with the participation of Germany, France, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has had little effect. The   ceasefire the Protocol stipulated has repeatedly been broken, although fighting is at a lower level that it was before Minsk II. The Protocol provided for local elections and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, actions that were to lead to the return of separatist regions to Ukraine’s control. None of these measures have been acted on.

Part of the problem may have been that the Protocol did not indicate in which order the steps should be taken. The German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier filled this gap when he presented, with French support and involvement, in October 2015 a Formula for carrying out these provisions.

Under the Steinmeier Formula, Ukraine would introduce in the constitution a special autonomous status for the Russian-controlled part of the Donbas that would give it representation in the Ukrainian parliament.

In addition, the terms for the municipal-level elections that, under the Minsk Protocol, were to be carried out in accordance with Ukrainian law, were instead to be negotiated with the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,”

Ukraine would bring the special autonomous status for the region into effect temporarily on the date of those elections and then on a permanent basis if the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found that those elections had “on the whole” respected international standards.

The elections were to take place before any withdrawal of any foreign forces. The departure of foreign forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control on the Ukrainian-Russian border on the east of the Donbas  were instead matters to be negotiated separately after the political steps had been taken.

Unlike the Minsk Protocol, the Steinmeier Formula did not have any official status.

The Ukrainian government did try to introduce legislation in 2015 to decentralize its constitution in reponse to the Minsk II Protocol, but gave up in face of a parliamentary and popular revolt.

It has always refused to contemplate holding elections in the rebel areas without the prior withdrawal of armed forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border.

It has also insisted that any elections should be held in accordance with Ukrainian law. The special law for elections in the Donbas would provide for Ukrainian and international election observers, the participation of all willing political parties, freedom of political campaigning, access to Ukrainian media for the residents, the freedom of Ukrainian media to report on the election campaign, and voting rights for the one and a half million refugees who had fled the Donbas.

Since the rejection by Ukraine of the terms of the Steinmeier protocol, there had been, up until the election of Volodymyr Zelensky as President of Ukraine last April, a stalemate in diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Russia; but a stalemate accompanied by repeated violations of numerous ceasefires and the use of prohibited weapons on the battle field, the seizure of Ukrainian naval ships in the sea of Azov last November, and the application of economic sanctions.

The announcement by the newly elected President that he wanted to reach a peace settlement within a year has led to an increase in Russian political and military activity and economic pressure.

The Russians revived the Steinmeier Formula. In October 1, after weeks of negotiation, and under pressure from Germany and France, President Zelensky finally gave in and accepted the Steinmeier Formula as a basis for a settlement. His move was greeted with hostile demonstrations across the country, and a condemnatory letter signed by Ukrainian notables, including former foreign ministers.

At the same time, however, as he accepted the Steinmeier Formula, Zelensky effectively undermined it by issuing a declaration reaffirming the traditional Ukrainian position that there could be no internationally recognized elections in the Donbas without the prior withdrawal of armed forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border.

We doubt whether Zelensky’s declaration will be accepted by the Russians. Putin’s top adviser, Yurii Ushakov on September 13 had demanded a “written codification of the Steinmeier Formula” at the leaders’ summit, as well as finalization of the summit’s concluding document ahead of the event itself, with its implementation guaranteed by an “iron agreement”.

We do not know either whether the Germans, and especially the French, will support any Ukrainian derogation from the Steinmeier Formula. President Macron stated in a speech on 27 August that “pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic mistake.” The EU had to make a new strategic offer to Russia.

Perhaps because of French and German pressure, the Ukrainians had earlier indicated their desire to bring the Americans and British into the negotiations. While the State Department has always supported the Ukrainian position on elections, President Trump has repeatedly called on the Ukrainians to settle their differences with the Russians. Then of course, he held up almost $400 million in military aid.

If the Russians refuse to accept Zelensky’s declaration, it is hard to see what interest the Ukrainians have in maintaining their acceptance of the Steinmeier Formula. As things now stand, the peace process is not likely to lead to the recovery of the Donbas for Ukraine, but instead to leave the Russians in control of a Trojan horse seeking to destroy Ukrainian independence.

In the first place, the Russians apparently consider that the two governments, together with their military organizations, of the  “people’s republics” in the Donbas would remain in place, unaffected by the outcome of the municipal elections. The people’s republics have already indicated that control of the borders was their responsibility and not that of the Ukrainian government.

In addition, we should have no illusions about what the Russians are after:

The Russian online newspaper Vzglyad  stated on Oct 3 that the adoption of the Steinmeier Formula will effectively turn Ukraine into a loose confederation, which Russia may gobble up piece by piece.

The Russian economist and former adviser to President Putin, Andrei Illarionov has stated that Putin sees in the Steinmeier Formula  “a historic chance to implement the program that he’s reiterated since 2014, namely to restore full control over Ukraine”.

“Ukraine will get a ticking time bomb, because the launch of this mechanism will mean the implementation of the first and second Minsk Agreements, as a result of which two quasi-state entities are integrated into the state body of Ukraine. These two entities will make Ukraine’s political system implode from within. They will block any attempts to bring about concrete internal developments, towards which pro-Ukrainian parties and civil society have been working so hard. Of course, they’ll block Ukraine’s movement and aspirations towards Europe, the European Union, NATO and integration into the Western world.”

We can only hope that President Zelensky will have the courage to withstand the considerable pressures that will be brought against him in his search for what appears at this time to be an illusory peace settlement.

(This analysis was presented during the event “Trump, Ukraine, and Putin” on October 9th at the University of Victoria)

“Friendship of Nations monument- brothers” by eldan is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

 

The tragedy of the commons – 15M-inspired responses to issues raised during the IWM Summer School, Austria

Pic by Louis Maniquet

15M-inspired responses to issues raised during the IWM Summer School, Austria

15M-inspired responses to issues/questions raised during the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) Summer School at Burg Feistritz, Austria

By Pablo Ouziel

 Entry number two: ‘The tragedy of the commons’

On one of the days at Feistritz castle, Holy Case, Associate Professor of History at Brown University, gave a talk in which she asked whether determining the relationship between democracy and demography was a thought problem or a real problem.

In her talk, Case presented our civilizations as shipwrecked in the global ecological disaster. Playing with the idea of metaphor she painted a picture of the current environmental crisis in which the more fortunate and capable passengers are able to escape on lifeboats, while others try to climb into the already overwhelmed and defective vehicles. At that point, those in the boats are faced with the dilemma of what to do. If they take the others, everyone sinks, if they do not, they have to live with their decision. Ultimately, some can be saved or everyone can drown.

Case was drawing on ecologist Garrett Hardin´s Lifeboat ethics: The case against helping the poor (1974). She also used William Forster Lloyd’s Two lectures on the Check to population (1833) to ask if we all should have equal right to an equal share of the resources. According to Lloyd “to a plank in the sea, which cannot support all, all have not an equal share.” It is the lucky individuals who appropriate the plank first that have the right to keep it for themselves at the expense of the remainder.

It is in this essay that Lloyd first raises the idea of the problem of the commons, describing the effects of unregulated grazing on common land. According to him, it is only through enclosure that land can be protected from over-usage. Nevertheless, it is only a century later in 1968, that Hardin popularizes the idea of the tragedy of the commons with his essay titled The Tragedy of the Commons.

As Case suggested during her talk, global warming is framed as a tragedy of the commons. Yet, I think it important to suggest that the co-regulated commons operate much like a dance that those bent on enclosing have not been able to understand. In fact, it is the tragedy of privatization, I will argue following James Tully, that is leading to accelerated climate change and environmental destruction.

As Tully has argued in Two ways of realizing justice and democracy: linking Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom (2013), from the space of elite democracy the institutional structure of the contemporary practice of democracy limits realization-focused democracy unjustly in two ways. First, it limits or eliminates alternative democracies. And, second, it limits democracy internally by pre-emptively privatizing a range of social and economic activities. This Tully argues, excludes realization-focused democracies from being brought under the democratic control of those who are engaged in and affected by them, and restricts democracy to public reasoning and representative government. As Tully points out, through privatization and shielding, a range of social and economic activities are left out of the democratization process and this causes three of the tragic global injustices we are currently living through. First, Global South exploitation, inequality and poverty. Second, the rapidly accelerating destruction of the environment. And third, global warming and climate change.

In his article Tully suggests that if we orient ourselves from this different democratic-commons perspective, “the injustices of the ‘institutional structure of the contemporary practice of democracy’ comprise what we can call ‘the tragedy of privatization’, in contrast to the thesis of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ that has served to legitimate the coercive globalization of this institutional structure since Hobbes.” Basically, what I gather from Tully’s work is that it is not the commons that is the main cause of our current environmental disaster but the enclosures that have been imposed on our common land (earth).

I think Tully makes a valuable observation in this work, which speaks to how people in 15M in Spain (that occupied public squares in 2011) see humans and their relationships with each other. Rather than seeing humans as independent, insecure, and unable to organize without violence and domination, those being 15M in Spanish public squares and beyond, defend and enact cooperative and interdependent relationships of contestation and integration. In doing this, 15M presents a tentative and alternative imaginary of social relationships and power configurations which rejects the tragedy of the commons and embraces commoning practices. It is through these kinds of relationships that those being 15M think systems of violent conflict can be transformed and replaced.

In a sense, 15M defends and enacts the kind of nonviolent agonistics which Richard Gregg and Mahatma Gandhi advocated for throughout their lives. Nevertheless, this mode of being of collective presences like 15M has often been misunderstood. Therefore, in order to help better understand them I suggest that it is best to take a critical stance on Hobbes and read Peter Kropotkin as a alter-narrative to the much praised myth of the Leviathan.

In Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902), Kropotkin speaks of mutual aid to describe the kind of power relationship we see today enacted by 15M. He points out that, despite the systematic destruction of mutual aid institutions over the centuries, such institutionality, together with its habits and customs has survived. According to Kropotkin, millions of individuals not only continue to enact mutual aid institutions but are reconstituting them where they have perished. This, he is saying in 1902, but arguing along similar lines in the present, Paul Hawken in Blessed Unrest, How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw it Coming (2007), has suggested that these mutual aid networks constitute the largest informal, symbiotic fellowship of engaged citizens in the world. As Hawken puts it, it makes up a network of human beings “willing to confront despair, power, and incalculable odds in an attempt to restore some semblance of grace, justice, and beauty to this world.”

Following from this and in multilogue with Kropotkin, Hawken, and millions of other participant-thinkers across time, 15M reveals the healthy existence of mutual aid institutionality within Spain. As a reminder, the popular 15M slogan ‘Vamos lentos porque vamos lejos’ (We go ever so slowly because we are going on forever) plays tribute to the autotelic relation between means and ends found in 15M’s joining hands relationships. I think of these joining hands relationships as exemplary responses and antidotes to neoliberalism and right-wing populism. Through them, citizens are challenging modernity’s foundational and violent forms of subjectivity, and building a counter-modernity “within, around, and against” the dominant institutions of their society. In this blog entry, I am not going to describe what these joining hands relationships entail because of space constraints, but if you are interested in reading about them in detail I have a forthcoming book on 15M in which I describe them in detail. The name of the book is Democracy here and Now: The exemplary case of Spain.

What is important for the purpose of this blog is to note that working around the enclosure of the commons, 15M continues to institute commoning practices in places were the commons seemed to have been lost. It is also important to highlight that 15M is just one recent example in Spain. Across the globe we can see examples and exemplars of commons and commoning practices that present a clear alternative view to that which Hardin popularized in his 1968 text. It is in these alternatives that one can perhaps tentatively respond to Case by suggesting that the problem we have when thinking about democracy and demography and how to overcome the climate crisis is not a real problem but a problem of thought. The reason I say this is that when humans have opted to think of these issues from the position of mutual aid, common responsibility and care, the concerns and responses have been different in kind.

Acknowledging the fact that there are many examples of the commons having historically worked and survived despite the enclosing logic of privatization, here are just some minor examples from the Spanish civil war which stem out of my research within 15M. What is interesting about this period is that a society under attack by totalitarian forces responded by sharing-with and mutual care and entered into gift-reciprocity relationships which obtained remarkable results.

On July 18, 1936, a military coup marked the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. During the very early days of the military outbreak, many workers who were actually on strike, soon began to reclaim their production capabilities; seizing corporations and organizing themselves into assembly-run collectives. Even strategic industries such as the oil company CAMPSA were collectivized. A mere week following the military uprising, different self-organizing demoi were running public transportation, the train system, water, and energy sources. In many cases, collectivization was so far reaching it encompassed the whole process of extraction or cultivation, production, distribution, and administration. In metropolitan areas, agrarian land was being collectivized.

In Barcelona, the central fruit and vegetable market in the neighbourhood of the Born was collectivized; distribution from the countryside was also facilitated through collectives. In Montblanc, articles were bought with a new collectivized currency. Some collectives used central storage areas where everyone took what was needed. In others, such as Llombay (Castellón), goods were distributed based on family needs. In most of the collectivized areas, when shortages existed, priority was given to children, the sick, elderly people, and women. In Seros, unmarried people were fed in communal kitchens and were given clean clothes. When they married, the community helped them set up their new family homes. In Graus, the population paid for newly-weds to go on honeymoons. Relationships in collectives were deeply democratic. In Hospitalet de Llobregat, they celebrated general assemblies every three months. In Ademuz, assemblies were celebrated every Saturday and, in Alcolea de Cinca, whenever anyone in the community deemed an assembly necessary.

During this period, a social revolution was taking place within the broader context of a civil war. In this sense, many collectives supported the Republican war effort. Nevertheless, most collectives were predominantly focused on developing their constructive programs towards a new society based on commoning, and constructed through nonviolent, cooperative and democratic principles. George Orwell, in Homage to Catalonia (1938) speaks of the Spanish Militias fighting at the Aragon front. Referring to the experience there as an experiment in classless society, he says the following: “In theory it was perfect equality, and even in practice it was not far from it.” It is interesting that as he brings the book to an end Orwell also points to the fact he had found himself in “the only community of any size in Western Europe were political consciousness and disbelief in capitalism were more normal than their opposite” a state of affairs which could not last because it was only a temporary and local phase in the enormous power-over game being played out over the whole surface of the earth.

With this post, I am not expecting every reader to all of a sudden embrace the idea of the commons, what I do hope, however, is that it will give a glimpse of one alternative to our current hegemonic understandings on how we as humans have interacted with each other over time and how we might interact moving forward as the twin crises of democracy and the environment continue to unfold.

In my next entry, I will write about ‘spontaneity and collective presences,’ this was another reoccurring issue during the multilogue at Burg Feistritz, which my work within 15M has revealed to be in need of serious attention.