Tag: Migration

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Populism and the politics of migration

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By Oliver Schmidtke, Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria

Migration figures prominently in the political mobilization of right-wing populism. Anti-immigrant sentiments are at the very core of this actor’s rallying cry and popular campaigns. Yet, how are we to understand the link between populism and migration? Are immigration and growing cultural diversity to blame for populist forces that advocate an exclusionary form of nationalism? For instance, has the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015-16 triggered or even caused the series of extraordinary electoral achievements of the populist right? In my view, this link between populism and migration is more indirect and multidimensional in nature. Here are some ways to conceptualize this link:

Migrants as easy scapegoats: It is one of the essential tools in (electoral) politics to assign blame and, by assigning responsibility for social ills, design politics based on the exclusion of the undesirable group. In politics, this form of scapegoating works so effectively for mobilizing purposes because it allows complex issues – such as unemployment, social inequality, housing, or crime – to be addressed in a highly simplistic fashion. Ascribing blame to a particular group like migrants steers a general, unspecific sense of frustration with politics towards a concrete adversary and frames intricate political issues in a simplistic logic of Us versus Them. Migrants are an easy target for such scapegoating practices also because they have a very limited public and political voice in particular in European societies. And right-wing populists can build on latent xenophobic feelings that are deeply rooted in the historic legacy of the European nation-state and its colonial practices.

Migrants as the threatening Other: Populists need a tangible sense of who is threatening the people and their well-being. Their very political identity is organized around the image of an urgent threat directed at ordinary people. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Twenty-First Century Populism, 2008) define populism as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.” The practice of depicting migrants as the ‘dangerous others’ is instrumental in providing the people with a collective identity (in the case of right-wing populism primarily defined in terms of an ethno-cultural nationalism) and identifying those depriving the ‘virtuous people’ and their community in fundamental ways. With the anti-immigrant rhetoric, the alleged threat to the wellbeing of the own community is given a face, an easily identifiable reference point for directing dissatisfaction and political aspiration.

Migrants as a tool for a mobilizing collective identity: The racialization of the non-national other is a highly productive way of political mobilization drawing on the friend-enemy dichotomy that Carl Schmitt depicted as the very essence of politics. In his book The Concept of the Political (1932: 26, 38), he describes the friend-enemy distinction as speaking to the “utmost degree of intensity … of an association or dissociation.” Right-wing populism exploits this distinction and the emotional, or even existential power it displays. In this regard, populists can challenge the often frustratingly unresponsive and stale routine of liberal democracy with an emotionally charged fight for the security, if not the survival of the own community. Migrants are indispensable for the form of identity politics based on which right-wing populism challenges traditional competitive party politics. The resurgence of exclusionary nationalism and anti-immigrant forces itself has the potential of developing into a veritable threat to the viability of liberal democracies in general and the rights of minorities in particular.

 

Not by accident these three interpretations focus on how populist actors use migration for their political mobilization rather on the challenges posed by migration itself. My underlying hypothesis is that the political and policy issues related to migration (security, long-term integration of newcomers, accommodation of cultural diversity, etc.) cannot explain the rise of right-wing populism. Rather, the politics of migration regularly follows a different logic. Consider the 2015/16 ‘refugee crisis’: The number of irregular border crossings has dropped dramatically and the number of asylum seekers coming to Europe has gone back to pre-crisis levels. Still, the political debate in many European countries is still dominated by anti-immigration rhetoric deliberately staged by right-wing populists to exploit a divisive issue for their political mobilization.

Are the three approaches to conceptualizing the link between migration and populism the most fruitful and relevant ones? What aspects do these three interpretations leave out? Please feel free to add to the conceptual discussion or contribute with some empirical observations.

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What does ‘Safety’ mean?

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By Franziska Fischer, Phd candidate at the Department of Political Science, the University of Victoria

We have come full circle, from the boy on the beach (Alan Kurdi, drowning on September 2nd, 2015, trying to cross the 4 km between Turkish and European soil by boat), to Óscar Ramírez and his daughter Valeria drowning in the Rio Grande, trying to swim towards a safer future. After September 2nd, when the world looked down on the small body of Alan Kurdi being washed up on a Greek beach, we have pledged to do better. Four years later the pledge we made has nothing to show for it.

Between Alan Kurdi and Óscar and Valeria Ramírez, thousands have died, and millions are caught in limbo between their dangerous past in war-torn regions and their hopeful future in ‘safe’ and ‘stable’ countries such as the US or Europe. People, humans, parents and their children are fleeing unsafe conditions in South America, Africa, and the Middle East. They are “fleeing a hell the US helped create”, as the Guardian put it, drawing on the violence and inequalities that US political and economic actors helped to create, perpetuated and reproduced through ongoing actions. I do not write this text to point fingers, even though one might rightfully do so. I do not write this text to get caught in the intricacies of why we are, where we are. I do not write this text to find blame. I write this text to find hope, to find my sanity and to find the belief in humankind. Because what I see, read and hear tears me apart. I have shared some of the articles underneath this text, there are thousands more.

Two ‘cornerstone events’ of Alan Kurdi and Óscar and Valeria Ramírez, framing a humanitarian crisis that has the world in its tight grip, illuminating just how drastic we have successfully split our world into two. Safe and unsafe, developed and undeveloped, successful and failed, stable and conflict. However, this dichotomous perception of our messy world is beginning to crumble, the lines between safe and unsafe are blurring. Can we with a straight face say, detention camps on the Mexican/US border are safe? Is crossing the Mediterranean Sea safe? Is it safe to rightfully claim asylum in a welfare state, with a stable democracy? What does safe mean? Having a place to sleep, being able to keep yourself and your children clean, being able to eat? Then No, the US is not safe, Europe is not safe, because none of these things are guaranteed when a human in need enters these territories. Organizations, Non-profits, and individual people try to make up for the failure of the governments, of the state officials, which are caught in the bickering of who will take on the ‘burden’ to provide the most basic needs.

I am not claiming to be able to relate but I can only imagine the devastation, fear and absolute horror, as well as the hope for a better future, that will convince a parent to give themselves and their children to the goodwill of human smugglers, to trust a little rubber dingy, or swim across a vicious river, all in hope for better conditions on the other side. But for those who actually make it to ‘safety’ and don’t become tragic figures of our contemporary world order, the journey through hell has only just begun.

I will direct my focus here towards the detention camps at the Mexico/US border, but by no means do I want to belittle the horrors, the terrible conditions and lack of resources in other places of this world. For me, the recent reports from detentions camps in Clint, Texas or El Paso amongst many more, feel personal, they hit home.

I read about people being held in tiny rooms or big storage facilities without windows; for days and for weeks. I witness the governments denying it is happening. I see families ripped apart for the benefit of bureaucratic processes and separated for months. I hear about children being pulled away from their mothers, and my heart breaks. The stories are endless, and I will share several of them under this text, as many others have done a much between job than me to illustrate the tragedies. This is when I get up from my computer and I sneak into the room next to me, just to lay down next to my napping five-month-old daughter, to hear her breathe, to wake her up just to see her happy little toothless smile and her chubby little arms grabbing onto me. Silent tears running down my face, half heartache for these women who are denied giving their love to their children, to make sure they are healthy and happy, clean and fed; literally the only thing a mother wants to do (I speak from experiences). The other half of my tear’s origins in unbelievable gratefulness and humbleness to be able to be with my daughter, to watch her grow, to know her safe and fed. This unbelievable privilege revealed by the horrors of stories of other mothers just one country to the south happening right now. As a German citizen, the resemblance to concentration camps in Germany in the Third Reich is uncanny. People keep asking how Germany could allow this to happen? We are allowing it to happen right now. And it needs to STOP!

I sit in my little office, reading books about Political Theory, Development, Economy, all part of my PhD program at the University of Victoria. And all I can think of is, what is it for? All this knowledge, all this wisdom, wrapped in books sitting neatly on my shelf. This is when I want to get up, grab my daughter and hop in the car to drive down to Texas. To drive a hole in the wall of the detention camps? To protest in front of their gates? To throw diapers above the fence? All of the above? The fear of bringing my own daughter near a place that allows for such terrifying things to happen and the grip of hopelessness has me paralyzed. What can we do?

Internet research readily provides lists of organizations that are on the ground, trying to help. It feels barely enough to send a few dollars through electronic channels, to somehow make the difference between a child living or dying. It feels detached and provokes an odd sensation of guilt! Is this doing my due diligence? Is it so I can sleep at night without having nightmares? Or is it the most effective and efficient thing that I could be doing at this moment in time in my position, being a 28-year-old German PhD student, living in Canada with my little baby girl. I honestly don’t know. Maybe I will find myself in Texas soon, maybe I won’t. But what I do know is that I want to help make this stop.

Please share with me your thoughts. What can we do? What are we doing? Do you know for any particular organization or individual that is on the ground and needs help? Needs funds? If you have now considered this but were thinking of doing something nice for me for my birthday, do something else instead, as I don’t need anything. Donate to the people on the ground. Vote for an administration that will not allow this to happen. Go down to Texas.

And please, someone more courageous than me, drive a hole into these walls.

https://www.newyorker.com/…/the-lasting-trauma-of-mothers-s…

https://www.refinery29.com/…/help-migrant-children-at-borde…

https://www.newsweek.com/migrant-children-share-heartbreaki…

https://www.theguardian.com/…/central-america-migrants-us-f…

 

 

 

 

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Do environmental refugees migrants have a greater right to safety and relocation?

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By Sarah Grunert,  student at the Political Science Department at the University of Victoria

Do environmental refugees or migrants have a greater right to safety and relocation? The positivist would argue that because science can observe natural disasters and climate change that there is realistic necessity for groups to relocate due to accelerated environmental change. Despite persistent protest by some individual countries that climate change is a lie, the fact remains that science is saying otherwise. Science has proven the existence of increased drought prevalence, heightened soil acidity in farming regions, or rising sea levels near to coastal towns. These changes put certain populations of people at risk, especially in developing countries that may not have the resources to combat climate change. These are not social constructs or individual truths, but facts.

Let us not be mistaken: There can be facts proving the necessity for people to relocate due to war or poor quality of life that are collected with positivist methods. While it is grim, you can turn body counts into statistical evidence supporting refugee claims. However, there is always concern that individual states may be covering up that sort of evidence, particularly if there is state-involvement behind the reasons for emigration. Similar to denials of climate change, there can be denials of genocide and civil war.

Environmental migration also falls on a strange and fine line between economic (or voluntary) and forced migration. Arguments can easily be made from each side, both for and against environmental migration. On one hand, if environmental changes create such havoc that there is no realistic way for people to survive, then they could declare they were forced from their lands. But others may claim that environmental degradation made some careers impossible to sustain and therefore left to seek employment elsewhere, which could fall under the title of voluntary. There is also the hypothetical question of what if a population is forced from their nation or territory because other outsiders are taking over the land to survive on their own right? Creating a native of who is eligible for refugee claims may be made even more difficult by the fact that there is no singular person or group to blame. Everyone is in some way, shape or form party to climate change.

So we return to the initial question: If there is greater proof that there is reasoning for these immigrants to exist, should that not mean there is greater international support for and acceptance of them? Is it not a collective responsibility to support environmentally displaced people, when every country around the world could be blamed in some part for climate change? Creating a discourse that accepts the legitimacy of environmental refugees will likely prove easier said than done once, especially when you begin to take factors like resource supply and nationalism into account. Water wars are all hypothetical fun and games now, but blindly ignoring their potential is just ignorant.

 

 

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The impact of the migrant crisis on human trafficking – insights to the work of PAYOKE

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By Jasmine Pathak, EU Study Tour 2019,   student and Director at Large at the University of Victoria Students’ Society

Payoke is a civil society organization (CSO) offering aid to victims of human trafficking and victims of smuggling with aggravating circumstances. During the second week of the European Union (EU) Study Tour 2019 I was able to participate in a presentation on how CSOs operate in the public arena and contribute to political and social development within the context of the EU.  The presenter focused mostly on the methods through which Payoke aids victims of human trafficking.

Firstly, Payoke outlines the Belgian legal system to victims and can support them to launch complaints against their traffickers. Secondly, Payoke helps victims to integrate into Belgian society by including the requirement of social skill development and learning the norms and values of Belgian life. This individual counselling helps them to integrate into the professional world while finding a suitable job. Moreover, Payoke also offers psychological support to help victims heal from any experienced trauma.

A significant point that I had not previously considered before visiting was the impact of the migrant crisis on human trafficking. For example, our speaker outlined how traffickers have capitalized on the migrant crisis by offering fraudulent, and often dangerous, services to transport migrants. In addition, we also discussed the challenges faced by EU leaders in responding to human trafficking cases on a supranational level, as some states wish to help victims upon arrival in Europe, whereas others would rather address the root causes. This point is supported by Gattinara (2017, p. 328) who argues that “EU leaders have been incapable, if not unwilling, to grasp the interconnectedness between the political, economic and ideological crises that the [migrant] community is facing” and that the EU must examine how different crises (such as the financial crisis, Brexit, and climate change) intersect with migration. I found this point interesting to compare with sentiments voiced in a later seminar with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), which stressed that effective migration policy is cross-cutting and multifaceted.

Finally, our speaker from Payoke highlighted the lack of European media attention to human trafficking, which also holds true in Canada. In fact, this visit encouraged me to conduct further research on the human trafficking of refugees in Canada. Overall, I was impressed by the number of services offered by Payoke, as the organization appeared to be operating on limited staff and resources, and I learned more about the role of civil society in the EU.

References

Gattinara, Pietro Castelli (2017).  ‘The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy’.  Contemporary Italian Politics, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 318-331

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Borders, Security, and Migration

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By Malcolm Thompson and Alina Sobolik, University of Victoria

Introduction: the Situation

The recent EUCANET Webinar titled “Borders, Security, and Migration” raised several interesting points of discussion regarding the importance of borders on the European and American continents. Specifically regarding the recent migration crisis that struck Europe in the mid-2010s, it was stated that this crisis highlighted the ‘paradoxical effect’ of the EU’s border security, in that there has been an ‘ever closer degree of cross-border mobility within Europe, but also an increased securitization of the external EU border.’ However, statements made in the webinar also highlighted how the migration crisis has contradicted this effect, causing individual EU member states to increase securitization of their internal borders. This blog post looks to highlight this contradiction, and show the economic and non-economic impacts that it increasing internal border checks in the Schengen zone, the area of internal free movement of people in Europe, has had as a result of the migrant crisis. This blog post will also highlight the existential challenges that the migration crisis has posed to the Schengen system and what this could mean for the future of the union.

The Schengen zone is a fundamental feature of the EU’s single market, allowing for the free movement of people internally between EU member states and 4 non-EU countries. However, the recent migrant crisis has called into question the support of this cross-national freedom to continue. As both The Economist (Oct 25, 2018) and Fisher (2018) explained, the increase of immigrants wishing to come into Europe since the beginning of the decade coupled with the impacts of the Eurozone crisis has caused a significant public opposition to the idea of a free internal movement of people, with individual states undermining the Schengen agreement by instituting internal border controls. As of late 2018, these internal border controls “have become more or less permanent in six European countries” (The Economist, Oct 25, 2018). The presence of border securitization within the Schengen zone has led to friction between the functioning of the EU and the national desires of its members. Importantly, this movement away from a fully operational Schengen zone have created fears of economic and political ramifications that could significantly impact the ability of the EU to further ingrate. As the next sections will show, both a breakdown of the Schengen zone could lead to troubles for the EU both economically and politically.

Economic argument

The nature of the Schengen zone as a core feature of the EU’s single market means that increased inefficiencies in the movement of people around Europe has a direct impact on the functioning of the EU’s economy. As Fisher (2018) stated, complications to Schengen resulting from an increase in internal border securitization would affect several “of the union’s most popular perks – ease of travel for work, vacation or family – and undercut trade and labor transfers, weakening the single market economy.” Bringing back stronger borders between Schengen members would constitute a significant cost, as is established by The Economist (Oct 25, 2018), which echoed findings by the European Parliament, and stated that “reintroducing border controls in the Schengen area could cost up to €20bn in one-off expenses and €2bn in annual operating expenses”. However, the economic impacts of rolling back the freedoms of the Schengen agreement reach deeper into the functioning of the EU’s economy, posing a serious potential impact to the operation of many EU businesses.

Speaking in extremes, Zalan (2016) highlighted predictions by the European Commission, and stated that “losing Schengen altogether could cost as much as an €18 billion drop in the EU’s annual GDP”. This, as Zalan, 2016 noted, would mean that the EU’s GDP could be reduced by 0.13% should Schengen fall apart completely. However, there are still significant effects on the EU’s economy should the Schengen zone experience increased complications but still remain intact. This would be seen both in terms of increased expenses for the 1.7 million workers in the Schengen zone that commute between states daily (euobserver, 2016); should internal borders become increasingly guarded, there would be a “lower[ing] of the economic output of the 27 EU countries by 0.19 percent to 0.47 percent on a yearly basis.” (Zalan, 2016)[1]. This decrease would cost the individual European citizen upwards of €130 a year (Zalan, 2016).

Thus, even if Schengen does maintain intact, complications to its functioning would severely affect both European businesses and citizens.

Non-economic implications:

When people feel under crisis, they turn to a strong identity for protection (Fisher, 2018). The desire to belong to a solid group of insiders is a basic human survival instinct (Fisher, 2018).The architects of the European Project had hoped that they could impose a European identity on their citizens through integration but they did not account for the various crises and how they would challenge this project. The people were not made privy to the blueprints for Europe. The migration crisis showed the member state citizens the reality of what was happening behind the scenes in Europe, the fact that integration doesn’t only mean free movement of goods and people but a limitation on member state sovereignty (Fisher, 2018).

To compensate for this sacrifice of sovereignty and ease the concerns of member states regarding security, FRONTEX was created to bolster the external security of the EU. However, RPPs have managed to establish internal borders as a symbolic representation of the nation-state and therefore, the people (The Economist, 2018). Ensuring the people that the EU will do a sufficient job of keeping them safe and that they do not need internal borders is a difficult task with the presence of RPPs who are able to point to various violent and emotionally powerful incidents and claim that it is because the EU is vulnerable, and the nation state must protect itself.

Because the EU does not have a prominent mouthpiece in domestic politics, it is necessary for member state politicians to defend the government’s decision to participate in integration if the project is to remain alive. However, what we’ve seen as a reaction to the various crises is that Politicians lack the “political will to bolster and support the Schengen system in crisis” (Traynor, 2016). Rather than articulating the wealth of benefits that member states receive as a result of the Schengen system, or highlighting the very real challenges to everyday life that a disintegration of the system would result in, politicians have acted to protect their vote, appealing to nationalist sentiments where it serves their electoral purpose (Traynor, 2016). This is not without consequence.

Perhaps the most dangerous impact of RPPs on Europe is not their direct effects on the migration crisis or the temporary closure of borders, but the residual sentiments of nationalism that have no decreased with the slowing of migration. As shown previously, member states benefit exponentially from the Schengen system, but ‘limit Schengen’ sentiments have continued past the immediate demands for control over the migration crisis (Fisher, 2018). The EU is experiencing a “crisis of trust” amongst the member states that fosters a divide between Northern European and Southern European states (The Economist, 2018). This divide, nationalist sentiments, and a desire for the return of member state sovereignty are all incompatible with the project of integration.

Going forward:

It is difficult to predict what will happen to the Schengen system going forward, given the facts that RPPs have established themselves in the political institutions of the member states and that the ideals they broadcast: sovereignty of member states and nationalism, are not compatible with integration.

Three possible outcomes that we have identified are a complete transfer of control over external borders to the EU, a regression of the system into various smaller free movement zones, or the end of the Schengen system (The Economist, 2018; Fisher, 2018; Traynor, 2016).

It is unlikely that, in this current political climate, member states would be willing to surrender control over the external borders to the EU, as shown in the negative reactions to the European Commission’s proposal to establish an EU border guard with authority over national border guards (Fisher, 2018). As well, strengthening external borders helps only to address the migration crisis (Fisher, 2018). What we’ve seen is that challenges to the Schengen system have evolved beyond a response to the migration crisis and established nationalist sentiments that are far more powerful. Supporters of RPPs would not likely support a measure such as this even if it could guarantee the security of external borders because of the implications to national sovereignty and identity.

The creation of smaller areas of passport-free travel opens possibilities to accommodate the ‘cultural’ argument made by RPPs, and allows ‘culturally similar’ member states to enjoy freedom of movement amongst themselves, while erecting borders along lines of variation. This could be a way in which the EU adapts to the presence of and leadership by nationalist RPPs.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/06/23/europes-passport-free-zone-faces-a-grim-future

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/world/europe/europe-borders-nationalism-identity.html

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/is-the-schengen-dream-of-europe-without-borders-becoming-a-thing-of-the-past

https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/10/25/border-checks-are-undermining-schengen

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-temporary-reintroduction-of-border-control-at-internal-borders

https://euobserver.com/business/133253

[1] Croatia is excluded in this count.

Picture: Quim Gil

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Separation Anxiety

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By Robert Gould

On March 14th while living in Seville I listened to and watched the online EUCanet seminar Borders, Security and Migration.  Thinking about some of the questions and exchanges, including the conceptualisations alluded to, I was considering writing a blog post about the anxiety surrounding a possible new border appearing in north-east Spain.  However, the following headlines in the press on the same day persuaded me to write about a different situation, one arising from irregular migration across the Mediterranean and the EU’s land borders with Africa in the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

First it should be explained that Spain is in an election year.  In 2017 Germany had what was called a Superwahljahr, a super election year, when four of the states elected new parliaments, followed by the Bundestag elections.  In 2019 Spain is now having a GIGANTIC election year: on April 28th there are elections for the Cortes Generales, i.e. the national parliament, and also for Les Corts Valencianes, the parliament of the autonomous community (think ‘province’ in Canadian terms, or Bundesland in Austrian or German terms) of Valencia.  On May 26 there will be elections for every municipality in the country, the parliaments of 12 of the 16 autonomous communities, and the Spanish members of the European Parliament.  The basically two-party system of Partido Popular (PP: conservative and catholic) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE: centre-left) has broken down.  In addition to some regional parties, nationally there are now three new parties: Podemos (far left), Ciudadanos (centre-right but without the Catholic background and in competition with the PP), and the new and far-right Vox (see the earlier blog post on this site and the commentary Vox Expaña, an alternative Identity for Spain[1]).  The party landscape is crowded, the competition is fierce, the situation is  hyper politicised, and although the campaigns have not officially started, of course they have in reality.

In addition, what is also at stake is the control of the Senate, composed partly of elected members and partly of members designated by the parliaments of the autonomous communities.  At this stage in Spanish political life this control is of particular importance because of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution.  This article is modelled exactly on Article 37 of the German Grundgesetz.  With the approval of the Bundesrat, and only the Bundesrat, it gives the federal cabinet the power to suspend the government of a Bundesland if it is failing to fulfil its constitutional obligations.  Similarly, with the approval of the Senate of Spain, and only the Senate, the national cabinet may suspend the powers of the government of an autonomous community and impose its own authority.  It did so following the illegal independence referendum of 1 October 2017 in Catalonia.  The PP and Ciudadanos take a particularly hard line on Catalan separation and are already speaking of using the power again, but they can only do so if they control the Senate.

The headlines in question are the following, first from the centre-left El País, which is also the newspaper of record in Spain (and also has a small online English-language edition); then in the conservative, Catholic and monarchist newspaper ABC, (close to the Partido Popular).

El País: “El PP propone retrasar la expulsión de mujeres inmigrantes que den a su hijo en adopción”:  https://elpais.com/politica/2019/03/13/actualidad/1552506632_424707.html

English edition: “PP proposes delaying deportation of pregnant migrants who opt for adoption”: https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/14/inenglish/1552551266_621264.html

ABC: “El PP propone que las mujeres inmigrantes que den a un hijo en adopción no sean expulsadas mientras dure el proceso”: https://www.abc.es/sociedad/abci-pp-propone-mujeres-inmigrantes-hijo-adopcion-no-sean-expulsadas-mientras-dure-proceso-201903141235_noticia.html

“The PP proposes that women migrants who give up a child for adoption should not be deported during the [adoption] process”.

The headlines emerged in the context of the announcement by Pablo Casado, National President of the PP, of a proposal to create an “Act for the Support of Motherhood” (Ley en Apoyo a la Maternidad), designed, among other things, to “promote a culture of life”, to reduce the rate of abortions, increase the birth-rate, and confront what he and others call “the demographic winter” (Spain has the second-lowest birth-rate in the EU, below even that of Germany).

In other words, the headlines suggested that the migrant woman is not wanted, but her child is.  The child will be brought up Spanish, but the mother will still have to leave, having severed all legal ties to the child.  This system, the press related, already existed in the autonomous community of Madrid.  Presumably the mother who stays in the country until the adoption formalities are completed after the birth of the child will benefit from the pre-natal, childbirth and post-natal care provided by the Spanish health service, rather than taking her chances in transit to where she came from.  This could be a significant inducement to agree to the adoption.  Another inducement would be that even if she could not achieve her dream of living and prospering in the security of Europe, at least her child could.

Elisabeth Vallet spoke of the high level of sexual violence suffered by women making the trek northwards to try to enter the United States via its southern border.  One can reasonably assume that the same thing is happening on the way north to Europe.  Undesired pregnancies accompany the migration of desperation.

In the present hyper politicized atmosphere news of the announcement led to the spread of an interpretation that the PP was promising residence papers to migrant women who gave up their newborns for adoption.  This was hotly denied as “fake news”, as it no doubt was.  Later, the PP clarified that all that was being proposed was that there would be absolute confidentially concerning the personal details of an irregular migrant given in the adoption process, and thus they could not be used against her and lead to her immediate expulsion.

Thus in this one brief episode of headlines and corrections we have a number of the conceptualisations relating to borders, migration and migrants mentioned in the seminar.  (1) The performance of a degree of compassion for women migrants and their (unborn) children (particularly following the massive demonstrations, which no politician can ignore, all over Spain on Friday 8 March in support of female equality), (2) questions of inclusion and exclusion, (3) migrants as pawns in an election campaign in which more than usual is at stake: In the face of the continuing separation movement in Catalonia and the desire to create a new border, it is being asserted on the political right (PP, Ciudadanos, and Vox) that nothing less than (4) the very existence and identity of the Spanish nation are endangered.

Sadly, one is also reminded of an earlier episode of family separations in the course of expulsions to North Africa.  When people of North-African background were expelled from the territory of what is now Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth century, in some circumstances young children were separated from their parents and had to remain behind.  This was because of the view that they could be raised as completely Spanish, thus contributing to the population numbers and in no way endangering national identity.

Seville, 15 March 2019

[1] URL:  https://carleton.ca/ces/wp-content/uploads/Commentary-Vox-An-Alternative-Identity-for-Spain-by-Robert-Gould-February-2019.pdf

Photo credits to CJ 1000